> On 8 Jun 2020, at 23:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/8/2020 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 12:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 5:16:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the behaviour of >>> single particle, or more generally to get some meaning of the relative >>> probabilities, experimentally, or in arithmetic. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> There are so many "mechanisms" so many people have come up with over many >>> decades now to "interpret" these "relative probabilities" that have been >>> experimentally recored. >>> >>> Sean Carroll has his "many worlds" >>> >>> or (another "possibility"): >>> >>> The offer wave going out in all directions and the many confirmation waves >>> returning are a sort of subset of the infinite number of virtual photons >>> traveling all possible paths between emitters and absorbers in Feynman's >>> "sum-over-paths" path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics. Kastner >>> proposes to regard the outgoing offer wave and many incoming confirmation >>> waves as "possible >>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/possibilism.html>" >>> transactions, only one of which indeterministically >>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/indeterminacy.html> becomes >>> "actual." >>> >>> Kastner is a possibilist >>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/possibilism.html> who >>> argues that OWs and CWs are possibilities that are "real." She says that >>> they are less real than actual empirically measurable events, but more real >>> than an idea or concept in a person's mind. She suggests the alternate term >>> "potentia," Aristotle's that she found Heisenberg had cited. For Kastner, >>> the possibilities are physically real as compared to merely conceptually >>> possible ideas that are consistent with physical law (for example, David >>> Lewis >>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/>' >>> "possible worlds." But she says the "possibilities" described by offer and >>> confirmation waves are "sub-empirical" and pre-spatiotemporal (i.e., they >>> have not shown up as actual in spacetime). She calls these "incipient >>> transactions.” >> >> >> This looks like Popper's propensity. It leads to a dualism (and indeed, he >> wrote with Clles a book defending dualism in philosophy of mind).
I meant Eccles (not Clles). > > I don't see that it entails dualism, even though Popper may have defended it. > Have you read the propensity theory of Paul Humphreys > > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/57cd/976f12b84c660a78d21c3cd207530a7fd82d.pdf > > <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/57cd/976f12b84c660a78d21c3cd207530a7fd82d.pdf> > I took a look at it just now. I tend to agree with him. As far as I understand “propensity”, I find rather normal that Bayes theorem does not apply, and that propensity is not probability. It remind me of the Shafer-Dempster theory of evidence, or Smets' Transferable Belief Model”. It might be close to the logic of []p & <>t, thanks to the lack of necessitation rules at the G* level. Now, all this seems to avoid the metaphysical issue. Popper used it to avoid the many-world, but eventually it leads to some action of consciousness on matter: a dualist interactionist theory, which makes not much sense to me. > > or the book "Causality" by Judea Pearl, which takes similar approach to > inference? Ah! I read many papers by Pearl when working with Smets on its belief theory (many years ago). Eventually the modal logic where based on the deontic axiom ([]p -> <>p), which is recovered by the []p & <>t mode of self-reference. But I have not read his book on “causality”. I tend to agree with such treatment of inference, but not when this is used to hide the metaphysical problem. Most of those approach avoid the metaphysical question. It is more artificial intelligence than philosophy of mind. Bruno > > Brent > >> It is conceptually more simple to consider an actuality as a possible seen >> from inside. Now, here, today are already indixicals,making sense. >> That fits with the overall “everything is simpler than any thing” philosophy >> of this list, and is made obligatory with mechanism, except for adding ad >> hoc complexity or conspiracy à la Bostrom. It is definitely incompatible >> with Mechanism + very weak version of Occam Razor. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> ... >>> >>> https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/ >>> <https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/#:~:text=Ruth%20Kastner%20is%20a%20physicist,possibilist%20extension%20of%20John%20G.&text=Cramer%20has%20explored%20the%20radical,backwards%20in%20time%20(retrocausality).> >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fbf449c4-3051-44c8-861c-b5fcbf26ab62o%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fbf449c4-3051-44c8-861c-b5fcbf26ab62o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B67083D3-58F8-4525-8FCF-C74D1B5E43A0%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B67083D3-58F8-4525-8FCF-C74D1B5E43A0%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4b44508a-9e82-24c7-e0d1-c36e8b24f45f%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4b44508a-9e82-24c7-e0d1-c36e8b24f45f%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BA29F5F6-ACBE-44F9-849B-E0010A88580C%40ulb.ac.be.
