> On 11 Jun 2019, at 08:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, June 11, 2019 at 12:42:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 9 Jun 2019, at 22:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, June 9, 2019 at 10:11:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 7 Jun 2019, at 20:22, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 11:54:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 6 Jun 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> [... stuff on libertarianism] >>>> >>>> I'm reminded of Bruno's theory that everything is computation… >>> >>> Just to be exact. My working hypothesis is “Indexical Digital Mechanism”. >>> It is “YD + CT” to sum it all. >>> >>> My contribution is a theorem: which says that if we assume Mechanism, it is >>> undecidable if there is more than the additive and multiplicative structure >>> of the natural numbers, or Turing equivalent. >>> >>> But most things are not computation. The mixing of the codes of the total >>> computable functions and the strictly partial one IS NOT computable, yet >>> “arithmetically real” and this will have a role in the “first person >>> indeterminacy” measure problem. >>> >>> If Mechanism is true, very few things are computable, or even deducible in >>> powerful theory. Both consciousness and matter are typically not >>> computable, yet absolutely real, for all Lôbian machines, from their >>> phenomenological perspective. >>> >>> Every is numbers, or computations, which means we can limit the >>> arithmetical reality to the sigma_1 sentences eventually, but that means >>> only that the fundamental ontology is very simple. The interesting things, >>> including god, consciousness and matter all get their meaning and laws from >>> the phenomenological perspective. >>> >>> So, to say that with mechanism, that 'everything is computation’ is a bit >>> misleading, as the phenomenologically apprehensible things will all be non >>> computable, and yet are *real*, as we all know. >>> >>> For consciousness you need only to agree that it is >>> >>> True, >>> Knowable, >>> Indubitable, >>> (Immediate), >>> >>> And >>> >>> Non-definable, >>> Non Rationally believable >>> >>> Together with the invariance for some digital transformation at some >>> description level. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and so everything must be explainable in terms of computation. >>> >>> In terms of addition and multiplication, you can understand where >>> consciousness come from, why it differentiates, and the transfinite paths >>> it get involved into, and why Reality is beyond the computable, yet >>> partially computable, partially and locally manageable, partially >>> observable, partially and locally inductively inferable. Etc. >>> >>> Even just the arithmetical reality is far beyond the computable, but from >>> inside, the sigma_1 (ultra-mini-tniy part of that reality) is already >>> bigger than we could hope to formalise in ZF or ZF + Large cardinal. >>> >>> Digital mechanism, well understood (meaning with understand the quasi >>> direct link between the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness, (which I >>> have explained many times, but I can do it again), is constructively >>> antireductionist theory. The Löb-Gödelian machines, those who obeys to the >>> probability/consistency laws of Solovays (cf G and G*) can defeat any >>> complete theory anyone could conceive about them. >>> >>> Only numbers at the ontological level, OK, but the crazily interesting >>> things appears at the phenomenological levels, where things are no more >>> very computable at all. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Today is the last day of UCNC 2019. >>> >>> Program: http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html >>> <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html> >>> >>> What the conference is about can be summed up as >>> >>> What is computing >>> if the CT thesis [ >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis> ] is false? >> >> >> If CT is false, it means that we miss some human computable operation on the >> natural numbers that a Turing machine, or a combinator, (…) cannot imitate. >> >> In that case, two things are possible: >> >> 1) that the new operation is still a mathematical operation, like an oracle >> à-la Turing, in which case we might still have a purely mathematical theory >> of computations, we might get a new notion of universal machine, stronger in >> abilities than any Turing machine, and we would keep the “measure problem” >> formulation of the mind-body (1p/3p, 1pp/3p) problem, but enlarged on more >> rich part of arithmetic/mathematics. Instead of sigma_1 completeness, we >> would be pi_1 complete, or perhaps complete on the analytical hierarchy, or >> perhaps not (many things remains possible, some in relation with “older” >> notion of computability, some totally new. There are no evidences for such >> human ability. >> >> 2) much more speculative would be that the new operation is not amenable to >> mathematics at all. It would be like a way to compute a function from N to >> N, needing consciousness for example. A zombie would be unable to imitate >> the computation. That is highly speculative, and bad scientific play: as it >> assumes the complicated in absence of evidences. Note that the first person >> experience is of that kind, by the indeterminacy on its histories, but that >> does not lead to computable function (the first person indeterminacy on the >> histories below the substitution level is not computable, albeit it could >> obeys precise statistical laws). >> >> The evidence for CT is strong, and, Imo, it should be provable that CT is >> equivalent with the belief that second order arithmetic make sense, or just >> that the notion of standard natural numbers is well understood, or that the >> notion of “finite” is well understood. >> >> The main evidences for CT are that all attempts to define the computable >> functions from N to N leads to the same class of total and partial >> computable functions (from N to N), and then the “Miracle of Gödel”, that >> is, the fact that the set of partial computable functions is closed for >> Cantor “transcendental” diagonalisation technique, which brings down the >> willing of universality on most epistemic-like predicate, like provability, >> definability, etc. >> >> Such closure property remains correct for the relativized theory, with >> oracles, and the “machine’s theology” is valid for large class of >> relativised notion of computability.It is what makes possible to apply the >> general theory to the machines embedded in their “cones” of computations >> (there infinitely many “past” and “futures” steps in the universal >> dovetailing on all computations. >> >> The finite and the infinite have deep relations, related to the relation >> between the computable and the non computable. Universal machines exploit >> their creativity on the frontiers between the computable and the non >> computable. The flux of consciousness is not solely related to the >> computations, but to where the person survives, all the modes of the self >> structured the space of accessible and relatively stable histories.. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> PS I have given more than three mathematical definition of computation and >> computable, the last one was by using the combinators. I might give another >> one soon and explains a relation between combinators, arithmetic, and >> computer science. >> >> >> >> Close to 2) above is what is called "intrinsic computing": >> >> A layered architecture based on intrinsic computing of physical systems >> avoids objections to a computationalism in the form of symbol manipulation. >> >> >> >> The Architecture of Mind as a Network of Networks of Natural Computational >> Processes >> <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/48ed/85597914902cd5a7270f56fbfff9ff83e60a.pdf> >> Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic >> <https://www.chalmers.se/en/staff/Pages/gordana-dodig-crnkovic.aspx> >> > > I know her, and appreciate her work, but it is not even close to violate CT, > Imo. > > >> >> It wouldn't be fair to say it's (completely) non-mathematical. It's a >> different mathematics perhaps that is more morphological and topological in >> nature. The key is that intrinsic computing is not reducible to Turing >> computing (but it has nothing to do with oracles in the hyperarithmetical >> sense). It is phenomenological computing (the hole in science left by >> Galileo - Galileo's Error: >> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff). >> >> Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (above) and Robert Prentner* are two intrinsic >> computing people. >> >> * Consciousness and Topologically Structured Phenomenal Spaces >> Robert Prentner >> https://psyarxiv.com/at53n/ <https://psyarxiv.com/at53n/> > This makes sense for many applications, but using this in metaphysics would > beg the question of mechanism. The phenomenal space brought by the first > person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t & p) have topological semantics justifying > some statements in such papers. They are right phenomenologically, but like > often, people have a tendencies to wish the phenomenology being directly > instantiated in *some* primitive matter, but that is like vitalism when you > grasp that arithmetic imposes non computational phenomenologies. > > Bruno > > > > > > it is not even close to violate CT, Imo > > It is argued that, on the lower levels of information processing in the > brain,finite automata or Turing machines may still be adequate models, while, > on the higher levels of whole-brain information processing, natural computing > models are necessary. > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/48ed/85597914902cd5a7270f56fbfff9ff83e60a.pdf > > <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/48ed/85597914902cd5a7270f56fbfff9ff83e60a.pdf> > > > Now that "Turing machines may still be adequate models" at lower-level > processing, but "natural computing models" are necessary" for higher-level > processing seems to violate CT to me. > > Unless you are saying that there's a class of non-Turing-machine (non-TM) > models that are included in CT. > > > arithmetic imposes non computational phenomenologies > > That may be (at least approximately) true (where "non-computational" I take > means "non-TM-computational", and "imposes"I takes means "denotes". > > So is arithmetic non-CT? Doesn't that mean that arithmetic violates CT?
If you don’t violate thesis at one level, you don’t violate thesis at any level. The soul violate mechanism from its perspective, but mechanism is just the statement that you are a machine at some level. Mechanism explain the non computational attribute of the machine. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/140c2342-e90c-4737-a354-7ad70c9fb44d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/140c2342-e90c-4737-a354-7ad70c9fb44d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/27B37124-7F9B-4DCD-AE4C-9FA79C73F6B3%40ulb.ac.be.
