Dear All,
the contrasting views between Loet’s understanding of order as an
implication of information and of the alternative which deducts information
from order are in no real opposition. Rather they reflect differing
perspectives, like the tradition of e.g. measuring a room from a middle
point outwards or from the corners inwards: this is an opportunity for
taxonomy and codification.
The numbers are fountains of possible compromises, as a closed system, of
which all alternatives are known, can easily be modelled by a collection of
logical statements.
Let me digress a bit about numbers: these are logical signs that can
represent anything. In the sentence-logic or order-logic that we try to read
out of them, they could be represented by ☺, ☼, ◊, ♣, etc. As long as they
obey the rule e.g. of ☼ + ◊ = ♣, and there is a sufficient number of them,
an order evolves. Now, what an order specifically is, that is the deepest
question of philosophy. This is why it is so helpful to use the index finger
and say: “this is a deictic definition of order” while one points the finger
to a sorted table. (Augustinus: Confessiones)
If the symbols are ordered and re-ordered, specific migration patterns
evolve. Some construct two spaces of three rectangular axes each. Loet said
the same in different words, by pointing out that some attributes give a
sort of fixation to a concept.
Usually, one uses the numbers for counting, that is, in their capacity as
natural numbers. Here, we can use them in their denominative capacity,
because even their ordinal capacity gets lost as they cease to impose the
“natural” order of natural numbers, namely 1,2,3,4,…
In its denominative capacity a+b=c can mean the same as ☼ + ◊ = ♣ or “horses
and tables have four feet”. Here comes the individuality within the group
(today’s slang for re and universalia), because on ☼ + ◊ = ♣ we recognise
that each ☼ of many ☼ is indistinguishable to the others and that we do not
know what the natural order between ☺, ☼, ◊, ♣ might be. So we do not know
the deviation of the members of a tie to the ideal-typical member of the
tie, and this means that information can and can not be present, in
dependence of the actual individuation of the members of the group. This is
what Loet and me agree on so far.
Loet and me have not yet compiled our concepts about fragments,
fragmentation and distinction, but I am very confident that he widens our
understanding on one hand and will be presenting an important – probably,
the most important – side of the coin.
What this person can contribute to the philosophical debate, is not much.
The accountant has produced a Table and uses it as a demonstrative tool for
concepts of order and reorder. A table of symbols has absolutely no meaning
at all, neither epistemological, nor transcendental, nor does it pretend any
exclusivity to order concepts.
One will certainly have difficulties explaining that the secret of the
cosmic (ultra, mega, meta, ultimate, basic, etc.) order lies in the
combinatorial intricacies of how to express 67 by means of extents <32 or
otherwise. This appears to govern the metamorphoses in the Table between
“how many”, “what kind” and “where”. Whether one gains or loses faith on
recognising that another mystery is gone is an individual matter. As a
culture, we have forgiven the meteorologists for ruining our concepts of
Thor rolling his hammer and substituting it with audible fragments of
discharges, which is much less juicy. So the metamorphosing tricks of Nature
may also be explained away with boring technicalities. The numbers
themselves make no revolutions, their interpretation does.
Karl
2011/3/28 Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>
> Dear Joe and colleagues,
>
>
>
> 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual
> states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are
> completely mutually exclusive?
>
>
>
> Of course, not: the expectations are informed by previous observations and
> further observations can change our expectations. More precisely:
> observational reports are needed to make the discourse (entertaining
> expectations) progressive.
>
>
>
> 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary
> are:
>
>
>
> By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from
> the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante
> rem)
>
> The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of
> order.
>
>
>
> I would prefer to use a plural for “ideas of order”: paradigms, theoretical
> frameworks, etc. As argued before, the “sunt” is problematic because this
> order does not “exist” (in the res extensa), but can be entertained (as
> cogitate in the res cogitans).
>
>
>
> The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the
> ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of
> which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests.
>
>
>
> The information content is always *expected* information content of a
> distribution.
>
>
>
> Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an
> ontological content?
>
>
>
> It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a
> cosmology. “Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and
> exchanges as cogitantes.
>
>
>
> Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the
> axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would
> appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly,
> since he writes:
>
>
>
> The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they
> had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
> ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles.
>
>
>
> These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in
> the substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by
> us in scholarly discourses.
>
>
>
> This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility
> of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being
> discovered, that would not be an "order" per se. Here, I would agree with
> Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?!
>
>
>
> “Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans.
> Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas
> Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology
> can be expected to prevail.
>
>
>
> Best wishes, Loet
>
>
>
> I look forward to hearing from you.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
>
>
> ----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
> Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com
> Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41
> An: "Pedro C. Marijuan"<pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
> Kopie: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam
>
> Dear James,
>
> thank you for the widening of this discussion.
>
> Order and Information
>
> Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the
> modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the
> relation between information and order bring us back to some deep
> problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages.
>
> The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs.
> the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as
> follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of
> the world as the descriptions of the things themselves?
>
> In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe
> how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach
> there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible
> alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that
> gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means
> the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in
> which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)
>
> The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea
> of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible
> alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints
> lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs.
> the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus).
>
> The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the
> things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth
> cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The
> members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where
> a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each
> deviate from the ideal-typical case.
>
> The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from
> the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an
> implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So
> it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are
> different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder
> creates different ties, therefore a different information content.
>
> The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that
> they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
> ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering
> principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are
> ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down.
> We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such
> exists.
>
> Karl
>
> 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>:
> >
> > Dear all,
> >
> >
> >
> > Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for
> > the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have
> > learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned
> > out to be very complicated indeed. The purpose of history, I think, is
> > to explain the past. It is not just a collection of facts ("one damn
> > thing after another") or even attempting to find out what "really
> > happened" (although it does help if we can do this). Historians want to
> > ask "why?" and "how?" as well as "what?"
> >
> >
> >
> > Among historians of science, there are two camps. The larger one
> > examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical
> > milieu. It seeks to answer questions like "why did people believe what
> > they believed?", "why did they practice science in the way they did?"
> > and "what did they hope science could achieve?" Historians in this camp
> > tend to be specialists in a particular area. They want to see the world
> > through the eyes of their historical agents. Questions about whether a
> > particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality
> > are not very relevant. What matters is the way people in the past saw
> > things. We need to understand them.
> >
> >
> >
> > A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my
> > own tent want to know what caused modern science. They recognise the
> > enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind
> > came by this wonderful tool. In other words, they seek a theory of the
> > historical origins of science. For this camp, questions about truth are
> > of paramount importance because we are trying to look back in time to
> > find the beginnings of processes that ultimately lead to a particular
> > end. That end is a scientific practice that produces true theories, or
> > at least theories that correspond to an objective reality.
> >
> >
> >
> > This quest for the origins of modern science is difficult, not to
> > mention rather pointless, if you contest the claim that modern science
> > can give rise to a true description of the objective world. So, when I
> > presented my claim that we should look in the Middle Ages for these
> > origins, it seems I had ignored a number of prior questions. Indeed,
> > the whole concept of science as producing true information was rapidly
> > thrown into question.
> >
> >
> >
> > I hope other members of the list have found some of the issues thrown
> > out of this discussion of interest.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thank you all for your patience.
> >
> >
> >
> > Best wishes
> >
> >
> >
> > James
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > /The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the
> > Scientific Revolution
> > <
> http://www.amazon.com/Genesis-Science-Christian-Scientific-Revolution/dp/1596981555/bedeslibrary
> >
> > /by James Hannam is available now.
> >
> >
> >
> > Shortlisted for the Royal Society Science Book Prize
> >
> >
> >
> > "Well-researched and hugely enjoyable." */New Scientist/*
> >
> >
> >
> > "A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development...
> > captures the wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity
> > and its engaging strangeness." */Sunday Times/*
> >
> >
> >
> > "This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable
> > no-nonsense clarity... James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down
> > an old caricature." */Sunday Telegraph/*
> >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
