> On 1 Jul 2019, at 22:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/1/2019 12:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 20:01, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> a écrit : >> >> >> On 7/1/2019 5:16 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 13:35, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 5:32 PM Quentin Anciaux <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 09:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 5:11 PM Quentin Anciaux <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 07:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> On 6/30/2019 11:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >> On 28 Jun 2019, at 22:31, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> >> <[email protected] >>> >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> On 6/28/2019 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Quentin is right on this, we cannot sample a random “observer moment” >>> >>> (cf ASSA, Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption) without taking the >>> >>> structure of that set into account. With Mechanism, we can use only a >>> >>> Relative SSA, both intuitively and formally, by incompleteness which >>> >>> distinguish between provable(p) and “provable(p) & consistent”. >>> >> The structure Quentin cited is ordering. >>> > Good insight, but very natural for being supported by computations, which >>> > can be typically seen as growing trees. It is the state of knowledge of >>> > some subject, and this fit well with its S4Grz logic, which provides an >>> > Intuionist logic for the subject, often having semantics in term of >>> > order, or partial order. >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> >> But how does that force RSSA in my example of taking a journey, which is >>> >> also ordered? >>> > It is the whole bayesian idea which does not make sense. I state of >>> > consciousness cannot be sampled on all states, the probabilities are >>> > related to histories/computations, with a relative measure conditioned by >>> > some mental state (of a Löbian machine in arithmetic to do the math). >>> > >>> > Nothing is obvious here. That is why I “interview” the (Löbian) universal >>> > machine, like PA and ZF. Both agrees, the traditional nuance brought by >>> > the neoplatonic on truth are differentiated due to incompleteness, and >>> > the probabilities are on the sigma_1 true propositions structured by the >>> > provability logics and the intensional variants given by those >>> > definitions. >>> > >>> > Also, how do you know that we are we not already very old? Perhaps even >>> > more so if the Big-bang admits a long preceding history, like branes >>> > wandering before colliding … (not that I believe in Brane or string >>> > except in arithmetic and Number theory). But that is irrelevant, because >>> > the self-sample is not on all the moments, but more on the consistent >>> > histories, structure by the laws of computer science/arithmetic, … >>> >>> So what? If QI is true then there are infinitely long consistent >>> histories. Are you saying that the measure is just the number of >>> consistent histories, independent of their length?...a measure likely to >>> be dominated by fetuses. >>> >>> The problem with your argument is it rely on the "fact" that we should only >>> *ever* really live one moment and to expect to be in that moment (either >>> old or fetuses or whatever doesn't matter)... But life is not a single >>> moment, it is a succession of ordered moments... so your argument is >>> absurd. You don't come into existence into a random "moment". >>> >>> But you spend more 'time' living between the ages of 40 and 90 than you do >>> between the ages of 1 and 20! >>> >>> And so what ? you have to have been 20 to be then between 40 and 90... your >>> moments are successive *and not picked up at random*. >>> >>> That does not address the point that I made -- there are more moments >>> between 40 and 90 than between 1 and 20, so you spend more time in your >>> mature years. Pick a time at random, you are likely to be mature. Your >>> points about ordering and succession are completely irrelevant to the main >>> point being made. >>> >>> Again *we don't pick our life moment at random*... I'm living *every day, >>> every second* of my life, there is no wonder to live your life, if your >>> theory is that every human should be between 40 and 90, because they have >>> more moments between 40 and 90 than between 1 and >>> 20, it's absurd... and false. >> >> Actually it's true that there are more humans between 40 and 90 than between >> 1 and 20. But that's what you would call ASSA. The >> original point was about one's personal experience and why is it not, with >> high probability, about being very, very old compared to those around you? >> >> >> Because the premise of the question implies there is an absolute probability >> associated to every moment or range of moments, that premise is non >> sensical. Life is a succession of ordered moment, like a program is a >> succession of ordered steps, it's not meaningful to ask the absolute >> probability of step n of program x. To be at step N you had to do every >> previous step. > > You can't seem to draw any conclusions from your theory, except that other > theories are wrong. So I guess I'll have to try to guess what you think your > theory implies. For example, it implies that the whatever the probability of > finding yourself at age X, the probability of finding yourself at age X-1 is > greater. Right?
The probability of having the memory of being at stage X-1 is indeed very great (even equal to one in most case) at stage X. The Washington guy has a probability close to zero to find itself in Helsinki, but has probability one to remember that he was in Helsinki. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e4159df0-567d-cf85-d775-2ab675914afc%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e4159df0-567d-cf85-d775-2ab675914afc%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/76D027CE-FB16-41D0-B09D-A924E4FA39EF%40ulb.ac.be.
