Marc Perkel wrote: > *trimming this - it has gotten overlong... (Peter Bowyer) >>> Granted that a spammer could forge received headers. Most don't. >>> >> Eh? Have you looked at many spam samples lately? Or in the last 10 years? >> >> >>> I'm >>> thinking that not bouncing forwarded email is better than the few spammers >>> who sneak through. >>> >> Not spammers - forgers. Providing a way to defeat an anti-forgery >> mechanism wouldn't be my choice. But hey, if that's what you want.... >> >> >> > > I'm thinking that forgers would be less of a problem that false > positives produced by forwarded email. I'm more concerned about false > positives which are far more common under SPF.
Marc, bass-ackwards logic. spf was intended to aid in reducing forgery, and - regardless of claims, cannot do that perfectly anyway. You can 'compromise' the utility of some other tool, but further compromising spf forgery-reduction capability is worse than simply ceasing to look at it at all. Grind the sharp-edge flat on an axe and go pound nails with it. Or sand. Either way, it makes a poor hammer. The balance is all wrong. Bill -- ## List details at http://lists.exim.org/mailman/listinfo/exim-users ## Exim details at http://www.exim.org/ ## Please use the Wiki with this list - http://wiki.exim.org/
