On Tuesday, October 15, 2019 at 6:02:15 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 15, 2019 at 5:48:58 AM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 15, 2019 at 2:24:10 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 14, 2019 at 6:52:24 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, October 14, 2019 at 4:44:42 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2019 at 5:38 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, October 14, 2019 at 1:20:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Part of the dislike of the MWI is that its proponents assume a 
>>>>>>> purity that is not an evident virtue of the intepretation.  For 
>>>>>>> example, 
>>>>>>> interpreting the squared amplitudes as probabilities seems to be 
>>>>>>> assumed, 
>>>>>>> along with the existence of the preferred basis in which the amplitudes 
>>>>>>> are 
>>>>>>> defined.  Together these are almost the same as CI.  If you ask 
>>>>>>> "probabilities of what?" in MWI the answer can't be probability of 
>>>>>>> existing 
>>>>>>> because MWI has committed to all solutions, however improbable, 
>>>>>>> existing.  
>>>>>>> So it becomes probability of finding yourself in a particular 
>>>>>>> world...which 
>>>>>>> depends on a theory of consciousness and seems to regress to von 
>>>>>>> Neumann 
>>>>>>> and Wigner.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Zurek's envariance attempts to answer these questions and provide a 
>>>>>>> justification for preferred bases and what probability refers to.  But 
>>>>>>> notice that to the extent he succeeds he is justifying taking a simple 
>>>>>>> probabilistic view and saying one of those preferred states happens and 
>>>>>>> the 
>>>>>>> others don't.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the single-particle double-slit experiment*, an observer could see 
>>>>>> a dot appear anywhere on a screen where path interference does not 
>>>>>> reduce 
>>>>>> the probability to zero. So with the literal many-world-branching 
>>>>>> theory, 
>>>>>> how many different worlds are produced, each on with its own observer 
>>>>>> seeing a dot on the screen?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> According to MWI, an infinite number. Each world will have the dot at 
>>>>> a different place on the screen.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What you say may open up a bit of a hole or snag in MWI. This is 
>>>> something I have been pondering some since Carroll's popularization. If 
>>>> MWI 
>>>> fundamentally preserves unitarity by splitting off worlds then 
>>>> localization 
>>>> of a measurement is an illusion.Consider a particle measured somewhere on 
>>>> a 
>>>> path from x and x'.  The path integral and the nonlocality of paths is a 
>>>> sum over all possible measurements in all space containing x and x', then 
>>>> there must be a continuum of possible worlds splitting off. If the 
>>>> operator 
>>>> has a continuum of eigenvalues *x*|x> = x|x> there must then be a 
>>>> continuum of possible worlds if there is indeed no fundamental 
>>>> localization 
>>>> with a measurement. This is not just infinite, but uncountably infinite.
>>>>
>>>> This is different from how decoherence maintains unitarity and 
>>>> conserves qubits. There a local interaction occurs that induces quantum 
>>>> phase to enter into a set of ancillary states or reservoir of states. Then 
>>>> we can consider quantum states as finite, but unbounded from above, so 
>>>> that 
>>>> local observations and measurements are possible. 
>>>>
>>>> This does seem to run into some oddities that either need to be worked 
>>>> out or that might indicate some gap in MWI. The persistence of nonlocality 
>>>> in MWI is interesting for possible quantum gravitation work. In that case 
>>>> I 
>>>> can think of maybe a way around this, where this uncountably infinite set 
>>>> of g_{ij} configurations, or Ψ[g_{ij}], can be identified with "exotic" 
>>>> manifolds that are removed. It is less clear how this can happen with 
>>>> ordinary quantum fields that have local realizations.
>>>>
>>>> LC
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To mix an analysis (or a theory) of the path integral with an analysis 
>>> (or a theory) of MWI is mixing two fundamentally contradictory frameworks 
>>> that only leads to confusion.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift 
>>>
>>
>> I am thinking of a path integral as most physicists do, which is an 
>> action principle that is a sum over amplitudes or histories. You are 
>> thinking according to the quantum interpretation of Dowker and others, 
>> which has auxiliary postulates or assumptions.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
> Path integrals or histories are  not eve brought up in Sean Carroll's book 
> (a search of the text shows).
>
> So they not present in any way in MWI.
>
> MWI (in Sean's mathematical formulation) is contrary to the path integral, 
> because histories (as you mention above) are simply not worlds (in Sean's 
> formulation).
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Path integrals are just methods. Three is nothing any different from QM or 
QFT without them other than a methodology. Dowker et al are jumping off 
into an interpretation based on path integrals.

LC 

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