On 5/5/2019 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 3 May 2019, at 01:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



On 5/2/2019 8:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 1 May 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



On 5/1/2019 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand. By definition, the substitution level take into 
account all what is relevant.
But definitions don't call the definidum into existence.??
Indeed. But I did not use a definition to claim any truth (of existence, or 
else). Mechanism assumes that you have a brain, that computer exists 
physically, that doctors exist, etc.

It does not assume that the physical existence is primary, though, and 
eventually, the reasoning shows that the physical existence (which is never 
doubted) is not primary.




By definition God is omnipotent.??
By*some*  definition.


But that doesn't mean there's an omnipotent being.
On the contrary indeed. Nothing is omnipotent. Omnipotence and omniscience are 
two inconsistent notions, even when taken in isolation.

I am not sure what was your point here Brent?

You wrote, "By definition, the substitution level take into account all what is 
relevant."  My point is that Holevo's theorem entails that there is lower bound on 
the incompleteness of the substitution; so it is not at all clear that there is a 
substitution level that takes into account all that is relevant.  Simply saying there is 
a definition of the term doesn't mean it refers.

Yes, so Mechanism might implied that we (as abstract immaterial computational object) are above the Holevo bound. Simply. But now, this is incorrect. Even if we need to go below that bound, like if we have a quantum brain, there is still a possibility that we don’t use the continuous information related to it, so we will still be “reconstituted” in the arithmetical reality, and the reversal physics/psychology-theology still occurs.

Mechanism would be false, if not only we are quantum machine, but some infinite information is relevant, and if that infinite information is not recoverable by the first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. In that case mechanism is false, and materialism is against consistent (but not yet necessarily true, note).

There is nothing in Holevo's theorem that implies the information is infinite.

I agree, but it grows quickly by entanglement diffusion, even toward infinity in an infinite physical universe.



Only that it is unobtainable.  Mechanism might still be true.

Yes, that is why a QC cannot violate Church’s thesis. But the non cloning is still a consequence of mechanism, and the non cloning inferred from observation is a confirmation of Mechanism.


We don't know what detail is needed so that one "feels the same" after replacing part or all ones brain by some Turing machine. It might be be very little.

OK.



  One the other hand it might makes the fact that one has been duplicated obvious even if you still "felt" ("reported"?) you were the same person.  So I'm not clear on why you think your duplication scenario is significant.

To understand that to make any prediction we need to take into account all our “reconsistitutions” in the arithmetical reality. We cannot use on ontological commitment (God or Universe) to select some computation. Or we need to say “yes” to the doctor, and pray that God to intervene to make that selection, but that is no more “mechanism”: it is usual invocation of a god (personal or non personal). That is what the physicists do all the time, when they do a prediction and verify it. With mechanism, the measure “one” (say) has to be derived from the statistics on all first person experience supported by all computations. That works well at the propositional level, thanks to the Gödel-Löb-Solovay G*.

That sounds completely circular attempt to define the individual. All /*our*/ reconstitutions are derived from as /*our*/ statistic from all experiences.

Brent

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