> On 13 Sep 2019, at 22:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 9/13/2019 4:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 13:16, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:49 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On 12 Sep 2019, at 01:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 1:55 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> On 11 Sep 2019, at 01:30, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>>>> On 8 Sep 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> If the only relevance you can find for many worlds is quantum >>>>>> immortality, then many worlds is indeed dead. Quantum immortality has >>>>>> been shown many times to be a complete nonsense. >>>>> >>>>> Really. I did not known that. Could you give the references. >>>> Follow the Wikipedia entry on quantum suicide. >>>> >>> That is not what I mean by a reference. >>> >>> I later gave a reference to the paper by Mallah -- whom you know of, >>> apparently. The paper is available at >>> >>> https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0187 <https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0187> >>> >>> >> >> >> Yes, the oldest participant in this list have know Jacques Mallah, who >> participated a lot in this list. >> >> Mallah is wrong here: >> >> << >> Max Tegmark publicized the QS idea, but in some ways he is more of a >> moderate on the issue than most of its believers are. If he were to follow >> in the footsteps of Don Page and alter his views, recanting belief in QS, it >> would be a great help in exposing the belief as a fallacy, and I hold out >> hope that it is possible that he will do so. >> >> In his paper [Tegmark 1] QS is explained as follows: >> >> “Since there is exactly one observer having perceptions both before and >> after the trigger event, and since it occurred too fast to notice, the MWI >> prediction is that” (the experimenter) “will hear “click” with 100% >> certainty.” >> >> That is a rather odd statement because he is certainly aware that in the MWI >> there is no sense in which it can be rightfully said that “there is exactly >> one observer” either before >> >> <page13image25488.png> >> or after the experiment. The ket notation may be unhelpful here; indeed, if >> the tensor product of kets on the left hand side were expanded instead of >> factoring out the observer, there would appear to have been “two observers” >> initially. >> >> >> >> I don't get Mallah's point here, either. I will have to look more clearly at >> his argument against QS. I don't think that case is a clear-cut as for QI. >> The fact that I am not the oldest person around is clear evidence against QI. >> >> It's wrong, that imply you can nerver have been young. > > And I am young, therefore quantum immortality is wrong. But exactly where is > it wrong. There seem to be two different ideas of quantum immortality. In > one verison, the everything-happens version, is that whatever your state > there is a physically possible way for you to survive...like invoking Bruno's > magic cosmic rays that just happen to trigger the right nerves for the brain > damaged student to ace her test.
Just to be clear, nobody believes in such magic cosmic rays. They have a probability zero in all histories, and I used them only to illustrate a point (indeed, they are replaced by the movie projection at the following step). The computationalist immortality does not rely on such magic. To be sure. > In this version, no matter your age or circumstance, there will be a 'you' > that remembers your age and circumstance indefinitely far into the future. > > The other version says that almost all Everettian 'copies' of your future > will die but there's a non-zero probability of one still existing at any > future time. So then the relative measure of your future self depends on the > ratio of copies that haven't died to those that have. This implicitly > assumes that whatever event that causes you to die does not also cause a > surviving copy to be created (i.e. it's not a Tegmark machine gun). I don’t see the difference. In all cases, when old and sick, surviving is like a white rabbit. The immortality comes only from the fact that no matter how the probability of surviving is small, from “your" first person view, death is not an experience, and “you” are always there. But you can become amnesiac, and the question of immortality without any amnesia is very different from more general form of immortality. There is no absolute personal identity. It is a relative indexical, useful for short and middle term planning, but full technological immortality with no amnesia does not make much sense. To forget might be the most key element in the ability to become conscious or borrow the arithmetical consciousness. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b3b00d6b-4757-702b-ca23-2ab2e6e3bfb6%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b3b00d6b-4757-702b-ca23-2ab2e6e3bfb6%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AE7B30C0-D6D6-4F7D-A203-F984D38733AF%40ulb.ac.be.
