On Tuesday, August 27, 2019 at 6:01:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 Aug 2019, at 23:08, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 26, 2019 at 11:21:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 Aug 2019, at 10:28, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> *The Mary-Go-Round* >> Galen Strawson >> https://www.academia.edu/31517753/Strawson_The_Mary_Go_Round >> >> "The mistake [in the debate about Mary in the Black and White Room] to >> think that *physics can give an exhaustive characterization of the >> nature of the physical**." >> >> that is, *material*, but Stawson I guess wants to be one of the cool kids >> >> >> >> I am quite amazed he cites Al Ghazali! I think Al Gazhali is partially >> responsible for the current widespread obscurantism in Islam. He “won” his >> debate against Averroès, in 1248 (or 1148). >> >> Al Ghazli defended the idea that Reason must be submitted to the Text, >> where Averroès defended the idea that the Text must be submitted to Reason. >> That has transformed the Golden Age of Islam into fight in between >> different radical versions of some literal reading of the Quran and some >> haddiths. The christian did the same error around 529. That transforms >> theology into “the opium of people”. It makes religion into authoritative >> arguments, and violence. >> >> Strawson argument is not valid, it identifies []p with []p & p, or []p & >> <>t with []p & <>t & p. Like Lucas and Penrose, in a different context. But >> I will not develop this right now. This asks to understand well how >> incompleteness imposes those nuances to the subject. Mary needs the “p” >> which is not a formalisable notion. Neither in arithmetic, nor in any >> complete 3p account of the physical reality. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > I don't know much about al-Ghazālī or much of anything about Islamic > philosophers (I did read something of Mulla Sadra once, who is noted as an > existentialist in the Islamic context), but al-Ghazālī apparently was a > Sufi, which supposedly is a liberal (in the modern sense) type of Islam, > relatively speaking. > > > I don’t think he was a Sufi, but he has been influenced by them at some > period of time. He is mainly the one defending and criticising also > Aristotle’s philosophy. The Stanford entry is not too bad, but you need to > take account our own cultural prejudice in favour of Aristotle and > “matter”. > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-ghazali/ > > (To be sure, like with Aristotle, it is unclear if they or their disciples > are responsible for the simplifications and the misunderstandings. I use > dates and philosophers as symbolic markers in the development of > metaphysics. > > > > But to the core of the paper ... > > Below, wherever Strawson writes "physical" I would write "material". He > is attempting to be faithful to "current" physicists definition of > "matter", but current physicists - philosophically confused - are wrong on > that matter in the first place. He refers to "materialism/physicalism" (he > says consistently one word is a substitute for the other), so why not > "material/physical". Aside from that inconsequential word substitution > argument - which is a bit too pedantic, here is the significant core > argument: > > > I agree. I would say that materialism is a form of naive physicalism. Both > are incompatible with Mechanism. Tegmark did have defended some form of > mathematicalist physicalism at some time. It is the idea that the physical > universe is a mathematical structure, with an implicit idea that we have > still to assume it, where with Mechanism, even if the universe is a > mathematical structure, it has to be derived from the universal machine > phenomenology. > > > > > > *Philosophers constantly question things that aren’t seriously in > question. * > > The claim that something is controversial has zero dialectical force in > philosophy, although it’s often made by referees rejecting papers submitted > to learned journals. This is because there is as Louise Antony says ‘no > banality so banal that no philosopher will deny it’. > > [1] everything that concretely exists is wholly physical. > > The Mary-carousel rotates round a mistake shared on both sides. The > mistake consists in the endorsement of a highly substantive thesis about > physics, the thesis that > > [2] physics can (in principle) give a full or exhaustive characterization > of the nature of the physical. > > [1] and [2] entail the view I call physics-alism: ‘the view—the faith—that > > [3] the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be > fully captured in the terms of physics. > > One can re-express [3] in a way that matches the wording of [2]: > > [3] physics can in principle give a full or exhaustive characterization of > the nature of everything that concretely exists. > > The mistake, on both sides of the Mary-go-round, is to turn > materialism/physicalism into physics-alism by adding [2] to [1] to produce > [3]. > > Endorsement of [2] leads to the false identification of [1] physicalism > with [3] physics-alism. > > On one side of the roundabout we confront the adamantine truth, already > recorded, that on leaving the black and white room > > [4] Mary learns something new about the nature of concrete reality > > in having a red-experience (an indubitably real concrete phenomenon) that > has the experiential-qualitative character (an indubitably real concrete > phenomenon) it does have. (If you doubt this, ask her.) This couples with > the widely agreed fact that > > [5] physics cannot characterize the nature of red-experience (colour > experience in general) to produce the mistaken conclusion that [6] Mary > raises a difficult and seemingly insoluble problem for physicalism by > showing that there is an undeniably real part of concrete reality that > physics can’t characterize. > > On the other side of the roundabout, [2] couples with the endorsement of > the truth of [1],physicalism, to produce the mistaken conclusion that (in > some sense or another) [4] is false—that Mary does not learn something new > about concrete reality when she leaves theblack and white room. > > Two mistakes. The solution is simple. Give up [2]. Nothing in [1], > physicalism, requires any attachment to [2], a thesis about the descriptive > reach of physics. It’s vital for physicalists to give up [2] because it is > certainly false if physicalism is true. It’s equally vital for those who > reject physicalism to give up [2], because their rejection of physicalism > can have no real force if it relies on [2]. If it relies on [2] it begs the > question: it defines physicalism/materialism in such a way that it can’t be > true. What if we replace ‘physics’ by ‘the physical sciences’ in [2], to > get > > [2] the physical sciences can (in principle) give a full or exhaustive > characterization of the nature of the physical? > > ... > > > We have, as remarked, ten propositions (they overlap in various ways, and > [7] is a version of [2]): > > > This is a bit hard to understand for me, but I will try below to clarify > the position of the universal machine (after she understand the UDA > argument, to be sure). > > > > [1] materialism or physicalism: everything that concretely exists is > wholly physical > > > Here I have a very general problem, which is that a “physical thing” is > always an abstraction made from the most concrete thing I can know (may own > consciousness, and then the natural numbers). A “material” concrete things > needed billions of neurons chatting together to look concrete. The > experience of a chair is quite concrete, but typically not material, as it > is an experience (and with Mechanism this is related to both a computation > and to some relation with Truth, both immaterial things). > In [1], I am not sure an implicit ontological commitment is not already > implicit. A table in a dream seems “concrete” and “hard and solid”, but we > know that it is an illusion brought by the brain (accepting some form > mechanism of course). Invoking concreteness seems a bit close to the > knowing table argument. It is not relevant for “Mary” a priori. > > > > [2] physics can give an exhaustive characterization of the nature of the > physical > > > Physics is the science of sharable first person plural relative > prediction. It does not address ontology, a priori. With QM, “simple" > boolean interpretation of matter is no more possible, and physics begun to > touch philosophy/theology, at least for those interested in the relation > between physics and “reality” (the thing the fundamentalist researcher > search, but never claim to have found). > > > > > [3] physics can give an exhaustive characterization of the nature of > everything that concretely exists > > > Of course, the machine cannot agree here. Numbers concretely exists (and > are the only things which concretely exists), and are used to explain what > will become a sophisticated explanation of the origin of measurements and > stable results (if it works). > > > > [4] Mary learns something new about concrete reality when she leaves the > black and white room > > > OK. > > > > [5] physics cannot characterize the nature of colour experience > > > OK. > > > [6] Mary raises a difficult and perhaps insoluble problem for physicalism > > > I don’t think so (but with mechanism, physicalism is in trouble for a > deeper reason, around the UDA). > > > > > [7] ‘x is physical’ entails ‘x’s nature is in principle fully > characterizable in the terms of physics’ > > > OK, but physics itself can become (and do become with digital mechanism) > fully characterizable in the arithmetical reality. Note that the full > arithmetical reality is not fully or completely characterisable in *any* > theory. > > > > [8] colour experience is real, a concretely existing phenomenon > > > Colour experience is real. OK. > > Now, if the experience is lived as a concrete thing, that is an illusion > (with Mechanism). Seeing red requires many chatty neurons, + some > transcendent truth. > > > > > [9] colour experience is wholly physical > > > I would say that it is wholly psychological, but with mechanism, the > entirety of physics is wholly psychological. The theory of matters is given > by the theory showing what almost *all* universal machine can predict about > observation. The physical becomes sharable illusions, a bit like in a video > games, except that the core of the video game is not programmable a priori > (it is the infinite sum of relative histories). > > > > [10] physicalism doesn’t entail physics-alism. > > > > I don’t understand what you mean here (and above). You might elaborate a > bit, perhaps. > > > > > I accept [1], [4], [5], and [8]–[10]. > > > I have a problem with the meaning of “concrete” in [1] and [8]. > > I (or the machine) makes sense of [4] and [5]. > > Your definition of “concrete experience” seems to fit with the machine’s > notion of “dreamable experience”, which with digital mechanism is related > (but not identified) with an infinity of computations, and in the explicit > company, or not, of truth. Incompleteness assures the consistency and > necessity of all those nuances. > > > > I know that accepting [1]—being a physicalist—doesn’t require me to be in > any way irrealist about conscious experience because I know that being > a physicalist doesn’t require to me accept [3] that physics can give an > exhaustive characterization of the nature of concrete reality. > > > Is it not in that case that those who want an exhaustive characterisation > of the “concerte reality” will need some other theory than physics? Some > materialist says so, and invoke Mechanism, but that is the point that the > UDA is supposed to debunk. > > > I accept [8] unconditionally, because its > truth is certain, as Descartes observed in his Second Meditation. > > > OK, for the certain part of this, but not OK that the experience is > concrete. The experience of concreteness is abstract, quite abstract! > > > > [1] and [8] entail [9], I take [5] to be beyond serious question, and [1] > and [5] entail [10]. One way to put the problem, plainly, is as a > disagreement about the meaning of the word ‘physical’. > > I’ve always taken ‘physical’ to be a natural-kind term. > > > That is where we differ the most, I guess. And as you seem to endow some > form of mechanism (codicalism), you will introduce insuperable difficulties > with that naturalisation intent. > > > It’s a term that denotes a fundamental kind of stuff whose nature we may > not fully know, and plainly do not fully know (ask the physicists). > > > Or asks a mechanist. He knows that the apparent primary stuff is a result > of a string indeterminacy on a transcendent reality (arithmetical truth). > Here, it is important to understand that after Gödel, we understand that > we don’t understand what is the arithmetical truth, even if it remains the > easiest thing to get some conception of (but that too is an illusion easily > explained). > > > > > > This puts me in conflict with Jackson when he says > that Mary in the black and white room can acquire ‘all the physical > information there is to > obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes’ (1982: 130, my > emphasis). The trouble is that Jackson equates ‘all the physical > information’ with ‘all the information expressible in the terms of > physics, or more generally the physical sciences’, and this equation makes > it impossible for someone who is a real realist about conscious experience > to count as a physicalist. This is a startling result for a great host of > physicalists like myself who are real realists about conscious experience, > whether or not they follow Russell when he says (correctly if physicalism > is true—see §9) that ‘we know nothing about the intrinsic quality of > physical events’—nothing about the intrinsic non-structural nature of > physical events—‘except when these are mental events that we directly > experience’ (1956: 153, my emphasis). In other terms: it directly begs the > question. > > > With Mechanism, it is close to the place we abandon the idea of primary > stuff. > > > > > The flagship materialist or physicalist thesis, in sum, is precisely that > consciousness— real consciousness—is wholly physical. > > ---------- > > *The flagship materialist (or physicalist) thesis, in sum, is precisely > that consciousness—real consciousness—is wholly material. * > > > But that contradicts the experience I have, and certainly the experience > all digital machines have in arithmetic. If consciousness is physical, then > it cannot be brought by digital computation, and your codicalism will have > to negate the idea that the brain is a functioning, mechanical, entity. You > will need to say “no” to the doctor, or “no” to the Church-Turing thesis > (which I think you already did). > > > > > I realize there is a trend towards immaterialism (by physicists today as > well). > > > Immaterialism has got bad press, because materialist have seen it as > adding some magical stuff above the usual physical stuff, like in the image > of a soul leaving the body. > With mechanism, immaterialism retrieve *all* sorts of stuff, and keep non > material entity with which we are familiar, like the idea that 2+2=4, or > that for all n bigger than 2, there is no x, y, z such that x^n + y^n = z^n > (very simple conceptually, despite very difficult to prove). > > Bruno > > > A gist of the Galen Strawson, Philip Goff, Hedda Morch "pansychism" is that
- reality has an extrinsic and intrinsic nature - the extrinsic nature is the physical (or "physics-ical", in Strawson terms) - the intrinsic nature is the psychical (or "experiential") Now both natures are combined in the thing we call matter (or matter+fields+energy+... or whatever is needed to make physicists happy), but it is the "real matter" (as opposed to the extrinsic-only perception of matter physicists have), as that is the common object of science. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1c95f0d4-58ae-4df1-841b-416ce176f945%40googlegroups.com.
