> On 23 Oct 2019, at 09:38, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, October 22, 2019 at 8:41:07 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > On Tuesday, October 22, 2019 at 1:42:20 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Tuesday, October 22, 2019 at 12:18:45 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > On Tuesday, October 22, 2019 at 9:25:11 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: > That's such a silly argument. This only proves there are interactions between > consciousnesses. > > On Tuesday, 22 October 2019 14:25:04 UTC+3, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > > I think Samuel Johnson had a good reply to Bishop Berkeley on refuting > idealism, "If I kick this rock thusly," which Johnson did, "It then kicks > back." This is not a complete proof, but it works well enough FAPP. > > > It is not silly. It is empirical. If you are interested in some sort of firm > "mathy" type of proof, then I would suggest the burden is more upon you to > prove your case that idealism is true. I have no particular interest in the > subject to begin with, so I put the ball in your court. Prove your case. > > LC > > > > Empiricism cannot say whether it's (all) matter, consciousness, or numbers. > > What makes the latter two dismissible is they do not explain what we know of > our own consciousness - that it is finite in time and bounded in space. > > @philipthrift > > I am not saying "if I kick it it kicks back" means everything is matter. In > fact the total mass-energy of the universe is zero. However, it does lend > weight to the proposition there exists at least locally matter that is > external to mind. Matter does not conform to what my mind might otherwise > desire things to be. Statistical mechanics even shows that what we see as a > desired order is just one rather small macrostate in the energy surface of > phase space. Besides, our conscious lives are pretty fragile in the face of > things. > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jdf5EXo6I68 > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jdf5EXo6I68> > > LC > > > Matter does not conform to what my mind might otherwise desire things to be. > > > "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the > body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?”
We can be sure of the existence of our mind (and indeed explain it in term of number relation, like in computer science). We can find the notion of matter very plausible and certainly very useful. But matter is not the same as the metaphysical notion of primary matter used in physicalism (a metaphysical position which assume that some matter exists whose appearance is not deducible from any theory which does not assume it at the start). The real question is why does people keep a materialist metaphysics, without any evidence for it, and a lot of evidence making this doubtful. Bruno > > https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html > <https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html> > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45919562-c977-4b84-ab00-598f0eadca53%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45919562-c977-4b84-ab00-598f0eadca53%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/104FCD79-82C8-4EBC-A4D4-0EAFAB08840A%40ulb.ac.be.
