On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 14:47, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/24/2023 9:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 13:59, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, May 24, 2023, 9:56 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 11:48, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >An RNG would be a bad design choice because it would be extremely >>>> unreliable. However, as a thought experiment, it could work. If the visual >>>> cortex were removed and replaced with an RNG which for five minutes >>>> replicated the interactions with the remaining brain, the subject would >>>> behave as if they had normal vision and report that they had normal vision, >>>> then after five minutes behave as if they were blind and report that they >>>> were blind. It is perhaps contrary to intuition that the subject would >>>> really have visual experiences in that five minute period, but I don't >>>> think there is any other plausible explanation. >>>> >>> >>>> I think they would be a visual zombie in that five minute period, >>>> though as described they would not be able to report any difference. >>>> >>>> I think if one's entire brain were replaced by an RNG, they would be a >>>> total zombie who would fool us into thinking they were conscious and we >>>> would not notice a difference. So by extension a brain partially replaced >>>> by an RNG would be a partial zombie that fooled the other parts of the >>>> brain into thinking nothing was amiss. >>>> >>> >>> I think the concept of a partial zombie makes consciousness nonsensical. >>> >> >> It borders on the nonsensical, but between the two bad alternatives I >> find the idea of a RNG instantiating human consciousness somewhat less >> sensical than the idea of partial zombies. >> > > If consciousness persists no matter what the brain is replaced with as > long as the output remains the same this is consistent with the idea that > consciousness does not reside in a particular substance (even a magical > substance) or in a particular process. This is a strange idea, but it is > akin to the existence of platonic objects. The number three can be > implemented by arranging three objects in a row but it does not depend > those three objects unless it is being used for a particular purpose, such > as three beads on an abacus. > > >> How would I know that I am not a visual zombie now, or a visual zombie >>> every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday? >>> >> >> Here, we have to be careful what we mean by "I". Our own brains have >> various spheres of consciousness as demonstrated by the Wada Test: we can >> shut down one hemisphere of the brain and lose partial awareness and >> functionality such as the ability to form words and yet one remains >> conscious. I think being a partial zombie would be like that, having one's >> sphere of awareness shrink. >> > > But the subject's sphere of awareness would not shrink in the thought > experiment, since by assumption their behaviour stays the same, while if > their sphere of awareness shrank they notice that something was different > and say so. > > > Why do you think they would notice? Color blind people don't notice they > are color blind...until somebody tells them about it and even then they > don't "notice" it. > There would either be objective or subjective evidence of a change due to the substitution. If there is neither objective nor subjective evidence of a change, then there is no change. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWc%3D1gzg1LQ%3DLYdtJTUYH3anjzOSFNvP9CTeqUC8x3KQg%40mail.gmail.com.
