> On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:48, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the WM-duplicatipon, when “W” > refers to the first person experience? > > No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to assign any > probability at all to the possibility that he will see W (or M) tomorrow,
Do you accept the idea that if we offer him (to the two copies, thus) a cup of coffee after reconstitution, in both M and W, that he can say in Helsinki that if mechanism is correct, he will drink coffee with probability one? What would you say if you were the H-guy? > The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit of relative > frequencies over a large number of trials. But one trial is enough to refute P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 1. Or to refute P(W & M) = 1, given that W and M are incompatible first person experience (none of the copies will feel to be in two cities at once). > If you perform the WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N "first person > experiences” OK. > and many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from 0.5. Not at all. In the limit most will say that it looks like white noise: arbitrary sequence. We can show that most histories (sequence of W and M) will be algorithmically incompressible, and if the copies met, they can see that their population is well described by the Pascal triangle (or Newton’s binomial). > > There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario. If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are still in Helsinki. If you predict that you die, then you reject Mechanism (assumed here). If you predict P(W) = 1, the city in Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong. If you predict that your history is the development of PI, then only 1/2^N will be be confirmed, etc. What is you prediction, if there is no probability. Keep in mind that “W” and “M” does not refer to self-localisation, but to the first person experience. Do you agree that in this case W and M are incompatible. I just try to understand. > This is also Adrian Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any > benefit you might seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every "first > person" will get a different eigenvalue in the limit of infinite trials.. That is not correct. If it is the frequency operator which is measure, it gives the Born Probabilities, at least if the “simple” derivation is correct. But my question is independent of Everett, so even if Kent is correct for QM, it remains false for Mechanism. Let us agree first on the simple Mechanist case, and then come back to Everett. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT7XucAw9EGuTCtUaGfcQL%3DoFPmXpD6bbVTznaGRThAWw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT7XucAw9EGuTCtUaGfcQL%3DoFPmXpD6bbVTznaGRThAWw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFF8B3CC-9768-4CE7-86BE-5104AFA53896%40ulb.ac.be.
