On 9/15/2019 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2019, at 22:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/13/2019 4:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 13:16, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:49 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12 Sep 2019, at 01:50, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 1:55 AM Bruno Marchal
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 11 Sep 2019, at 01:30, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
On 8 Sep 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
If the only relevance you can find for many worlds
is quantum immortality, then many worlds is indeed
dead. Quantum immortality has been shown many times
to be a complete nonsense.
Really. I did not known that. Could you give the
references.
Follow the Wikipedia entry on quantum suicide.
That is not what I mean by a reference.
I later gave a reference to the paper by Mallah -- whom you
know of, apparently. The paper is available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0187
Yes, the oldest participant in this list have know Jacques
Mallah, who participated a lot in this list.
Mallah is wrong here:
<<
Max Tegmark publicized the QS idea, but in some ways he is
more of a moderate on the issue than most of its believers
are. If he were to follow in the footsteps of Don Page
and alter his views, recanting belief in QS, it would be a
great help in exposing the belief as a fallacy, and I hold
out hope that it is possible that he will do so.
In his paper [Tegmark 1] QS is explained as follows:
“Since there is exactly one observer having perceptions both
before and after the trigger event, and since it occurred
too fast to notice, the MWI prediction is that” (the
experimenter) “will hear “click” with 100% certainty.”
That is a rather odd statement because he is certainly aware
that in the MWI there is no sense in which it can be
rightfully said that “there is exactly one observer” either
before
<page13image25488.png>
or after the experiment. The ket notation may be unhelpful
here; indeed, if the tensor product of kets on the left hand
side were expanded instead of factoring out the
observer, there would appear to have been “two observers”
initially.
>>
I don't get Mallah's point here, either. I will have to look
more clearly at his argument against QS. I don't think that case
is a clear-cut as for QI. The fact that I am not the oldest
person around is clear evidence against QI.
It's wrong, that imply you can nerver have been young.
And I am young, therefore quantum immortality is wrong. But exactly
where is it wrong. There seem to be two different ideas of quantum
immortality. In one verison, the everything-happens version, is that
whatever your state there is a physically possible way for you to
survive...like invoking Bruno's magic cosmic rays that just happen to
trigger the right nerves for the brain damaged student to ace her test.
Just to be clear, nobody believes in such magic cosmic rays. They have
a probability zero in all histories, and I used them only to
illustrate a point (indeed, they are replaced by the movie projection
at the following step).
The computationalist immortality does not rely on such magic. To be sure.
In this version, no matter your age or circumstance, there will be a
'you' that remembers your age and circumstance indefinitely far into
the future.
The other version says that almost all Everettian 'copies' of your
future will die but there's a non-zero probability of one still
existing at any future time. So then the relative measure of your
future self depends on the ratio of copies that haven't died to those
that have. This implicitly assumes that whatever event that causes
you to die does not also cause a surviving copy to be created (i.e.
it's not a Tegmark machine gun).
I don’t see the difference. In all cases, when old and sick, surviving
is like a white rabbit. The immortality comes only from the fact that
no matter how the probability of surviving is small, from “your" first
person view, death is not an experience, and “you” are always there.
But that's the probability of you surviving conditional on you knowing
it. That doesn't even take immortality. It's true even at a time when
there is no one who remembers being you. I'm discussing what you
observe about the age of other people, because that can test the idea of
quantum immortality...depending on which kind immortality is hyposthesized.
But you can become amnesiac, and the question of immortality without
any amnesia is very different from more general form of immortality.
Why is it very different. Why isn't there always a small probability of
not having amnesia, or at least to remember some of a distant past?
Brent
There is no absolute personal identity. It is a relative indexical,
useful for short and middle term planning, but full technological
immortality with no amnesia does not make much sense. To forget might
be the most key element in the ability to become conscious or borrow
the arithmetical consciousness.
Bruno
Brent
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