> On 7 Aug 2020, at 17:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Friday, August 7, 2020 at 9:43:38 AM UTC-5 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 7 Aug 2020, at 13:38, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <applewebdata://E26282B2-FC79-4117-BB13-70B5226AB646>> wrote: >> >> That might be, but a programming language that has no context with anything >> is not that valuable. > > > At least, we should take the semantic of the reality on which that language > is based. A language per se is not enough. > > > > > >> At least it is not that valuable to me. My point is this seems to connect >> with concepts of spacetime as built up from large N entanglements. > > I agree, and the entanglement must be explained from the first person > indeterminacy, singular and plural, which are imposed by incompleteness on > all “creatures” living in arithmetic (or at its internal phenomenological > border given by the self-reference mode available to the universal machine. > > With mechanism, physics is a branch of machine biology (or psychology, or > better “theology” …). > > Bruno > > > But that has nothing to do with physics..
How could a derivation of physics have nothing to do with physics? You are right, physics describes some reality through number relation (like F = ma, F = GmM/r^2, …), but with Mechanism, those physical (ov-bservable, locally predictable) number relations must be explained in a sort of Darwinian way from the “number”s dream” (which we know to be all realised in arithmetic). > Physics only describes (in a language). > > Musing about its "meaning" is for philosophers to waste their time on. With mechanism, physics becomes a branch of some philosophies or theologies, making them testable. Philosophy and theology are just nickname for fundamental science. People who do not muse on this usually accept the Aristotelian theologies, which unfortunately are logically incompatible with Darwin or any inferred physical laws until now, including the non computable part. > > "Our best computer simulations, accurately describing everything [in > physics], use only finite computer resources by treating everything as > finite." > -- Max Tegmark > https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25344 That is locally correct, and exploited through Mechanism (by Nature), but to get the qualia, there is not much choice to come back to Plato. You can divide the theologies in three categories: 1) those with a Creator and a Creation, 2) those with only a Creation 3) Those without a Creator and without a Creation 1) and 2) are what I called Aristotelian theologies. They “believed” in some “creation”, with or without a creator (personal or not). 3) is Plato (although Plato was just searching and looking at alternative, and we could add all the nuances between Platonism, Middle-Platonism (neopythagoreanism) and néoplatonisme. Mechanism enforces the theologies of type three “3)", also called “neutral monism”. There is still a sort of God, but it makes not much sense to look at It like it could be a creator (the arithmetical reality, which supports all computations, from which the universal machine will infer an observable reality, a long time before realising it was also deducible. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7915f095-f2ae-43d2-8dd1-2ad6a8b7b4a8n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7915f095-f2ae-43d2-8dd1-2ad6a8b7b4a8n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11463EFC-4EC0-46B1-A2EC-732B6D7F2630%40ulb.ac.be.
