On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/20/2020 1:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 1:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/20/2020 5:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 15 Oct 2020, at 22:53, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/15/2020 12:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 1:56 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> You should have read Vic Stenger's "The Fallacy of Fine Tuning". Vic >>> points out how many examples of fine tuning are mis-conceived...including >>> Hoyle's prediction of an excited state of carbon. Vic also points out the >>> fallacy of just considering one parameter when the parameter space is high >>> dimensional. >>> >> >> Hi Brent, >> >> Thanks for the suggestions. I did read Barnes's critique of TFOFT ( >> https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647 ) and I just now read Stenger's reply: >> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.4359.pdf >> >> I think they both make some valid points. It may be that many parameters >> we believe are fine tuned will turn out to have other explanations. But I >> also think in domains where we do have understandings, such as in >> computational models (such as algorithmic information thery: what is the >> shortest program that produces X), or in the set of all possible cellular >> automata that only consider the states of adjacent cells, the number that >> are interesting (neither too simple nor too chaotic) is a small fraction of >> the total. So there is probably fine tuning, but it is, as you mention, >> extremely hard to quantify. >> >> >>> >>> But my general criticism of fine-tuning is two-fold. First, the concept >>> is not well defined. There is no apriori probability distribution over >>> possible values. If the possible values are infinite, then any realized >>> value is improbable. Fine tuning is all in the intuition. Charts are >>> drawn showing little "we are here" zones to prove the fine tuning. But the >>> scales are sometimes linear, sometimes logarithmic. And why those >>> parameters and not the square?...or the square root? Bayesian inference is >>> not invariant under change of parameters. >>> >> >> At least for the cosmological constant, there seems to be some >> understanding of its probability distribution, and it is relatively >> independent of the other parameters in that it is unrelated to >> nucleosynthesis, chemistry, etc. Therefore it is our best candidate to >> consider in isolation from the other parameters in the high-dimensional >> space. >> >> >>> >>> Second, calling it "fine-tuning" implies some kind of process of >>> "tuning" or "selection". But that's gratuitous. Absent supernatural >>> miracles, we must find ourselves in a universe in which we are >>> nomologically possible. And that is true whether there is one universe or >>> infinitely many. So it cannot be evidence one way or the other for the >>> number of universes. >>> >> >> Let's say we did have an understanding of the distribution of possible >> universes and the fraction of which supported conscious life. If we >> discover the fraction to be 1 in 1,000,000 would this not motivate a belief >> in there being more than one universe? >> >> >> No, because it is equally evidence that one universe (this one) was >> realized out of the ensemble. You are relying on an intuition that it is >> easier to explain why all 1,000,000 exist than to explain why this one >> exists. But that's an intuition about explaining things, not about any >> objective probability. Every day things happen that are more improbable >> than a million-to-one. >> >> >> >> You need to take all the histories, which we know exists in arithmetic, >> >> >> I don't know what "exists in arithmetic" has to do with existence. >> >> then consciousness will differentiate on those histories which seems to >> be fine tuned. Like you say, we have to eliminate the selector, except for >> consciousness. >> >> Until Everett no one thought it necessary to suppose all the >> counterfactuals happened "somewhere else”. >> >> >> >> Well, there was Borgess of course, and the idea is present in the whole >> neoplatonism, arguably. Then, for any one who believes that 777 is odd >> independently of him/herself, all computations are run independently of >> anyone. >> >> >> That's a non-sequitur. One can try dividing 777 by 2. One can't verify >> all computations are independently or dependently of anyone. >> > > If you accept the independent truth of the equation "Y = 2X+1" in the case > of "Y=777" and an integer X, then you should likewise also accept the > existence of all computations, > > > How can you be so casual about leaping from "This statement is true." to > "The relation it expresses entails that the relata exist." "True" and > "exist" are even different words. > We've argued this countless times before, so I don't want to repeat it again. The truth that 777 is odd implies the existence of an integer X, which is 1 more than 777 divided by 2. Truth has ontological implications and consequences when they relate to the existence or non-existence of other entities. > "Watson is the companion of Holmes" is true in many logics (just note that > it's negation is false) yet nobody thinks it makes Sherlock Holmes into a > person who existed. > What reality are you applying the word "exists" within? You never specified it, which makes any answer regarding the existence or non-existence of Watson ambiguous. > In mathematics, "exists" means has a value that satifies (makes true) > and expression. It says nothing about whether you can kick it and whether > it kicks back. > > Kicking back occurs from the perspective of entities existing who live within long computational histories which occur in platonically existing computational threads, which exist if you assume arithmetical truth. Jason > Brent > > as a consequence of the equation defined here: > ftp://ftp.math.ethz.ch/hg/EMIS/journals/AMI/2003/jones.pdf > > Jason > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhQXt6v60%2Bdqw0e%2BjjwKZLJG%2BTR-%2BY-7w96r6kK%3DABZnw%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhQXt6v60%2Bdqw0e%2BjjwKZLJG%2BTR-%2BY-7w96r6kK%3DABZnw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3614d16d-3478-95a5-0da9-b93c8fb40aa4%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3614d16d-3478-95a5-0da9-b93c8fb40aa4%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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