> On 18 Aug 2019, at 01:06, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 7:31 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > I believe in the physical reality, but I do not necessarily believe that > > the physical reality is the fundamental reality. > > Who cares?
It is the subject of the thread. If you don’t care, why do you insist that fundamental stuff must exist to dignity a computation as “real". > Fundamental stuff by definition is not made of parts and so its behavior is > simple and dull, non-fundamental stuff, like intelagent behavior, is complex > and interesting. > > > Look at experimental physicists. They measure numbers only, > > How can you measure the pure number 7? OK. I meant (if course) they measure numerical magnitude, and infer computable relation relating them. > You can't, nobody can measure a pure number, experimental physicists measure > units that are based on physics, like mass in kilograms or speed in meters > per second or acceleration in meters per second per second. > > >> It's the very best sort of bet. If I win I receive a infinitely large > >> jackpot. If I don't win then I've lost nothing except $80,000 and I can > >> afford that. > > > That is a bit like 0 and 1, in a context where there are many more > > possibilities in between the jackpot and some putative inexistence. You > > have no idea who will be the doctor who would reconstitute you, nor his > > intent, and life might be not so rosy, if not hellish > > If Everett is right then the doctor who awakens me will be angelic and bring > me to technological heaven, and the doctor who awakens me will be satanic and > bring me to technological hell. But the situation is no different for you > because you will somehow end up getting frozen even though you haven't paid > for it or want it. But as I've said before, although Everett has my favorite > quantum interpretation I'm not willing to stake my life on it. Fair enough. Death is always risky ... > > >> I'm betting that certain atoms don't have my name scratched on them and > >> atoms are generic. I'm betting that the key aspect of what makes me be me > >> is not the particular atoms that make up my body right now but the related > >> orientation the atoms have with each each other, and that is information > >> can be stored digitally. I'm betting that is the road to immortality if > >> such a road exists. > > > With mechanism, we are already immortal. > > Could be but nobody knows because every time you try to explain what you mean > by "mechanism" you start using words like "fundamental " and "primitive" > which are irrelevant in a philosophical discussion about immortality, > intelagent behavior or consciousness. Mechanism is "Yes Doctor”. It needs CT, and some amount of arithmetical realism to define what is a digital machine. That physics is no more the fundamental science is a consequence, and not part of the hypothesis. > > >Our digital information is store in the many number relations, and execute > >in all possible relative computational histories, > > I know and that is exactly the trouble. There are an infinite number of > computational relationships, but most of them are nonsense and pure > mathematics has no way to sort the sense from nonsense, but physics does. If > you have one rock of a certain mass moving at a certain velocity and then you > get another identical rock then you have exactly 2 times the energy and > momentum, not 1 or 3 or 4 or any other number, only 2 will work. Without > physics numbers wouldn't even have a consistent meaning. And of course there > would be no way to make a calculation or form a thought. Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning. Computational relationship are not propositions. It makes no sense to attribute nonsense to them. Either a sigma_1 proposition is true, or it false. Either a computation is run in arithmetic, or it is not. Then those going through your relative state are those important (for the prediction) relatively to you. > > > and there is an infinity of such histories realised in all the models of > > arithmetic. > > I know, and because of that in pure mathematics there is nothing special > about 2+2=4, 2+2=5 works fine, No. 2+2=5 entails 0 = 1, and that entails all propositions. It dos not work. You confuse grammar and logic. > but there is something about 2+2=4 in Physics that 2+2=5 lacks. > > > “Primitive” refer to what I have to assume. > > Whatever that primitive stuff is there are 2 things we know for certain about > it: > > 1) It has contrast, that is to say everything either exists or it does not > and there is a detectable difference between the two; "nonexistence" has the > property of infinite unbounded homogeneity and existence is everything else. > > 2) The primitive stuff must be able to be organized into parts that are > themselves organized in complex ways and behave in ways the unorganized > primitive stuff could not. That works well for the numbers. > > > To define what is a digital machine [...] > > To hell with definitions, Turing taught us how to BUILD a digital machine. So > we can just point and say a digital machine is one of those. He gave the first definition of Digital machine (together with Post, Church, etc.). Then we can implement in physics of not, but the digital machine is an abstract, immaterial notion. You cannot identify a digital machine with a representation of that machine is a Turing universal context, be it set theoretical, numerical or physical. That belongs to the confusion between finger and moon, or between representation and the thing represented. > > > I have to assume the natural numbers and at least addition and > > multiplication. > > You don't have to assume numbers or anything else, you only need to observe > that things change in time and space Assuming time and space is much more than assuming numbers. > and if it's a digital machine the change occurs in steps, and you can always > predict what the next step will be but not necessarily the last step. There > might not even be a last step. > > > I cannot select one computation as more real than other, > > Yes you can! Some computations, like the sort INTEL makes with their silicon, > can play a part in cause and effect, and some "calculations", like your silly > phantom calculations, can not. Only if the silicon is blessed with Holy water. Oh you bless it only with Holy Matter. That’s not my religion. I prefer to be agnostic as long as no evidences are given, and in that case, Iwill abandon Mechanism as a plausible explanation, given that magic role given to some metaphysical stuff. > > >> Complex things are by definition NOT primitive > > > We agree on this important point. > > And complex things have complex behavior and simple things have simple > behavior, so why does someone interested in complex stuff like intelligence > and consciousness talk so much about what is and what is not primitive? Curiosity in fundamental question. > > > That is a reason why I do not assume, neither matter, nor consciousness, > > Not even your own consciousness? You think you may be a zombie? No, I derive consciousness and matter from the computational relation. I don’t have to assume it in the fundamental theory, but of course, it is needed to define computationalisme, but then we can discharge it and explain it from G* and its variants imposed by incompleteness. Roughly speaking consciousness is just the indubitable immediate truth, yet non provable and non definable without referring to the notion of truth (which is arithmetic is definable in analysis), that all universal machine can’t avoid when looking inward. > > > consciousness is just the obvious indubitable truth that no universal > > machine can avoid, and that the Löbian machine [...] > > And now nobody knows what you're talking about, at least nobody that Google > or Bing has ever heard of. > > > (A Löbian machine is a universal machine capable of proving its own Turing > > universality. > > A universal Turing machine can emulate any Turing Machine by reading its > input tape which contains the description of the machine to be simulated as > well as the data to be worked on. So all Löbian machines are Turing Machines > but not all Turing Machines are Löbian machines. Indeed. The Löbian machine believes in enough induction axioms to be able to prove that they are universal. Let p represent a sigma_1 proposition. We have that machine is universal iff p -> []p is true for the machine. But a machine is Löbian iff she can prove p -> []p. > Most people can't prove anything so they can't be Löbian machines, so I guess > only mathematicians are conscious. Most people can prove or understand/check proofs in elementary arithmetic, and they can prove or convince themselves that they can prove p->[]p for p sigma_1. It is pretty obvious once you agree that any (definable) set of natural numbers has a smallest element (that is equivalent with induction). > > >> the John Clark in Physics is totally uninterested in the John Clark in > >> arithmetic because the John Clark in arithmetic can not change and thus > >> can not behave intelligently or be conscious or *do" anything at all. > > > The John Clark in arithmetic change relatively to the universal numbers > > running them. Take the number corresponding to a simulation of our cluster > > of galaxies at the level of strings with 10^(10^10000) decimals. > > That huge number never changes, or at least it wouldn't if it existed, but if > the entire expanding accelerating universe I don’t assume any of this. > lacks the ability to even express a number with that many digits (much less > calculate it!) then ii makes no difference to any THING if the number exists > or not. > > >> What textbooks prove is one set of ASCII characters that belong to the > >> lambda universe is equivalent to another set of ASCII characters that > >> belongs to the Turing universe. > > > Programming language are not just set of characters. There is a grammar, > > and a notion of reality attached > > The notion of reality that needs to be attached is hardware, a computer made > of matter that obeys the laws of physics; because without that the programing > language is just a set of characters that never change and is incapable of > changing anything. That shows you have never read a book in mathematics, or you did not understand anything in there. You confuse a language with the first order specification of a Turing universal theory. I guess your “conventionalism” explains this attitude. > > >> What those textbooks most certainly do NOT prove or even hint at is that > >> either set of ASCII characters can do what a Physical Turing Machine can > >> do. > > > Indeed. They don’t even assumes anything physical, unless they have a > > chapter on the physical machines, which is rare in the theoretical textbook > > I refer too. But none assume a primitively real reality. > > Oh no we're back with "primitive”! It is what we are discussing. > You agree a Physical Turing Machine can do things that pure numbers can not > and that's all that's important, it's irrelevant if it's primitive. It is the subject of the discussion. > > > You confuse x and “x”. Here x did not refer to anything syntactical, but on > > what the apparent syntax refers for. I point the finger toward the moon, > > but you keep looking at the finger. > > I wouldn't do that because both your finger and the moon are physical > objects, but if you point to the number 7 I would have no choice but to look > at your finger because there would be nothing else to look at. > > > Gödel is a are thinker who did not take the “natural world” for granted, > > and was fond on theological reflection. Unlike Einstein, who was religious > > in the meliorative sense of the word, Gödel advocate the return of reason > > in theology, so much that he wrote that ontological proof (a formal > > rendering of St-Anselmus proof of the existence of God). > > Gödel was a genius but he went insane, Einstein never did. > > >>Nature selected the belief in matter because it worked, so there must be > >>some truth to it. > > > True does not make something primitive, > > Who cares if it's primitive or not?! > > > Animals do not believe in physics. They believe in a physical reality, and > > rightly so. Everybody in this list, and elsewhere, believe in the physical > > reality. > > Because if anybody on this list did not believe in physical reality they'd be > killed the first time they tried to cross a street. Everybody believe in the physical reality. Not everybody believe that the physical reality is not reducible to another realm. > But I have never believed in your phantom calculations but I survive just > fine. To you agree with Euclid’s proof that there is no biggest prime number? > > > The point is on the Plato/Aristotle [...] > > And the mention of people who didn't know where the sun went at night is my > cue to say goodnight. X saying a bs is not a proof that X says only bs. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3Adb7Z8yps5RBS-5BxTAHX2zozEG9J%3D%2B1uwg5mvXWwTg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3Adb7Z8yps5RBS-5BxTAHX2zozEG9J%3D%2B1uwg5mvXWwTg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/92E37BB7-83D3-45FD-A498-DBFA3F514718%40ulb.ac.be.
