On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:13:02 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 9/14/2019 1:27 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 7:28 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > t*hat classical probability for a winning ticket is determined by some >> quantum superposition of states that give a probability for a ticket to be >> printed with some set of numbers, or for some probability of tickets being >> distributed in some way.* >> > > The Schrodinger wave equation says the ticket is printed in every possible > way and the winning number is picked in every possible way, > > > It predicts that at some point well before the number is picked, at time > at which quantum level effects can be amplified to different ball > selections. That would not be the case nano-seconds before the pick, or > milliseconds before, and maybe not hours before. > > That is the point, and quantum interpretations have these dubious issues. Copenhagen has problems with defining what is meant by the partition of quantum and classical domains. Maybe this is a manifestation of the subjectivity inherent in entropy, where classicality is a change in information available to a local observer. With MWI there is the more complete nonlocality, which means there is an uncertainty in the meaning of a locality to a splitting of worlds. QuBism simply says a decoherent event or measurement is a Bayesian update, where this is a change in local information content, but it forces this as a determinant by a local processor or mind. That leads to a sort of solipsism; quantum outcomes have no objective basis.
It may well be that these problems in total are telling us something. I am not at all concerned with whether any quantum interpretation is "true" and others "false," so much as I find it curious we have an apparent need for these and whether these are connected to the Born rule, or the decidability of the Born rule. Quantum interpretations also seems to play with some sort of dualism between locality and quantum nonlocality. LC > but that's not all you yourself are also a quantum object so you interact > with the ticket in every possible way. > > > Only if you and the powerball are not influenced by that the same random > quantum events that got amplified to determine the ball AND to determine > your choice of number. > > Some interactions result in great wealth, some result in no profit, and > some result in oblivion as in the suicide scenario. > > >> * > In performing this quantum suicide experiment one is forcing the >> situation in something similar to a Wheeler delayed choice experiment.* >> > > I don't see the analogy at all. Regardless of if you perform the quantum > suicide experiment or not every possible lottery ticket was printed, and > you bought every possible lottery ticket, and every possible number was > picked as the winning number. The past is not changed but the future is > changed depending on if you performed the experiment, if you do then in the > future there is no universe in the multiverse where you're looking at a > losing ticket, if you don't do the experiment then there is; but the past > is the same in both cases. > > So the multiverse contains 2 very general types of "you", universes where > you decide to do the experiment and always end up looking at a winning > ticket (a universe for every possible winning number), and universes where > you decide not to do the experiment and always end up looking at numbers > most of which are losing numbers. But in either case I don't see why backward > causality is needed. > > > *with this suicide experiment there is a quantum outcome prior to the >> final experimental end that demolishes the appearance of superposition. How >> is that localized? * >> > > By just looking at the lottery ticket. Normally there would be far more > versions of you looking at a losing ticket than a winning one, but in the > suicide experiment there are not as many versions of you but all of them > are looking at a winning ticket. > > > I can think of an interesting variation on the suicide experiment. I > decide to do it but I offer you a side bet and give you a thousand to one > odds that I have the winning ticket; if my ticket loses I will give you a > thousand dollars if I win you only have to give me one dollar. The logical > thing for both of us is to make the bet (if we make the big assumption that > Many Worlds is true), you calculate that there is only one chance in 80 > million of me winning so you know you are almost certain to win a thousand > dollars, and I calculate I will win an additional dollar with > absolute certainty to go with my vast lottery winnings. Yes in most > universes my estate will owe you a thousand dollars but I no longer exist > in them so I have no use for that money. It's a win win bet. > > > But as Mallah points out, all you are doing is pruning those of your > future lives in which you don't win the lottery. That's rational if your > life has negative net value in those branches, but it's not increasing the > value of the branches in which you do win the lottery. > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/34724897-02d5-4dc1-9fb2-7bda9c7c7b34%40googlegroups.com.
