> On 4 Jul 2021, at 21:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 7/4/2021 4:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 19 Jun 2021, at 13:17, smitra <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Information is the key. Conscious agents are defined by precisely that >>> information that specifies the content of their consciousness. This means >>> that a conscious agent can never be precisely located in some physical >>> object, because the information that describes the conscious experience >>> will always be less detailed than the information present in the exact >>> physical description of an object such a brain. There are always going to >>> be a very large self localization ambiguity due to the large number of >>> different possible brain states that would generate exactly the same >>> conscious experience. So, given whatever conscious experience the agent >>> has, the agent could be in a very large number of physically distinct >>> states. >>> >>> The simpler the brain and the algorithm implemented by the brain, the >>> larger this self-localization ambiguity becomes because smaller algorithms >>> contain less detailed information. Our conscious experiences localizes us >>> very precisely on an Earth-like planet in a solar system that is very >>> similar to the one we think we live in. But the fly walking on the wall of >>> the room I'm in right now may have some conscious experience that is >>> exactly identical to that of another fly walking on the wall of another >>> house in another country 600 years ago or on some rock in a cave 35 million >>> year ago. >>> >>> The conscious experience of the fly I see on the all is therefore not >>> located in the particular fly I'm observing. > > This seems to equate "a conscious experience" with "an algorithm”.
Not sure if you ask Saibal or me. Obviously, it has as much wrong to identify consciousness with a brain than with an algorithm. It is the same error, as a brain, its mechanist relevant part, is a finite word/program, written in some subset of the physical laws. > But an algortihm is an extended thing that in general has branches > representing counterfactuals. That’s not an algorithm, but a computations. The counterfactual are the differentiating branches of the computations. > >>> This is i.m.o. the key thing you get from identifying consciousness with >>> information, it makes the multiverse an essential ingredient of >>> consciousness. This resolves paradoxes you get in thought experiments where >>> you consider simulating a brain in a virtual world and then argue that >>> since the simulation is deterministic, you could replace the actual >>> computer doing the computations by a device playing a recording of the >>> physical brain states. This argument breaks down if you take into account >>> the self-localization ambiguity > > What is this "self" of which you speak? Again, ask Saibal. I did not wrote the text above. I never use the term “information”, because it is confusing, as we use with its first person meaning and its third person meaning all the time, and that the whole mind-body problem consists in handling all this carefully, taking into account all modes of self implied by incompleteness. The theory is there. It is not know because physicist comes with the right question and wrong metaphysics, and logicians comes up with the right metaphysics, but wrong question. I am afraid also that the reaction of the logicians to Penrose use of Gödel’s theorem (against Mechanism) has deter the physicists to even study logic and Gödel’s theorem. Yet, with mechanism, we get a simple explanation, without any ontological commitment except for at least one universal machinery (to get machines, and the numbers are enough) of both qualia, quanta, and their mathematical relations, but also their necessarily non mathematical relations. Bruno > > > Brent > > >>> and consider that this multiverse aspect is an essential part of >>> consciousness due to counterfactuals necessary to define the algorithm >>> being realized, which is impossible in a deterministic single-world setting. >> OK. Not only true, but it makes physics into a branch of mathematical logic, >> partially embedded in arithmetic (and totally embedded in the semantic of >> arithmetic, which of course cannot be purely arithmetical, as the machine >> understand already). >> >> I got the many-dreams, or many histories of the physical reality from the >> many computations in arithmetic well before I discovered Everett. Until that >> moment I was still thinking that QM was a threat on Mechanism, but of course >> it is only the wave collapse postulate which is contradictory with Mechanism. >> >> We cannot make a computation disappear like we cannot make a number >> disappear… >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> Saibal >>> >>> >>> On 18-06-2021 20:46, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> In your opinion who has offered the best theory of consciousness to >>>> date, or who do you agree with most? Would you say you agree with them >>>> wholeheartedly or do you find points if disagreement? >>>> I am seeing several related thoughts commonly expressed, but not sure >>>> which one or which combination is right. For example: >>>> Hofstadter/Marchal: self-reference is key >>>> Tononi/Tegmark: information is key >>>> Dennett/Chalmers: function is key >>>> To me all seem potentially valid, and perhaps all three are needed in >>>> some combination. I'm curious to hear what other viewpoints exist or >>>> if there are other candidates for the "secret sauce" behind >>>> consciousness I might have missed. >>>> Jason >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUik%3Du724L6JxAKi0gq-rPfV%3DXwGd7nS2kmZ_znLd7MT1g%40mail.gmail.com >>>> [1]. >>>> Links: >>>> ------ >>>> [1] >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUik%3Du724L6JxAKi0gq-rPfV%3DXwGd7nS2kmZ_znLd7MT1g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bd53588153f2debae241dbb41e48b60a%40zonnet.nl. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/52092278-3991-54c6-e8d4-0989f64d7d44%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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