> On 1 Jul 2019, at 20:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/1/2019 7:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 1 Jul 2019, at 07:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/30/2019 11:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> On 28 Jun 2019, at 22:31, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/28/2019 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> Quentin is right on this, we cannot sample a random “observer moment” >>>>>> (cf ASSA, Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption) without taking the >>>>>> structure of that set into account. With Mechanism, we can use only a >>>>>> Relative SSA, both intuitively and formally, by incompleteness which >>>>>> distinguish between provable(p) and “provable(p) & consistent”. >>>>> The structure Quentin cited is ordering. >>>> Good insight, but very natural for being supported by computations, which >>>> can be typically seen as growing trees. It is the state of knowledge of >>>> some subject, and this fit well with its S4Grz logic, which provides an >>>> Intuionist logic for the subject, often having semantics in term of order, >>>> or partial order. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> But how does that force RSSA in my example of taking a journey, which is >>>>> also ordered? >>>> It is the whole bayesian idea which does not make sense. I state of >>>> consciousness cannot be sampled on all states, the probabilities are >>>> related to histories/computations, with a relative measure conditioned by >>>> some mental state (of a Löbian machine in arithmetic to do the math). >>>> >>>> Nothing is obvious here. That is why I “interview” the (Löbian) universal >>>> machine, like PA and ZF. Both agrees, the traditional nuance brought by >>>> the neoplatonic on truth are differentiated due to incompleteness, and the >>>> probabilities are on the sigma_1 true propositions structured by the >>>> provability logics and the intensional variants given by those definitions. >>>> >>>> Also, how do you know that we are we not already very old? Perhaps even >>>> more so if the Big-bang admits a long preceding history, like branes >>>> wandering before colliding … (not that I believe in Brane or string except >>>> in arithmetic and Number theory). But that is irrelevant, because the >>>> self-sample is not on all the moments, but more on the consistent >>>> histories, structure by the laws of computer science/arithmetic, … >>> So what? If QI is true then there are infinitely long consistent histories. >> Not necessarily. We can be immortal by being incarnated on some circular >> time, like in Gödel’s universe, or like in any circular computations >> existing in arithmetic. > > But my memory only goes back so far. So unless it's future infinite, it's > finite.
I don’t understand. All machine have a finite memory, and it determines its possible subjective past and some range of possible futures. > >> >> Like “infinite”, “immortal” is not a simple notion, and it can be many >> different things. I am not sure that the concept of infinite(personal) >> history can make sense. > > A "person" is not a simple notion either. That’s part of the problem encountered by physicalist (or physicists working on the foundation of physics, the measurement problem …). They never define what is an observer (except Everett of defined it by an automata with memory, and that is close to the mechanist definition where a person is a universal number with some inductive beliefs, enough to obey to the “theology” G*. > >> >> With mechanism there are many notion of immortality. > > But you rely on a notion of temporal continuity to define FPI. Nope. I use only the elementary fact that computations proceed by steps. In the intuitive UDA, I use the physical decor, but I do not assume it is continuous, or discrete, nor if it is real or coming from something else. There eventually we realise that it has to come from arithmetic or Turing equivalent. The theory of everything is derived from Mechanism, but once it is there, you can even abandon the mechanist hypothesis, and just test the theory of everything (which here is very simple as any specification of a Turing universal machine, or sigma_1 complete set of numbers, … will do its job. Everything I say is a theorem either in elementary arithmetic (RA) or in some sound effective extension (PA, ZF, …). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7f3cc413-9184-d1df-9d5c-d4294e5e2393%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/53ADF418-E37F-4C41-BF0A-E7BBD76DAEC8%40ulb.ac.be.
