> On 14 Aug 2019, at 16:22, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 6:37 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > I don’t *assume* the physical. By this I don’t mean that the physical does > > not exist. > > Then I don't know what you mean.
I mean that I believe in the physical reality, but I do not necessarily believe that the physical reality is the fundamental reality. Like I tend to believe that the human biological reality emerges from the physical reality, I am aware that if we assume Mechanism, the physical reality has to emerges from arithmetic, or more precisely from some intensional variant of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay (known as GLS, or G*). > > > Eventually I show that it is derivable from the laws of the observable for > > the universal machine. > > Physical objects are observable, pure numbers are not and neither is a > universal machine unless its made of physical objects. We might argue differently. Look at experimental physicists. They measure numbers only, and they infer relation between numbers. That those number corresponds to some reality is possible, but not obvious, and certainly more so with quantum mechanics, which behaves already much more like Mechanism suggest, as a measure theory on locally accessible histories/computations (with a notion of first person plural view). This explains the physical observable without the need to commit oneself ontologically in a primitively physical reality. The laws of physics have a reason, in the mechanist setting. > > >> You speak of several areas where induction is used but apparently there > >> are so many "very different" things about the two types of induction that > >> you are unable to specify a single one. I would really like to know which > >> one does not involve the core concept that things usually continue. > > > Mathematical induction is only a set of induction rules or axioms, used in > > theoretical deduction. > > The fundamental axiom of any form of induction is the same, things usually > continue. For animals induction is even more important than deduction even > though if you follow it for long enough eventually it will always fail. It > won't work forever but it will give you a very good winning streak. Yes, inference inductive is done all the time, and mathematical induction has some relation with this, but is different, and used in deduction, where inductive inference is never valid as a deduction. I just point on the fact that induction and inductive inference are different notions (even if related philosophically). > > > It is used in applied mathematics, and it is studied in theoretical > > learning theory. I mentioned often the paper by Case and Smith, for a very > > good introduction to learning (and extrapolating, …) theory. > > Animals have been using induction to their advantage for at least 500 million > years and they didn't need a paper by Case and Smith to do it. Atoms have been around since a longer time, and they didn’t need Bohr, Heisenberg, de Broglie’s papers to do what they do. Your argument are weird. > > >> An infinity? There may or may not be an infinity of John Clarks in the > >> Multiverse but there is not even one John Clark in arithmetic; > > > When you say “yes” to the *digitalist* doctor, > > And I have in effect said yes to the digitalist* doctor. > > > you bet that you will survive > > It's the very best sort of bet. If I win I receive a infinitely large > jackpot. If I don't win then I've lost nothing except $80,000 and I can > afford that. That is a bit like 0 and 1, in a context where there are many more possibilities in between the jackpot and some putative inexistence. You have no idea who will be the doctor who would reconstitute you, nor his intent, and life might be not so rosy, if not hellish when you see what humans can do to their fellow. > > > through the fact that some reconstitution of yourself will keep intact the > > digital (and thus arithmetical) relations at some relevant level. > > I'm betting that certain atoms don't have my name scratched on them and atoms > are generic. I'm betting that the key aspect of what makes me be me is not > the particular atoms that make up my body right now but the related > orientation the atoms have with each each other, and that is information can > be stored digitally. I'm betting that is the road to immortality if such a > road exists. With mechanism, we are already immortal. Our digital information is store in the many number relations, and execute in all possible relative computational histories, and there is an infinity of such histories realised in all the models of arithmetic. Technological immortality is complaisance in the Samsara and procrastination of the Nirvana. > > >> If you're reading this then right now the proof they exist is LITERALLY > >> right in front of your face because your computer is a material Turing > >> Machine. > > > Yes, but a material machine is not necessarily a primitively material > > machine. > > Given that consciousness is the only thing you're interested in I don't > understand why you keep talking about what is or is not "primitive”. “Primitive” refer to what I have to assume. To define what is a digital machine, I have to assume the natural numbers and at least addition and multiplication. That can be proved to be non derivable by anything less. But then that is already a lot. Indeed once we have the natural numbers and those two laws, we get all “digital machine” and all their computation, on all inputs (including all streaming). I cannot select one computation as more real than other, and physics is reduced to an internal “many-histories” interpretation of arithmetic, on which the universal machine converges by introspection (handled by Kleene or Gödel’s technics). > Complex things are by definition NOT primitive We agree on this important point. That is a reason why I do not assume, neither matter, nor consciousness, in the formal mechanist TOE (which is basically only Kxy = x, + Sxyz = xz(yz) with some identity rules). > but they can do things that primitive things can not, things that are > more...well.. complex; intelligent behavior for example. OK. > And if you believe that Darwin was right about Natural Selection than you'd > have to conclude you couldn't be smart without being conscious, although you > couldn't rule out the reverse. As I have explained, consciousness is just the obvious indubitable truth that no universal machine can avoid, and that the Löbian machine can describe but not truly defined, except using computationalism and some notion of truth. (A Löbian machine is a universal machine capable of proving its own Turing universality. You like examples, and the examples are numerous: all effective consistent extensions of Peano arithmetic PA, or of Zermelo-Fraenkel theory ZF, etc.). > > > Given that all computations are realised in the arithmetical reality [,,,] > > No computations are realised in arithmetic. That is wrong. I guess you mean again “No primitively physical computations are realised in arithmetic” which is true. > Not one. Computations are performed by Physical Turing Machines and only by > Physical Turing Machines. Only Physical computations, and this is explained in arithmetic, and by PA, ZF, etc. > > >>The John Clark in arithmetic does not exist because John Clark can change > >>but arithmetic can’t. > > > The John Clark in arithmetic does change relatively to the universal number > > running them. > > Then the John Clark in Physics is totally uninterested in the John Clark in > arithmetic because the John Clark in arithmetic can not change and thus can > not behave intelligently or be conscious or *do" anything at all. The John Clark in arithmetic change relatively to the universal numbers running them. Take the number corresponding to a simulation of our cluster of galaxies at the level of strings with 10^(10^10000) decimals. There was already an infinity of John Clark there, and they move, and sent mails, etc. Now, you can know, by reasoning, that they might not have a big measure, compared to the simulations of the Big Bang, and compared to all universal dovetailing in arithmetic. But that requires work, etc. > In other words it does not make the slightest difference to me or to anything > in my world if the "John Clark in arithmetic" exists or not. Except that with computationalism, all physical objects are reduced into map of your accessible computations in arithmetic. If the John Clark in arithmetic does not exist, you don’t exist, unless miracle, magic matter, etc. > > You keep talking about that but as far as intelagent behavior and > consciousness is concerned I'll be damned if I can see how it makes the > slightest difference if matter is primitive or not. Animals are not primitive > because they are made of atoms, but that does not change the fact that > animals are alive and atoms are not. It does not matter FAPP. But it matters to figure out why we are here, who we are, and what we can expect in the long run. It matters for people interested in metaphysics,theology and/or any fundamental questions. > > >>> And Turing showed that a lambda expression can emulate all Turing machine, > > >> No he did not. > > That is proved in all textbook. > > No they do not. What textbooks prove is one set of ASCII characters that > belong to the lambda universe is equivalent to another set of ASCII > characters that belongs to the Turing universe. Programming language are not just set of characters. There is a grammar, and a notion of reality attached to their first order logical specification. The equivalence are true proof that whatever a Turing machine do, a lambda expression can do that as well, and thus elementary arithmetic too, as elementary arithmetic *is* a first order specification of a Turing complete theory. > What those textbooks most certainly do NOT prove or even hint at is that > either set of ASCII characters can do what a Physical Turing Machine can do. Indeed. They don’t even assumes anything physical, unless they have a chapter on the physical machines, which is rare in the theoretical textbook I refer too. But none assume a primitively real reality. Only metaphysicists work on such type of assumption. Then the point is that it is inconsistent with Computationalism. > I said it before I'll say it again, you may be able to follow the individual > steps of a proof but when you get to the end you don't understand exactly > what it is that has been proven. > > >> A Physical Turing Machine can emulate Lambda Calculus but Lambda Calculus > >> can't emulate a damn thing without getting physical. > > > x emulate y on z means only the arithmetical sentence saying that > > phi_x(y,z) = phi_y(z), > > Yes exactly, one set of squiggles means the same thing as another set of > squiggles; but squiggles can not make a calculation, only a Physical Turing > Machine can. You confuse x and “x”. Here x did not refer to anything syntactical, but on what the apparent syntax refers for. I point the finger toward the moon, but you keep looking at the finger. You can demolish all intellectual activities with trick like that (I am aware it is a trick). > > >> And that's why Godel thought Turing's work was superior to that of Alonzo > >> Church. > > > Gödel’s thought Turing was more convincing for the claim that his formalism > > captures the notion of human calculation. > > Yes I agree, Gödel’s thought humans and Physical Turing Machines could make > calculations but lambda calculus could not. Gödel is a are thinker who did not take the “natural world” for granted, and was fond on theological reflection. Unlike Einstein, who was religious in the meliorative sense of the word, Gödel advocate the return of reason in theology, so much that he wrote that ontological proof (a formal rendering of St-Anselmus proof of the existence of God). He never claim that such a proof must itself be taken literally, but that it was a good start to dialog on this. > > >> Lambda Calculus is just a programing language, it's unique because it's > >> the smallest one known but it's still just a language. > > > Don’t confuse the syntax and grammar, with the model of Lambda Calculus. > > If Lambda Calculus is a model it's not a working model, but a Turing Machine > is the real deal. For all universal machinery, there is a language, a grammar, a set theory (set of axioms), a notion of proof, and then a semantic (a notion of model). It is important to distinguish all those different feature related to Turing universal systems or theories. > > >> Meaning? The Davis book by itself has no meaning whatsoever, it only has > >> meaning in relation to something physical, like a brain that knows English > >> and is familiar with mathematical notation. And the knowledge of those > >> things is encoded in the way physical neurons in the brain are wired up. > > > I was not talking on the meaning of a book, but about an explanation useful > > for this thread which can be found in that book, but you shift the level > > systematically here. I will no more answer such claims. > > That is probably a wise move on your part; I mean how could anybody > successfully rebut such claims. > > > Natural selection selected the belief in matter. I can be OK with this. > > Nature selected the belief in matter because it worked, so there must be some > truth to it. True does not make something primitive, or in need to be assumed at the start. > Animals that believed in Physics were able to pass on their genes to the next > generation, animals that didn't did not. Animals do not believe in physics. They believe in a physical reality, and rightly so. Everybody in this list, and elsewhere, believe in the physical reality. The point is on the Plato/Aristotle debate. Is that physical reality ontological or phenomenological. Bruno > > > But natural selection did not select the metaphysical assumption that > > Natural Selection is totally uninterested in metaphysics because it has just > as much effect on the physical universe as your silly phantom calculations > do. None at all. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2BhQERjnZaQypc%3DASP5tMPD9Xd54aOaWW8vqvkbTFByg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2BhQERjnZaQypc%3DASP5tMPD9Xd54aOaWW8vqvkbTFByg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5281ADE2-7D48-4BEC-8877-364A34CD693E%40ulb.ac.be.
