On Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 12:13:39 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 May 2019, at 08:47, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 9:30:04 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 5/21/2019 11:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:51:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/21/2019 2:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> via Hedda Hassel Mørch @heddamorch >>> https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/113048705070737817 >>> >>> >>> A lot to read: >>> >>> >>> *On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of >>> consciousness* >>> Tim Bayne [ https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/timothy-bayne ] >>> https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy007/5047367 >>> >>> *Symposium on Bayne, “On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated >>> information theory of consciousness”* >>> >>> http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/05/20/symposium-on-bayne-on-the-axiomatic-foundations-of-the-integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness.aspx >>> >>> >>> includes >>> Hedda Hassel Mørch (commentary): >>> >>> "[IIT] can also be and is in some ways better interpreted as a form of >>> Russellian monism, the view that conscious or protoconscious properties >>> constitute the intrinsic nature of physical properties (which physics >>> reveals as purely extrinsic and structural), and therefore would not be >>> (purely) physical. This could be understood as compatible with IIT’s claim >>> that consciousness is identical with integrated information, which could be >>> interpreted to say that consciousness is identical with integrated >>> information understood, not as a purely physical property, but as a >>> property that may include a non-physical intrinsic nature." >>> >>> >>> But read https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 >>> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scottaaronson.com%2Fblog%2F%3Fp%3D1799&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFkrIgncRPq5YjsNnBBL1uJbVLygQ> >>> >>> first. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> >> I think Scott (who wrote that in 2014) needs to read this symposium >> article. >> >> He knows something about - and may be considered an expert in - >> computational complexity (classical and quantum), but he doesn't know much >> more than anyone else outside his specialty, especially - he doesn't know >> much about the subject of consciousness. >> >> >> Neither does Tononi. And Scott knows how to calculate integrated >> information. >> >> Brent >> > > > "integrated information" (in the context of consciousness science) is not > a well-defined term. That was part of what the underlying paper (on > "axioms") and commentary critical of IIT was all about. > > So why doesn't Scott write an update post from the one he wrote 5 years > ago? Because he is not in the field of conscious science - his field is > computational complexity, which is pretty useless in contributing anything > to the subject. > > > I could agree with you, in the sense that computational complexity can > address some aspect of consciousness, but could be use to hide the > conceptual issue. > > As they use mechanism, they should better “just" listen to the machine, > and what she says about herself. > “Just” is in quote because today that requires the study of Gödel 1931, > Turing 1936, Church 1936, Löb 1955, … Solovay 1975 (G and G*). > > I don’t remember if you agree with the following quasi-definition of > consciousness, which is that “I am conscious”, from the first person point > of view of a machine is something verifying the following conditions; > > It is immediately known > It is indubitable > It is non provable > It is non definable > > The machine has soul, it lives at the intersection of the believable and > truth, it is like a inner God, nobody can define it, although everybody can > use the indexical “I” to get a local ostensive temporary “not-a-name” but > 3p image in the mind of the others.The machine knows that this soul is not > just non definable, but she can refute explicitly all effective theories > made about her and what she could be. > > The Gödel-Löbian machine can destroy effectively all reductionist > conception you could have about her. > > And that does not need a lot of complexity. Just Robinson Arithmetic (RA, > a sub theory of all branches in “exact sciences” if not implicit in most > human sciences as well) + the induction axioms (the axioms responsible for > the rich cognitive ability. (RA emulates all machines, and I interview the > richer Löbian machine that RA emulates. I mean, the induction axioms are > not in the ontological part). Arithmetic emulates/enacted relative numbers > believing in sets and infinities. > > Bruno > > > The Experientialists are in the right ballpark in this regard: The "richest" Löbian machine will still be missing the real semantics and entities of experiences.
One needs a Löbian-Husserlian machine. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2ddda621-b891-4cc0-8333-ce602240ddd8%40googlegroups.com.
