Dear Bruno, You state that: "When poll are done at congress in cosmology or quantum computing, about half of the physicists endorse the non collapse theory, as it is covariant, and has no “measurement problem”. This means that the main tenet of your account, your "First Principle", is not accepted by HALF of the scholars. How can you build your huge building on a so much controversial claim? Furthermore, your links with Tegmark and Benacerraf confirm my thesis: your account is a philosophical one, based on a logical principle, that, although fashinating and intriguing, is highly controversial. The results in common with the scientific knowledge are just coincidental, I believe. On the other side, Robert Grosseteste talks about the big bang in 1228, based on simple logical accounts, and Eraclitus talks about the vacuum. Just coincidences. -- Inviato da Libero Mail per Android lunedì, 21 maggio 2018, 00:16PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be :
>Dear Arturo, > >This is already my second post of this week, so you might answer to my two >posts, and I will comment your possible answer (if necessary) next week. Thank >you. > > >>On 20 May 2018, at 19:30, tozziart...@libero.it wrote: >>Dear Bruno, >>You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the >>arithmetical reality)". >>This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of >>mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of >>Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, >>Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, >>Benacerraf. >> > >Well, actually it is Tegmark which follows my lead, as he sent me his first >draft of the “mathematical universe”, and took my suggestion into account when >adding computationalism, but he missed the 1P/3p distinction, so my older >studies remains more consistent. Actually, he cite my papers in the draft, but >I guess was not able to maintain it for publication. Many told me that there >is some resistance, not to my ideas, but personal or political (I don’t know >as I have never met such opponents). >But I have been influenced by Benacerraf and also Judson Webb, etc. (and of >course Gödel, Hilbert, etc.). > >Yet my approach is different. I start from the computationalist hypothesis, >and everything I say is derived from it, first informally (the universal >dovetailer argument) and formally (in the more mathematical part). > > >>Your idea is interesting and intriguing, related as it is to the philosophy >>of mathematics. >It can be related to philosophy of mathematics, but that is a work which >remains to be done. > >>However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method >>and of testable hypothesis. >That is not correct. I prove that if Mechanism is true, the physical reality >is “in the head of the universal Turing machine”. >That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics which is in the head >of the machine with the physics that we infer from observation. When I was >young I concluded that Mechanism is refuted, but I was naive and ignorant of >quantum mechanics, which eventually confirmed all the weirdness that I got >from mechanism, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, the possibility >of many “parallel” computations/worlds and the possibility to extract a >material sort of information (confirmed by the notion of quantum information). >A lot of works remains to be done, but until now, mechanism is confirmed by >nature, when physicalism + mechanism is refuted by nature. Physicalism + non >mechanism is still an option, though, but is it really plausible? I don’t >know. As a scientist, I do not defend any options. I just show mechanism >testable and confirmed up to now. > > > > >>You are talking about philosophy, not about science. >> > >The complete contrary. I avoid doing philosophy. That is especially important >when tacking some philosophical questions (at least classify as such by >Aristotelians) and show them testable experimentally. > > >>I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying >>the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific >>papers. > >Then study well my papers, because there is no statements which are not >testable. The whole goal of my work was to show that metaphysics and theology, >in the frame of some hypothesis, become amenable to the scientific method.I >literally predicted quantum mechanics from pure arithmetic + mechanism a long >time ago. Then my thesis shows that all universal machine finds this when >looking inward (in the sense of Gödel’s self-reference). > > >>Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context. >> > >I am with you on this. It is the whole point of my research. Too show that >thanks to Gödel’s and Turing’s discovery, and some works, we can test today if >Aristotle Primary Matter hypothesis is confirmed by Nature. But the results is >that Plato is confirmed, and Aristotle is debunked. We can say that we have >looked closely at Nature, and that it confirms the immaterialism of Mechanism. >Nature exists phenomenologically, as we recover its logic and laws from >arithmetic when we assume computationalism. But assuming some primary matter >re-introduce the mind-body problem. As there has never been any evidence for >primary matter found yet, better to not add it. > >Bruno > > > > >>-- >>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 >>da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be : >> >>>Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues, >>> >>> >>>>On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths < dai.griffith...@gmail.com > wrote: >>>>What is a 'thing'? >>> >>>I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if >>>true it provides a clear (and tastable) answer. >>> >>>For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any >>>universal complete theory or system. >>>To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are >>>more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. >>>That determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience >>>differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially >>>correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the >>>believer, the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc. >>> >>>A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative) >>>neighbourhood of consistent continuations. >>> >>>I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it >>>explains many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as >>>immediate undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for >>>consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that only processes exist, and that >>>>for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual membranes >>>>around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. From this >>>>point of view we do not have two aspects (things and predictions about >>>>those things), but simply the monitoring of processes, and theorising about >>>>what we find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. >>>>mechanisms might be a special kind of process). >>>>Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully >>>>reformulated as "Is information a thing?”. >>> >>>It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal >>>difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen >>>from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not >>>dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity >>>emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted >>>the non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it. >>>The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations >>>between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe, >>>know, observe among all things/relations. >>> >>>Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what >>>the universal machine like to do the most. >>>See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast >>>variety of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which >>>exist also in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its >>>computable part). >>> >>>Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>Dai >>>> >>>> >>>>On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote: >>>>>Dear FISers, >>>>>I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an >>>>>idea -maybe not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of >>>>>philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of >>>>>things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against >>>>>Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are >>>>>undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we >>>>>cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is >>>>>scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative >>>>>social system differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I >>>>>think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the >>>>>social system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are >>>>>incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown >>>>>(in this point I confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's >>>>>ideas. I think I have many points of agreement with him but also of >>>>>disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a >>>>>thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent >>>>>ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with >>>>>paradoxes. >>>>>Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the >>>>>constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set >>>>>of statements that represent what we know about information. The problem >>>>>is that although we can have the intuition that information is real, >>>>>physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like >>>>>"reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the >>>>>system. I remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised >>>>>the concept of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, >>>>>the Ding an sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we >>>>>should not be asking us a question that cannot be answered. >>>>>Best, >>>>>JJ >>>>>El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > >>>>>escribió: >>>>>> Dear FISers, >>>>>> It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and >>>>>>creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. >>>>>>Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this >>>>>>discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem >>>>>>based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions. >>>>>> >>>>>> To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is >>>>>>information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here >>>>>>physical means the nature of information and not its substance, or more >>>>>>exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical >>>>>>biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum information” is >>>>>>only the way of expressing that the carrier of information belongs to the >>>>>>quantum level of nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed >>>>>>numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only forms or number >>>>>>representations and not numbers themselves. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, >>>>>>to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that >>>>>>information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our >>>>>>discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for example, >>>>>>Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information). >>>>>> >>>>>> Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, >>>>>>to admit that information is physical because only physical things exist. >>>>>> If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we >>>>>>have three options assuming that information exists: >>>>>>- information is physical >>>>>>- information is mental >>>>>>- information is both physical and mental >>>>>> >>>>>>Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises >>>>>>three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of >>>>>>structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists: >>>>>>- information is physical >>>>>>- information is mental >>>>>>- information is structural >>>>>>- information is both physical and mental >>>>>>- information is both physical and structural >>>>>>- information is both structural and mental >>>>>>- information is physical, structural and mental >>>>>> >>>>>> The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to >>>>>>avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information >>>>>>(in a general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical >>>>>>world, it is called energy , in the mental world, it is called mental >>>>>>energy , and in the world of structures, it is called information (in >>>>>>the strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of >>>>>>Mark Johnson that information is both physical and not physical only the >>>>>>general theory of information makes this idea more exact and testable. >>>>>> In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the >>>>>>strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations >>>>>>and carriers. Note that any representation of information is its carrier >>>>>>but not each carrier of information is its representation. For instance, >>>>>>an envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in this letter but >>>>>>it is not its representation. >>>>>> Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by the >>>>>>name energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy. >>>>>> >>>>>> Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this discussion, >>>>>>may be Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative combining the >>>>>>most interesting contributions into a paper with the title >>>>>> >>>>>>Is information physical? >>>>>> and publish it in his esteemed Journal. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sincerely, >>>>>> Mark Burgin >>>>>> >>>>>>On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote: >>>>>>>Dear Arturo, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that >>>>>>>relate to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. >>>>>>>That was the time as computers could newly be used in an interactive >>>>>>>fashion, and the Rogers techniques were a current discovery. >>>>>>>(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the >>>>>>>contents of what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of >>>>>>>the message, assumed to be at work in the patient.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a >>>>>>>human or a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are >>>>>>>indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called >>>>>>>"expert systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is >>>>>>>rational, that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi >>>>>>>Wittgenstein, the difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery >>>>>>>or a human", becomes irrelevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to >>>>>>>translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not >>>>>>>yet well understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the >>>>>>>current fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we >>>>>>>shall live to experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely that >>>>>>>humans are a combinatorial tautology. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you >>>>>>>state: that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are >>>>>>>hints that as far as rational capabilities go, the same principles >>>>>>>apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not of this kind. The counter >>>>>>>argument says that irrational processes do not take place in organisms, >>>>>>>therefore what you refer to belongs to the main process, maybe like >>>>>>>waste belongs to the organism's principle. This view draws a picture of >>>>>>>a functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism is raw >>>>>>>material for a different kind. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Karl >>>>>>>< tozziart...@libero.it > schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24: >>>>>>>>Dear Bruno, >>>>>>>>You state: >>>>>>>>"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, >>>>>>>>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. >>>>>>>>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion. >>>>>>>>...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level >>>>>>>>of description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not >>>>>>>>feel any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine >>>>>>>>emulating the brain/body at that level of description". >>>>>>>>The problem of your account is the following: >>>>>>>>You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS". >>>>>>>>Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically >>>>>>>>tested and it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a >>>>>>>>sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it. The >>>>>>>>current neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can be >>>>>>>>replaced by) a digital machine. >>>>>>>>In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not >>>>>>>>exist in our real world. Here your entire building falls down. >>>>>>>>-- >>>>>>>>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM >>>>>>>>+02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be : >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend >>>>>>>>>it, with minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my >>>>>>>>>first comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my >>>>>>>>>new computer classifies them in some mysterious way! >>>>>>>>>This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at >>>>>>>>>the end of the week. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > >>>>>>>>>>wrote: >>>>>>>>>>Dear Colleagues, >>>>>>>>>>I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion >>>>>>>>>> Is information physical? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>My result here is that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, >>>>>>>>>i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from >>>>>>>>>Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of >>>>>>>>>“model" (logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory"). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of >>>>>>>>>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel >>>>>>>>>any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine >>>>>>>>>emulating the brain/body at that level of description. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all >>>>>>>>>physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. >>>>>>>>>Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any >>>>>>>>>Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny >>>>>>>>>semi-computable part of arithmetic) is Turing complete (Turing >>>>>>>>>Universal). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>The basic idea is that: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an >>>>>>>>>arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are >>>>>>>>>necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations >>>>>>>>>emulated in arithmetic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to >>>>>>>>>my actual state, and see from some first person points of view >>>>>>>>>(something I can describe more precisely in some future post perhaps). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, >>>>>>>>>we cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be >>>>>>>>>used to recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, >>>>>>>>>like Peano arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction >>>>>>>>>between first and third person views (and six others!). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this >>>>>>>>>(including the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago. I >>>>>>>>>was about sure this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about >>>>>>>>>quantum mechanics, which verifies all the most startling predictions >>>>>>>>>of Indexical Mechanism, unless we add the controversial wave collapse >>>>>>>>>reduction principle. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many >>>>>>>>>computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird >>>>>>>>>indeterminacy becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The >>>>>>>>>non-cloning of matter becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the >>>>>>>>>result of the first person indeterminacy (the first person view of the >>>>>>>>>amoeba undergoing a duplication, …) on infinitely many computations. >>>>>>>>>This entails also that neither matter appearance nor consciousness are >>>>>>>>>Turing emulable per se, as the whole arithmetical reality—which is a >>>>>>>>>highly non computable notion as we know since Gödel—plays a key role. >>>>>>>>>Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to inconsistency, as it >>>>>>>>>implies indexical computationalism which implies the negation of >>>>>>>>>Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire physical universe, >>>>>>>>>which I rather doubt). >>>>>>>>>>My opinion is presented below: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Why some people erroneously think that information is physical >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The main reason to think that information is physical is the >>>>>>>>>>strong belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is >>>>>>>>>>only physical reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, >>>>>>>>>>people encounter something that they call information. >>>>>>>>>> When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is >>>>>>>>>>information because with the letter they receive information. The >>>>>>>>>>letter is physical, i.e., a physical object. As a result, people >>>>>>>>>>start thinking that information is physical. When people receive an >>>>>>>>>>e-mail, they comprehend that it is information because with the >>>>>>>>>>e-mail they receive information. The e-mail comes to the computer in >>>>>>>>>>the form of electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, >>>>>>>>>>people start thinking even more that information is physical. >>>>>>>>>> However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical >>>>>>>>>>objects are only carriers or containers of information. >>>>>>>>>> To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is >>>>>>>>>>possible to say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person >>>>>>>>>>will tell that the textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge >>>>>>>>>>itself. In the same way, the textbook contains information but is not >>>>>>>>>>information itself. The same is true for letters, e-mails, >>>>>>>>>>electromagnetic waves and other physical objects because all of them >>>>>>>>>>only contain information but are not information. For instance, as we >>>>>>>>>>know, different letters can contain the same information. Even if we >>>>>>>>>>make an identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the letter >>>>>>>>>>and its copy will be different physical objects (physical things) but >>>>>>>>>>they will contain the same information. >>>>>>>>>> Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of >>>>>>>>>>knowledge, data and similar essences. In spite of this, information >>>>>>>>>>can act on physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also >>>>>>>>>>misleads people who think that information is physical. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non >>>>>>>>>physical objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem >>>>>>>>>faced by dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we >>>>>>>>>recover many dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> One more misleading property of information is that people can >>>>>>>>>>measure it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible >>>>>>>>>>to measure only physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to >>>>>>>>>>the erroneous conclusion that information is physical. However, >>>>>>>>>>measuring information is essentially different than measuring >>>>>>>>>>physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no “scales” that measure >>>>>>>>>>information. Only human intellect can do this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of >>>>>>>>>the “knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you >>>>>>>>>will not tell me that this table is unreal”. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made >>>>>>>>>dreams in which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by >>>>>>>>>that argument … until I wake up. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream >>>>>>>>>argument” illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything >>>>>>>>>ontological. A subjective experience proves only the phenomenological >>>>>>>>>existence of consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although >>>>>>>>>there are plenty of strong evidences for a material reality, there are >>>>>>>>>no evidences (yet) for a primitive or primary matter (and that is why, >>>>>>>>>I think, Aristotle assumes it quasi explicitly, against Plato, and >>>>>>>>>plausibly against Pythagorus). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is >>>>>>>>>the world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since >>>>>>>>>very elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor >>>>>>>>>axiom) is already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a >>>>>>>>>Universal Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all >>>>>>>>>programs). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we >>>>>>>>>assume Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also >>>>>>>>>not *primarily* physical: it is all in the “head of the universal >>>>>>>>>machine/number” (so to speak). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if >>>>>>>>>there is a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the >>>>>>>>>observation, and the physics that we extract from “the head” of the >>>>>>>>>machine. This took me more than 30 years of work, but the results >>>>>>>>>obtained up to now is that there is no discrepancies. I have compared >>>>>>>>>the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness (formally) on the >>>>>>>>>semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, with most >>>>>>>>>quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Best regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>Bruno >>>>>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>> >>>>-- >>>>----------------------------------------- >>>> >>>>Professor David (Dai) Griffiths >>>>Professor of Education >>>>School of Education and Psychology >>>>The University of Bolton >>>>Deane Road >>>>Bolton, BL3 5AB >>>> >>>>Office: M106 >>>> >>>>SKYPE: daigriffiths >>>> >>>>Phones (please don't leave voice mail) >>>> UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 >>>> Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 >>>> Work landline: + 44 (0)1204903598 >>>> >>>>email >>>> d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk >>>> dai.griffith...@gmail.com _______________________________________________ >>>>Fis mailing list >>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>> >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Fis mailing list >>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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