I’m sorry, this thread is from another mailing list and seems to have been posted by mistake to the Everything List.
On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 00:15, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Jan 2020, at 22:02, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 05:26, Brent Allsop <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> With your robot example, you are proposing that we consider what qualia > are, then change the system so that the qualia are inverted or disappear or > are represented by a different, abstract method. The qualia would change, > and the behaviour of the system would also change if it had a memory of > what it was like before. > > >Exactly. The consensus Representational Qualia Theory says that > consciousness is computationally bound elemental physical qualities, in the > brain, like redness and grenness. > > > How could a representational theory be related to (physical) qualities; > What could be a physical qualities? > > Above all, how could a anything (a physical universe, a god, whatever) > select some computations in arithmetic? > > > > You can play all you want with thought experiments. But if they do not > include the minimum requirements to not be qualia blind thought > experiments, you aren't really talking about the qualitative nature of > consciousness or what it is like. You are just talking about what > computers can do and just quine or ignore qualia. > > > OK. > > > > > >>What I am proposing with the neural substitution is that you only > attempt to reproduce the low level behaviour. So in a robot, if there is a > LM741 op amp you can replace it with a TL071 op amp, which has a completely > different internal circuit design but identical pins and similar > performance. > > >Yes, and all this is completely qualia blind. You start with the > assumption that whatever it is that has the redness quality we can directly > experience can somehow "arise" in a disconnected or separate from reality > "magic happens here" way. If you could include anything in your thought > experiment of things you are substituting that includes redness, and the > ability to bind this with something physically different like grenness, > this substitution thought experiment would be something more than absurd > (i.e. only revealing of your ignorance of how consciousness is > "computationally bound qualia.") And also, I predict that no matter what > you come up with as a prediction of what could be redness (whether > functional, behavioral, physical, quantum, the right set of logic gates, > the rite string of ones and zeros... or anything else, even including > "magic happens here") you will find that this will be impossible, for the > same reasons you don't think glutamate can be redness. The way this > thought experiment is designed qualia simply aren't possible, even > magically. It's just not logically possible in any way, without having the > same problem you have with glutamate being redness. To say nothing about > the required neural ponytail binding system which can connect to brains so > you can verify whether it has changed, or not, after the substitution. > > You don’t think it’s possible the robot’s red qualia could be a property > specific to the LM741 op amp? Neither do I. Here is why. > > 1. Suppose the red qualia are a specific property of the LM741 op amp, a > component in the robot’s visual processing system. > > 2. The TL071 op amp has completely different internal circuitry to the > LM741, but an identical pin configuration, and identical performance in the > robot. > > 3. Therefore, if you replace the LM741 with TL071, the robot will behave > the same in every way. You can observe it, test it, talk to it, connect it > with a neural ponytail to your own brain: there can be no difference. > > 4. The conclusion is that red qualia cannot be a specific property of the > LM741 op amp. > > > No, but it can still be the first person result of infinitely many > computations structured by the logic of self-reference, which, as the rch > (Löbian) machine already explain as something that can be felt immediately, > can have shapes, is non rationally justifiable without invoking a notion of > truth, cannot be communicated among subjects, etc. > > Of course, the problem here is that if we follow this (computationalist) > line, at some point we have to understand that there is no physical > universe at all, except as a sort of consciousness selection of infinitely > many histories in arithmetic. > > Here the magic is still there, but is reduced into our unexplainable > belief/understanding, if not consciousness, of the natural numbers. Here > the advantage is that the machine can explain why this has to be > unexplainable, unless assuming more unexplained objects. > > The qualia red is what appears in those histories where machine develop > vision together with “enough” self-reference abilities, and the > Gödel-Löbian machine, which are just the machine believing in some > induction axioms, can already explain why the qualia cannot have any > representational theory. > But there can be a theory, and the theory provided by the machine (X1*) is > testable because it contains the whole theory of quanta (first person > plural, the quanta are qualia at the start, they are the sharable part of > the qualia). We cannot test it on the non sharable part, but we can test it > on the sharable part: we can measure and communicate results to others, > with the qualia, and the machine explains why there is an extension of > quanta which is not communicable as such. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypW6nqAkft2NWsbJE-NY%3DKzz-4Z4qvHZgGBQXc3%2BpFjm%2Bg%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypW6nqAkft2NWsbJE-NY%3DKzz-4Z4qvHZgGBQXc3%2BpFjm%2Bg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/039A6291-BA34-4BB3-ACCC-3728100B9E05%40ulb.ac.be > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/039A6291-BA34-4BB3-ACCC-3728100B9E05%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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