> On 29 Aug 2019, at 20:46, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, August 29, 2019 at 9:06:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I am not sure I understand what you mean by “real matter”, nor which role it > can play for the minds and the souls once we bet on Mechanism. Any evidence > that there exists something like “primitive real matter” would give a > refutation of Mechanism. (Primitive means “has to be assume” or “cannot be > explained by some other things”). > > Bruno > > > > > My 'real matter' is just Stawson's "real" 'physical stuff', in > > Galen Strawson > Realistic Monism > http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf > > This paper recasts and expands parts of ‘Agnostic materialism’ (Strawson, > 1994, pp. 43–105, especially pp. 59–62, 72, 75–7) and ‘Real materialism’ > (Strawson, 2003a) and inherits their debt to Nagel (1974). I have replaced > the word ‘materialism’ by ‘physicalism’ and speak of ‘physical stuff’ instead > of ‘matter’ because ‘matter’ is now specially associated with mass although > energy is just as much in question, as indeed is anything else that can be > said to be physical, e.g. spacetime — or whatever underlies the appearance of > spacetime. > > Nothing more than that. It's a matter of considering matter in the way of the > ancient materialists.(from Thales to Epicurus) rather than the way physicists > think of it today. > > 'Matter' is also easier to refer to and use as a term than 'physical stuff' > it seems to me. Who the hell walks around talking about 'physical stuff'? > 'Matter' is just one word.
At the level of generality needed to solve the mind-body problem, there is no problem equating physical stuff and matter/ This comprehend all physical things, including physical time, and physical space, or physical space-time. Later some nuances are brought by the fact that we get three “physical realms” from the arithmetical self-reference, and we can introduce the nuances when they become appropriate. With mechanism, there is a (testable) explanation of why we feel, and are locally correct about that, that there is some primary stuff, by its explanation of being the result of the first person indeterminacy on all computations below our substitution level. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/53d07313-9223-49fe-b263-18156ca8f1ff%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/53d07313-9223-49fe-b263-18156ca8f1ff%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/34CB7E7D-2970-4CEF-A994-D33CCE974842%40ulb.ac.be.
