Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 09:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> a
écrit :

> On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 5:11 PM Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Le lun. 1 juil. 2019 à 07:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> [email protected]> a écrit :
>>
>>> On 6/30/2019 11:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >> On 28 Jun 2019, at 22:31, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> On 6/28/2019 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >>> Quentin is right on this, we cannot sample a random “observer
>>> moment” (cf ASSA, Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption) without taking the
>>> structure of that set into account. With Mechanism, we can use only a
>>> Relative SSA, both intuitively and formally, by incompleteness which
>>> distinguish between provable(p) and “provable(p) & consistent”.
>>> >> The structure Quentin cited is ordering.
>>> > Good insight, but very natural for being supported by computations,
>>> which can be typically seen as growing trees. It is the state of knowledge
>>> of some subject, and this fit well with its S4Grz logic, which provides an
>>> Intuionist logic for the subject, often having semantics in term of order,
>>> or partial order.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> But how does that force RSSA in my example of taking a journey, which
>>> is also ordered?
>>> > It is the whole bayesian idea which does not make sense. I state of
>>> consciousness cannot be sampled on all states, the probabilities are
>>> related to histories/computations, with a relative measure conditioned by
>>> some mental state (of a Löbian machine in arithmetic to do the math).
>>> >
>>> > Nothing is obvious here. That is why I “interview” the (Löbian)
>>> universal machine, like PA and ZF.  Both agrees, the traditional nuance
>>> brought by the neoplatonic on truth are differentiated due to
>>> incompleteness, and the probabilities are on the sigma_1 true propositions
>>> structured by the provability logics and the intensional variants given by
>>> those definitions.
>>> >
>>> > Also, how do you know that we are we not already very old? Perhaps
>>> even more so if the Big-bang admits a long preceding history, like branes
>>> wandering before colliding … (not that I believe in Brane or string except
>>> in arithmetic and Number theory). But that is irrelevant, because the
>>> self-sample is not on all the moments, but more on the consistent
>>> histories, structure by the laws of computer science/arithmetic, …
>>>
>>> So what?  If QI is true then there are infinitely long consistent
>>> histories.  Are you saying that the measure is just the number of
>>> consistent histories, independent of their length?...a measure likely to
>>> be dominated by fetuses.
>>>
>>
>> The problem with your argument is it rely on the "fact" that we should
>> only *ever* really live one moment and to expect to be in that moment
>> (either old or fetuses or whatever doesn't matter)... But life is not a
>> single moment, it is a succession of ordered moments... so your argument is
>> absurd. You don't come into existence into a random "moment".
>>
>
> But you spend more 'time' living between the ages of 40 and 90 than you do
> between the ages of 1 and 20!
>

And so what ? you have to have been 20 to be then between 40 and 90... your
moments are successive *and not picked up at random*.


> Ordering is irrelevant to the number of moments....and the measure of your
> existence.
>
> Bruce
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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