> On 4 Jul 2021, at 17:40, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Friday, June 18, 2021 at 8:46:39 PM UTC+2 Jason wrote: > In your opinion who has offered the best theory of consciousness to date, or > who do you agree with most? Would you say you agree with them wholeheartedly > or do you find points if disagreement? > > I am seeing several related thoughts commonly expressed, but not sure which > one or which combination is right. For example: > > Hofstadter/Marchal: self-reference is key > > I don't know if self-reference in the sense of Godel sentences is relevant to > consciousness
There are two senses used in computer science, and well captured by the first and second recursion theorem, also called fixed point theorem. The second recursion theorem is more important and more “intensional”, taking the shape of the (relative) code more into account. The real surprise in that the Gödel-Löbian self-reference, by its clear and transparent siplliting along truth (axiomatised by the modal logic G*, which I call “the theology of the sound machine”) and proof (axiomatised by G), justifies again, like Theaetetus, and unlike Socrates, the modes of truth described since Parmenides, Plato, Moderatus of Gades, Plotinus… Damascius. For example, written in Modal logic, consistency (NOT PROVABLE FALSE) can be written ~[]f, or equivalently <>t, and Gödel’s second incompleteness is <>t -> ~[]<>t, or equivalently <>t -> <>[]f. Löb’s theorem ([]([]p->p)->[]p) generalises this, and is the main axiom of both G and G*. G* has all theorems of theorem of G, plus []A -> A, but has no necessitation rule (you cannot infer []A from A. The main point is that G1* (G* + p->[]p, for the mechanist restriction, as I have often explained), proves the equivalence of the five modes p (truth) []p (provable, rationally believable) []p & p (rationally knowable) []p & <>t (observable) []p & <>t & p (sensible) Yet, G, the justifiable part of this by the machine does not prove any of those equivalence. The provable obeys to G, the knowable gives a logic of knowledge (S4 + a formula by Grzegorcyk), and, as predicted both through tough experiment, and Plotinus, the “observable” obeys to a quantum logic, and the sensible to a intutionistic quantum logic, which allows to distinguish clearly the quanta, as first plural sharable qualia, solving some difficulties in the “mind-body” problem. This theory is justified for anybody accepting a digital physical computer brain transplant. > but I would say that self-reference in the sense of intrinsic identity of an > object explains qualitative properties of consciousness (qualia). But what is a object? What is intrinsic identity? And why that would give qualia? > I imagine that every object has two kinds of identity: intrinsic identity > (something that the object is in itself) To be honest, I don’t understand. To be sure, I like mechanism because it provide a clear explanation of where the physical appearance comes from, without having us ti speculate on some “physical” object which would be primary, as we have no evidence for this, and it makes the mind-body problem unsolvable. Are you OK if your daughter marry a man who got an artificial digital brain after a car accident? > and extrinsic identity (relations of the object to all other objects). > Intrinsic identity is something qualitative (non-relational), a quality that > stands in relations to other qualities, so it seems like a natural candidate > for the qualitative properties of consciousness. This brings back essentialism. Here, you might appreciate that the machine ([]p) is unable to define “[]p & p”, except by studying a simpler machine than itself, and then she can lift that theology by faith in its own soundness, which she can neither prove, nor even express in its language (by results analog to the non definability of truth (Tarski-Gödel, Thomason, Montague, ... ). The qualia appear to be measurable, but non communicable or rationally justifiable. The universal+ machine knows that she has a soul, and she knows that she can refute *all* complete theories made on that soul. Se knows already that her soul is NOT a machine, nor even anything describable in the third person, redoing Heraclite and Brouwer, even Bergson, on that subject. S4Grz is an incredible product of G*, a formal theory of something that no machine can define or formalise, without invoking a notion of truth, which is indeed a key for qualia, and knowledge. > All relations are instances of the similarity relation (similarities between > qualities arising from common and different properties of the qualities), of > which a particular kind of relation deserves a special mention: the > composition relation, also known as the set membership relation in set > theory, or the relation between a whole and its part (or between a > combination of objects and an object in the combination), which gives rise to > a special kind of relational identity of an object: the compositional > identity, which is constituted by the relations of the object to its parts > (in other words, it is the internal structure of the object - not to be > confused with the intrinsic identity of the object, which is a non-structural > quality!). Set theory describes the compositional identity of all possible > composite objects down to non-composite objects (instances of the empty set). Formal set theories are example of universal+ machine, and indeed, very useful to describe the phenomenology. In the ontology, we cannot use the induction axioms, still less any infinity axioms, but in the phenomenology, we cannot live without them, and no infinity axioms can be rich enough to get the arithmetical truth, or the computer science truth. > > Since all objects have an intrinsic identity, this is a panpsychist view but > it seems important to differentiate between different levels or intensities > of consciousness. OK. You might need to say “no” to the doctor... Bruno > > Tononi/Tegmark: information is key > > Study of neural correlates of consciousness suggests that the level or > intensity of consciousness of an object depends on the complexity of the > object's structure. There are two basic approaches to the definition of > complexity: "disorganized" complexity (which is high in objects that have > many different and independent (random) parts) and "organized" complexity > (which is high in objects that have many different but also dependent > (integrated) parts). It is the organized complexity in a dynamic form that > seems important for the level of consciousness. Tononi's integrated > information theory is based on such organized complexity though I don't know > if his particular specification of the complexity is correct. > > Dennett/Chalmers: function is key > > From the evolutionary perspective it seems important for an organism to be > able to create internal representations of external objects on different > levels of composition of reality. Such representations reflect both the > diversity and regularities of reality and need to be properly integrated to > have a unified, coordinated influence on the organism's behavior. So the > organized complexity of the organism's representations seems to be related to > its functionality. > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cdb10702-4479-4089-b0c0-2d145de35efdn%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cdb10702-4479-4089-b0c0-2d145de35efdn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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