> On 28 Jan 2020, at 17:58, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > I’m sorry, this thread is from another mailing list and seems to have been > posted by mistake to the Everything List.
I saw that, but those matters concerns anyone interested in unifying our (partial and plausibly wrong) conception of “everything". As the post is interesting I answered it, and ask question, also … Bruno > > On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 00:15, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> On 21 Jan 2020, at 22:02, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 05:26, Brent Allsop <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> With your robot example, you are proposing that we consider what qualia >> >> are, then change the system so that the qualia are inverted or disappear >> >> or are represented by a different, abstract method. The qualia would >> >> change, and the behaviour of the system would also change if it had a >> >> memory of what it was like before. >> >> >Exactly. The consensus Representational Qualia Theory says that >> >consciousness is computationally bound elemental physical qualities, in the >> >brain, like redness and grenness. > > How could a representational theory be related to (physical) qualities; What > could be a physical qualities? > > Above all, how could a anything (a physical universe, a god, whatever) select > some computations in arithmetic? > > > >> You can play all you want with thought experiments. But if they do not >> include the minimum requirements to not be qualia blind thought experiments, >> you aren't really talking about the qualitative nature of consciousness or >> what it is like. You are just talking about what computers can do and just >> quine or ignore qualia. > > OK. > > > >> >> >>What I am proposing with the neural substitution is that you only attempt >> >>to reproduce the low level behaviour. So in a robot, if there is a LM741 >> >>op amp you can replace it with a TL071 op amp, which has a completely >> >>different internal circuit design but identical pins and similar >> >>performance. >> >> >Yes, and all this is completely qualia blind. You start with the >> >assumption that whatever it is that has the redness quality we can directly >> >experience can somehow "arise" in a disconnected or separate from reality >> >"magic happens here" way. If you could include anything in your thought >> >experiment of things you are substituting that includes redness, and the >> >ability to bind this with something physically different like grenness, >> >this substitution thought experiment would be something more than absurd >> >(i.e. only revealing of your ignorance of how consciousness is >> >"computationally bound qualia.") And also, I predict that no matter what >> >you come up with as a prediction of what could be redness (whether >> >functional, behavioral, physical, quantum, the right set of logic gates, >> >the rite string of ones and zeros... or anything else, even including >> >"magic happens here") you will find that this will be impossible, for the >> >same reasons you don't think glutamate can be redness. The way this >> >thought experiment is designed qualia simply aren't possible, even >> >magically. It's just not logically possible in any way, without having the >> >same problem you have with glutamate being redness. To say nothing about >> >the required neural ponytail binding system which can connect to brains so >> >you can verify whether it has changed, or not, after the substitution. >> >> You don’t think it’s possible the robot’s red qualia could be a property >> specific to the LM741 op amp? Neither do I. Here is why. >> >> 1. Suppose the red qualia are a specific property of the LM741 op amp, a >> component in the robot’s visual processing system. >> >> 2. The TL071 op amp has completely different internal circuitry to the >> LM741, but an identical pin configuration, and identical performance in the >> robot. >> >> 3. Therefore, if you replace the LM741 with TL071, the robot will behave the >> same in every way. You can observe it, test it, talk to it, connect it with >> a neural ponytail to your own brain: there can be no difference. >> >> 4. The conclusion is that red qualia cannot be a specific property of the >> LM741 op amp. > > No, but it can still be the first person result of infinitely many > computations structured by the logic of self-reference, which, as the rch > (Löbian) machine already explain as something that can be felt immediately, > can have shapes, is non rationally justifiable without invoking a notion of > truth, cannot be communicated among subjects, etc. > > Of course, the problem here is that if we follow this (computationalist) > line, at some point we have to understand that there is no physical universe > at all, except as a sort of consciousness selection of infinitely many > histories in arithmetic. > > Here the magic is still there, but is reduced into our unexplainable > belief/understanding, if not consciousness, of the natural numbers. Here the > advantage is that the machine can explain why this has to be unexplainable, > unless assuming more unexplained objects. > > The qualia red is what appears in those histories where machine develop > vision together with “enough” self-reference abilities, and the Gödel-Löbian > machine, which are just the machine believing in some induction axioms, can > already explain why the qualia cannot have any representational theory. > But there can be a theory, and the theory provided by the machine (X1*) is > testable because it contains the whole theory of quanta (first person plural, > the quanta are qualia at the start, they are the sharable part of the > qualia). We cannot test it on the non sharable part, but we can test it on > the sharable part: we can measure and communicate results to others, with the > qualia, and the machine explains why there is an extension of quanta which is > not communicable as such. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypW6nqAkft2NWsbJE-NY%3DKzz-4Z4qvHZgGBQXc3%2BpFjm%2Bg%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypW6nqAkft2NWsbJE-NY%3DKzz-4Z4qvHZgGBQXc3%2BpFjm%2Bg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/039A6291-BA34-4BB3-ACCC-3728100B9E05%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/039A6291-BA34-4BB3-ACCC-3728100B9E05%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypUGWg-aqyooepLu2Q2%2BLTDRSWYjj3sNjD%2BqsfNBzgw%2Bfw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypUGWg-aqyooepLu2Q2%2BLTDRSWYjj3sNjD%2BqsfNBzgw%2Bfw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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