On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 11:48, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Wed, May 24, 2023, 9:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Thu, 25 May 2023 at 06:46, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 12:20 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 21:56, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 24, 2023, 3:20 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 15:37, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, May 24, 2023, 1:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 04:03, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 7:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 21:09, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As I see this thread, Terren and Stathis are both talking past >>>>>>>>>>> each other. Please either of you correct me if i am wrong, but in >>>>>>>>>>> an effort >>>>>>>>>>> to clarify and perhaps resolve this situation: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I believe Stathis is saying the functional substitution having >>>>>>>>>>> the same fine-grained causal organization *would* have the same >>>>>>>>>>> phenomenology, the same experience, and the same qualia as the >>>>>>>>>>> brain with >>>>>>>>>>> the same fine-grained causal organization. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, there is no disagreement between your positions with >>>>>>>>>>> regards to symbols groundings, mappings, etc. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> When you both discuss the problem of symbology, or bits, etc. I >>>>>>>>>>> believe this is partly responsible for why you are both talking >>>>>>>>>>> past each >>>>>>>>>>> other, because there are many levels involved in brains (and >>>>>>>>>>> computational >>>>>>>>>>> systems). I believe you were discussing completely different levels >>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>>> hierarchical organization. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> There are high-level parts of minds, such as ideas, thoughts, >>>>>>>>>>> feelings, quale, etc. and there are low-level, be they neurons, >>>>>>>>>>> neurotransmitters, atoms, quantum fields, and laws of physics as in >>>>>>>>>>> human >>>>>>>>>>> brains, or circuits, logic gates, bits, and instructions as in >>>>>>>>>>> computers. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think when Terren mentions a "symbol for the smell of >>>>>>>>>>> grandmother's kitchen" (GMK) the trouble is we are crossing a >>>>>>>>>>> myriad of >>>>>>>>>>> levels. The quale or idea or memory of the smell of GMK is a very >>>>>>>>>>> high-level feature of a mind. When Terren asks for or discusses a >>>>>>>>>>> symbol >>>>>>>>>>> for it, a complete answer/description for it can only be supplied >>>>>>>>>>> in terms >>>>>>>>>>> of a vast amount of information concerning low level structures, be >>>>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>> patterns of neuron firings, or patterns of bits being processed. >>>>>>>>>>> When we >>>>>>>>>>> consider things down at this low level, however, we lose all >>>>>>>>>>> context for >>>>>>>>>>> what the meaning, idea, and quale are or where or how they come in. >>>>>>>>>>> We >>>>>>>>>>> cannot see or find the idea of GMK in any neuron, no more than we >>>>>>>>>>> can see >>>>>>>>>>> or find it in any neuron. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Of course then it should seem deeply mysterious, if not >>>>>>>>>>> impossible, how we get "it" (GMK or otherwise) from "bit", but to >>>>>>>>>>> me, this >>>>>>>>>>> is no greater a leap from how we get "it" from a bunch of cells >>>>>>>>>>> squirting >>>>>>>>>>> ions back and forth. Trying to understand a smartphone by looking >>>>>>>>>>> at the >>>>>>>>>>> flows of electrons is a similar kind of problem, it would seem just >>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>> difficult or impossible to explain and understand the high-level >>>>>>>>>>> features >>>>>>>>>>> and complexity out of the low-level simplicity. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is why it's crucial to bear in mind and explicitly discuss >>>>>>>>>>> the level one is operation on when one discusses symbols, >>>>>>>>>>> substrates, or >>>>>>>>>>> quale. In summary, I think a chief reason you have been talking >>>>>>>>>>> past each >>>>>>>>>>> other is because you are each operating on different assumed levels. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Please correct me if you believe I am mistaken and know I only >>>>>>>>>>> offer my perspective in the hope it might help the conversation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think you’ve captured my position. But in addition I think >>>>>>>>>> replicating the fine-grained causal organisation is not necessary in >>>>>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>> to replicate higher level phenomena such as GMK. By extension of >>>>>>>>>> Chalmers’ >>>>>>>>>> substitution experiment, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Note that Chalmers's argument is based on assuming the functional >>>>>>>>> substitution occurs at a certain level of fine-grained-ness. If you >>>>>>>>> lose >>>>>>>>> this step, and look at only the top-most input-output of the mind as >>>>>>>>> black >>>>>>>>> box, then you can no longer distinguish a rock from a dreaming >>>>>>>>> person, nor >>>>>>>>> a calculator computing 2+3 and a human computing 2+3, and one also >>>>>>>>> runs >>>>>>>>> into the Blockhead "lookup table" argument against functionalism. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, those are perhaps problems with functionalism. But a major >>>>>>>> point in Chalmers' argument is that if qualia were substrate-specific >>>>>>>> (hence, functionalism false) it would be possible to make a partial >>>>>>>> zombie >>>>>>>> or an entity whose consciousness and behaviour diverged from the point >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> substitution was made. And this argument works not just by replacing >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> neurons with silicon chips, but by replacing any part of the human with >>>>>>>> anything that reproduces the interactions with the remaining parts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> How deeply do you have to go when you consider or define those >>>>>>> "other parts" though? That seems to be a critical but unstated >>>>>>> assumption, >>>>>>> and something that depends on how finely grained you consider the >>>>>>> relevant/important parts of a brain to be. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For reference, this is what Chalmers says: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a >>>>>>> principle of organizational invariance, holding that experience is >>>>>>> invariant across systems with the same fine-grained functional >>>>>>> organization. More precisely, the principle states that given any system >>>>>>> that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same >>>>>>> functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively >>>>>>> identical conscious experiences. A full specification of a system's >>>>>>> fine-grained functional organization will fully determine any conscious >>>>>>> experiences that arise." >>>>>>> https://consc.net/papers/qualia.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> By substituting a fine-grained functional organization for a >>>>>>> coarse-grained one, you change the functional definition and can no >>>>>>> longer >>>>>>> guarantee identical experiences, nor identical behaviors in all possible >>>>>>> situations. They're no longer"functional isomorphs" as Chalmers's >>>>>>> argument >>>>>>> requires. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> By substituting a recording of a computation for a computation, you >>>>>>> replace a conscious mind with a tape recording of the prior behavior of >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> conscious mind. This is what happens in the Blockhead thought >>>>>>> experiment. >>>>>>> The result is something that passes a Turing test, but which is itself >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> conscious (though creating such a recording requires prior invocation >>>>>>> of a >>>>>>> conscious mind or extraordinary luck). >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The replaced part must of course be functionally identical, otherwise >>>>>> both the behaviour and the qualia could change. But this does not mean >>>>>> that >>>>>> it must replicate the functional organisation at a particular scale. If a >>>>>> volume of brain tissue is removed, in order to guarantee identical >>>>>> behaviour the replacement part must interact at the cut surfaces of the >>>>>> surrounding tissue in the same way as the original. It is at these >>>>>> surfaces >>>>>> that the interactions must be sufficiently fine-grained, but what goes >>>>>> inside the volume doesn't matter: it could be conventional simulation of >>>>>> neurons, it could be a giant lookup table. Also, the volume could be any >>>>>> size, and could comprise an arbitrarily large proportion of the subject. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Can I ask you what you would believe would happen to the conscious of >>>>> the individual if you replaced the right hemisphere of the brain with a >>>>> black box that interfaced identically with the left hemisphere, but >>>>> internal to this black box is nothing but a random number generator, and >>>>> it >>>>> is only by fantastic luck that the output of the RNG happens to have >>>>> caused >>>>> it's interfacing with the left hemisphere to remain unchanged? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I was going to propose just that next: nothing, the consciousness would >>>> continue. >>>> >>> >>> A RNG has a different functional description though, from any >>> conventional mind. It seems to me you may be operating within a more >>> physicalist notion of consciousness than a functionalist one, in that you >>> seem to be putting more weight on the existence of a particular physical >>> state being reached, regardless of how it got there. In my view (as a >>> functionalist), being in a particular physical state is not sufficient. It >>> also matters how one reached that particular state. A RNG and a human can >>> both output the string "I am conscious", but in my view only one of them is. >>> >> >> An RNG would be a bad design choice because it would be extremely >> unreliable. However, as a thought experiment, it could work. If the visual >> cortex were removed and replaced with an RNG which for five minutes >> replicated the interactions with the remaining brain, the subject would >> behave as if they had normal vision and report that they had normal vision, >> then after five minutes behave as if they were blind and report that they >> were blind. It is perhaps contrary to intuition that the subject would >> really have visual experiences in that five minute period, but I don't >> think there is any other plausible explanation. >> > > I think they would be a visual zombie in that five minute period, though > as described they would not be able to report any difference. > > I think if one's entire brain were replaced by an RNG, they would be a > total zombie who would fool us into thinking they were conscious and we > would not notice a difference. So by extension a brain partially replaced > by an RNG would be a partial zombie that fooled the other parts of the > brain into thinking nothing was amiss. > > >> >> >>> After answering that, let me ask what you think would happen to the >>>>> conscious of the individual if we replaced all but one neuron in the brain >>>>> with this RNG-driven black box that continues to stimulate this sole >>>>> remaining neuron in exactly the same way as the rest of the brain would >>>>> have? >>>>> >>>> >>>> The consciousness would continue. And then we could get rid of the >>>> neuron and the consciousness would continue. So we end up with the same >>>> result as the rock implementing all computations and hence all >>>> consciousnesses, >>>> >>> >>> Rocks don't implement all computations. I am aware some philosophers >>> have said as much, but they achieve this trick by labeling successive >>> states of a computation to each time-ordered state of the rock. I don't >>> think any computer scientist accepts this as valid. The transitions of the >>> rock states lack the counterfactual relations which are necessary for >>> computation. If you were to try to map states S_1 to state S_5000 of a rock >>> to a program computing Pi, looking at state S_6000 of the rock won't >>> provide you any meaningful information about what the next digit of Pi >>> happens to be. >>> >> >> Yes, so it can't be used as a computer that interacts with its >> environment and provides useful results. But we could say that the >> computation is still in there hidden, in the way every possible sculpture >> is hidden inside a block of marble. >> > > I am not so sure. All the work is offloaded to the one doing the > interpretation, none of the relations are inherent in the state > transitions. If you change one of the preceding states, it does not alter > the flow of the computation in the expected way, and the period of the > rock's state transitions (it's Poincare recurrence time) bears no relation > to the period of the purported computation being executed. > All the work is offloaded onto the one doing the interpretation, but what if we consider a virtual environment with no outside input? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypVfTxkfeb39uu8ACZh%3DwE%2BjN_qQJvqdX1g%3DX-5mAUj81g%40mail.gmail.com.
