> On 4 May 2020, at 14:08, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Monday, May 4, 2020 at 5:35:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 3 May 2020, at 23:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> I am a mathematician - not a physicist - but I don't understand why there is >> this complaint against the Wolfram Model - > > Because it cannot work, nor does it agrees the fundamental question. > > > > On what basis do you draw that conclusion?
On my contribution in the domain. I can explain this (I have already explain this on this list some time ago). You might read the argument in eight step, which shows that consciousness cannot be related to a computation, but only to infinities of computation (which are arithmetical objects as we know since the 1930s). You can attach a mind to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its own mind to a singular computation. Wolfram is Mechanism, + an implicit invocation in a materialist commitment or in a digital universe, but this is precisely what cannot work when we assume mechanism. > I am not a panegyric for Wolfram's theory at this time. What I say is more about his “new science” basic philosophy. > I have not studied it enough to make a judgment. It appears to be a form of > combinatorics combined with the sort of AI based graphs Nerode introduced to > categorize the Chomsky hierarchy of grammars. This then might have at least > some facet of the foundations of physics. At this time I really do not know. It is too much Aristotelian to make sense with the mechanist assumption, where the physical has to emerge from a statistic on all computations “as seen from inside” (something that the logic of provability of Gödel-Löb-Solovay makes possible to make mathematically precise). That last work of Wolfram might help, or not, but fail to address the fundamental questions. It is still “physics” , which is nice, per se, but the way he present it, as fundamental, requires physicalism and this non-mechanism (if you are aware of my contribution, or of Plato skepticism). With mechanism, the dream argument becomes a theorem in arithmetic, leading to a testable theory in metaphysics, a bit like the Bell inequalities makes some philosophical point made by Einstein testable. Bruno > > LC > > >> but not many complaints about >> >> Many Worlds theories - https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.08132 >> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.08132> > > For a mechanist, Thea priori question is why only those many worlds, as it > *seems* to be a filtration on “all computations”. I have thought that Nature > refutes mechanism, because I thought obvious that the physical universe was > unique, but then physics confirms the “obvious” all computations aspect of > arithmetic. > > > >> Ghost fields - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_(physics) >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_(physics)> > I have no clues on this, yet. > > Bruno > > > >> etc. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 2:02:00 PM UTC-5, ronaldheld wrote: >> >> I am a physicist. Ignoring the mind/body problems,what new predictions >> does his model make,and can it be falsified? >> Ronald >> n Wednesday, April 29, 2020 at 4:40:56 AM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> The "hypergraph" stuff from Stephen Wolfram in recent news on his "new >> foundation" of physics has a name: The Wolfram Model. >> >> >> >> Some Relativistic and Gravitational Properties of the Wolfram >> Model >> Jonathan Gorard >> https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-quantum-mechanical-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf >> >> <https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-quantum-mechanical-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf> >> >> Some Quantum Mechanical Properties of the Wolfram Model >> Jonathan Gorard >> https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-relativistic-and-gravitational-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf >> >> <https://www.wolframcloud.com/obj/wolframphysics/Documents/some-relativistic-and-gravitational-properties-of-the-wolfram-model.pdf> >> >> >> @philipthrift >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/af0a2949-5a75-4d99-9ff4-5639b356b90a%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/af0a2949-5a75-4d99-9ff4-5639b356b90a%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/290dc535-8f52-45ec-9265-afac3f3e3024%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/290dc535-8f52-45ec-9265-afac3f3e3024%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F25CC33F-1C8E-4B0F-A2C4-071127805D0D%40ulb.ac.be.
