On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 12:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 13:37, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 11:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:48, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 8:42 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:03, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> it is true that my brain has been trained on a large amount of data - >>>>>> data that contains intelligence outside of my own. But when I >>>>>> introspect, I >>>>>> notice that my understanding of things is ultimately rooted/grounded in >>>>>> my >>>>>> phenomenal experience. Ultimately, everything we know, we know either by >>>>>> our experience, or by analogy to experiences we've had. This is in >>>>>> opposition to how LLMs train on data, which is strictly about how >>>>>> words/symbols relate to one another. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The functionalist position is that phenomenal experience supervenes on >>>>> behaviour, such that if the behaviour is replicated (same output for same >>>>> input) the phenomenal experience will also be replicated. This is what >>>>> philosophers like Searle (and many laypeople) can’t stomach. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think the kind of phenomenal supervenience you're talking about is >>>> typically asserted for behavior at the level of the neuron, not the level >>>> of the whole agent. Is that what you're saying? That chatGPT must be >>>> having a phenomenal experience if it talks like a human? If so, that is >>>> stretching the explanatory domain of functionalism past its breaking point. >>>> >>> >>> The best justification for functionalism is David Chalmers' "Fading >>> Qualia" argument. The paper considers replacing neurons with functionally >>> equivalent silicon chips, but it could be generalised to replacing any part >>> of the brain with a functionally equivalent black box, the whole brain, the >>> whole person. >>> >> >> You're saying that an algorithm that provably does not have experiences >> of rabbits and lollipops - but can still talk about them in a way that's >> indistinguishable from a human - essentially has the same phenomenology as >> a human talking about rabbits and lollipops. That's just absurd on its >> face. You're essentially hand-waving away the grounding problem. Is that >> your position? That symbols don't need to be grounded in any sort of >> phenomenal experience? >> > > It's not just talking about them in a way that is indistinguishable from a > human, in order to have human-like consciousness the entire I/O behaviour > of the human would need to be replicated. But in principle, I don't see why > a LLM could not have some other type of phenomenal experience. And I don't > think the grounding problem is a problem: I was never grounded in anything, > I just grew up associating one symbol with another symbol, it's symbols all > the way down. > Is the smell of your grandmother's kitchen a symbol? > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXViwvq0TnbJXnPt7VVDoy8zASJyZeq-O3ZpOpMSx6cwg%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXViwvq0TnbJXnPt7VVDoy8zASJyZeq-O3ZpOpMSx6cwg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMy3ZA-0ZVcLfU0bBLCP%3DRsZNOSbAadhBONRNjM6wXLNk5iZxA%40mail.gmail.com.
