On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 14:23, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 12:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 13:37, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 11:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:48, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 8:42 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:03, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> it is true that my brain has been trained on a large amount of data >>>>>>> - data that contains intelligence outside of my own. But when I >>>>>>> introspect, >>>>>>> I notice that my understanding of things is ultimately rooted/grounded >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> my phenomenal experience. Ultimately, everything we know, we know >>>>>>> either by >>>>>>> our experience, or by analogy to experiences we've had. This is in >>>>>>> opposition to how LLMs train on data, which is strictly about how >>>>>>> words/symbols relate to one another. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The functionalist position is that phenomenal experience supervenes >>>>>> on behaviour, such that if the behaviour is replicated (same output for >>>>>> same input) the phenomenal experience will also be replicated. This is >>>>>> what >>>>>> philosophers like Searle (and many laypeople) can’t stomach. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think the kind of phenomenal supervenience you're talking about is >>>>> typically asserted for behavior at the level of the neuron, not the level >>>>> of the whole agent. Is that what you're saying? That chatGPT must be >>>>> having a phenomenal experience if it talks like a human? If so, that is >>>>> stretching the explanatory domain of functionalism past its breaking >>>>> point. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The best justification for functionalism is David Chalmers' "Fading >>>> Qualia" argument. The paper considers replacing neurons with functionally >>>> equivalent silicon chips, but it could be generalised to replacing any part >>>> of the brain with a functionally equivalent black box, the whole brain, the >>>> whole person. >>>> >>> >>> You're saying that an algorithm that provably does not have experiences >>> of rabbits and lollipops - but can still talk about them in a way that's >>> indistinguishable from a human - essentially has the same phenomenology as >>> a human talking about rabbits and lollipops. That's just absurd on its >>> face. You're essentially hand-waving away the grounding problem. Is that >>> your position? That symbols don't need to be grounded in any sort of >>> phenomenal experience? >>> >> >> It's not just talking about them in a way that is indistinguishable from >> a human, in order to have human-like consciousness the entire I/O behaviour >> of the human would need to be replicated. But in principle, I don't see why >> a LLM could not have some other type of phenomenal experience. And I don't >> think the grounding problem is a problem: I was never grounded in anything, >> I just grew up associating one symbol with another symbol, it's symbols all >> the way down. >> > > Is the smell of your grandmother's kitchen a symbol? > Yes, I can't pull away the facade to check that there was a real grandmother and a real kitchen against which I can check that the sense data matches. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXiwn%2Bwh2K_T6K5pL5NZJR8%3DaPejiWQmyy5SHtee0%2Bouw%40mail.gmail.com.
