Dear Arturo,

> On 21 May 2018, at 12:49, wrote:
> Dear Bruno, 
> You state that:
> "When poll are done at congress in cosmology or quantum computing, about half 
> of the physicists endorse the non collapse theory, as it is covariant, and 
> has no “measurement problem”.
> This means that the main tenet of your account, your "First Principle", is 
> not accepted by HALF of the scholars.
> How can you build your huge building on a so much controversial claim?

That was just a probably useless reply to the remark according to which few 
people endorse the non-collapse theory. In science, there is no poll, no vote, 
no mainstream, nor any similar form of argument per authority.

My claim for the non)collapse theory is that the collapse theory violate the 
Schroedinger equation, or the unitary evolution, and so is mainly a statement 
that quantum mechanics does not apply to … and the rest has never been made 
clear. There are almost as much collapse theory than there are physicists 
rejecting the SWE. Even Bohr, after expelling us that the collapse results from 
the perturbation of the act of measuring, admits to Einstein & AL., in his 
reply to the EPR paper (which shows that if there is a collapse due to 
measurement, it has to be Faster Than Light (FTL), that the collapse is not a 
physical phenomenon. Yet, he will later refuse to talk to Everett, and ciricize 
his idea of abandoning the collapse.

Now, you can say that I am biased, as I predicted the “many-worlds” much before 
I knew about quantum physics, in the form of the many computations which have 
been proved to be executed in virtue of very elementary truth. That has been 
seen by Gödel partially, and made clear by Church, Kleene and the works which 
followed. Today we know that even a simple Diophantine equation does already 
the job, and emulate or simulate exactly all computational processes. 

Unfortunately, when I will study quantum mechanics, I will take, like many, the 
collapse for granted, but I was still sure about the many computations, and I 
was still predicting the digital equivalent of a notion of “many-worlds”. It 
took me to read the EPR paper to begin to change my mind, but it is only after 
the careful study of Everett argument, that I will realise that quantum 
mechanics confirms the “many-worlds”, and thus the simplest and obvious, albeit 
shocking perhaps, consequence of Mechanism in the philosophy of mind (aka 
cognitive science). I predicted also the non-cloning theorem, indeterminacy, 
and non-locality, all as a natural phenomenology “lived” by any introspective 
universal machine.

> Furthermore, your links with Tegmark and Benacerraf confirm my thesis: your 
> account is a philosophical one,
Not at all. I have proven that if Mechanism isn correct, then physics has to be 
retrieved in a very precise way, as a mode of knowledge imposed by 
incompleteness in the machine or number self-reference theory, and I would have 
claim to have refute that form of Mechanism if the facts would have refuted 
this. But the facts confirm this, up to now.

So, Mechanism explains, until now, both consciousness and matter appearances, 
where physicalism and/or materialism failed, up to now, and indeed it would 
require a non-mechanist theory of mind, which usually are nonsense.

It explains consciousness by showing that any universal machine which 
introspect itself, and remains sound in that process, is confronted to 

- True,
- Non doubtable,
- Immediate,
- Non provable,
- Non definable.

Which is a good candidate for consciousness.

The theory also provides a role for consciousness, as it shows that such truth 
can be used by the machine to transform itself into a more speedy machine 
relative to the machine(s) supporting it, or even to simply other machines. The 
machine needs to be very cautious, because if it deduces that this is true, it 
becomes inconsistent and unsound, so the machine needs some act of faith, or to 
remember the question mark when invoking Mechanism. It is a subtle but 
important point.

> based on a logical principle, that, although fashinating and intriguing, is 
> highly controversial. 

Mechanism in cognitive science is an old and venerable theory, appearing in 
Indian and Greek antic text, renewed by Descartes and Diderot (who called it 

Note that mechanism in cognitive science refutes mechanism in physics. This is 
due to the fact that no universal machine can ever know for sure which machine 
she is, nor which computations (in arithmetic) supports us, and that any exact 
observable prediction has to be retrieved from a non computable statistics on 
all computations. But the propositional physical logic has been shown 
decidable, and you can consult my long texts to look at a theorem prover for it 
in LISP.

Is the theory of evolution controversial? It used implicitly mechanism, because 
non-mechanism would require infinite amount of information in the brain or 
body, which would make the cellular organism unable to use redundancy and 
approximation to learn the tasks needed to survive. Most of science is 
mechanistic. Quantum mechanics is a priori computable, except for ad hoc non 
computable solution of the SWE, like Ae^iHt with H invoking a non computable 
real numbers. If we are machine, we would not even recognise such a wave.

> The results in common with the scientific knowledge are just coincidental, I 
> believe. 
This can be said for all confirmation of any theory in science.

> On the other side, Robert Grosseteste talks about the big bang in 1228, based 
> on simple logical accounts, and Eraclitus talks about the vacuum.  Just 
> coincidences.  

In science we can never know-for-sure if a theory is true or false. We can only 
judge them plausible or not plausible. We might know them in the Theaetetus’ 
sense: i.e., we can believe/assume them, and they might be true.
Even in pure arithmetic, it is simpler and better to always consider the axioms 
as question, in need of confirmations. Now, it could be debated that arithmetic 
is the theory closest to “certainty”, but I do avoid that debate, as I am not a 
philosopher. I offer a result: IF mechanism is true, then physicalism is false. 
Or if you prefer the equivalent If physicalism is true, then Mechanism is 
false. Then I show how to test this, and explains that the retrospective facts 
(quantum mechanics) fits with Mechanism and not with Materialism. 

I don’t let people know my opinion on that issue, as that would indeed be 
confusing. I only and rarely express myself, and only when people have grasped 
the results. Nor do I claim my proof is 100% valid, but I cry since more than 
40 years for people helping me to find the error. Eventually, they stated to 
suggest I defend this as a thesis, as that would be the simplest way to get a 
refutation or correction. But the jury did not find any mistake, so I got a PhD 
title instead. How frustrating. Maybe there is just no error, after all.

I think that people who fear mechanism, confuse automata and universal machine. 
The first are controllable and predictable in principle. The second are not 
controllable, nor predictable, intrinsically. In fact a universal machine can 
defeat all mechanist metaphor made to explain her. Its first person, or soul, 
knows that she is not a machine from its/her private first person view. Only 
“god” (the arithmetical truth is enough her) knows better.



> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> lunedì, 21 maggio 2018, 00:16PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal 
> <>:
> Dear Arturo,
> This is already my second post of this week, so you might answer to my two 
> posts, and I will comment your possible answer (if necessary) next week. 
> Thank you.
>> On 20 May 2018, at 19:30, 
>> <> wrote:
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the 
>> arithmetical reality)".
>> This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of 
>> mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of 
>> Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, 
>> Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, 
>> Benacerraf.  
> Well, actually it is Tegmark which follows my lead, as he sent me his first 
> draft of the “mathematical universe”, and took my suggestion into account 
> when adding computationalism, but he missed the 1P/3p distinction, so my 
> older studies remains more consistent. Actually, he cite my papers in the 
> draft, but I guess was not able to maintain it for publication. Many told me 
> that there is some resistance, not to my ideas, but personal or political (I 
> don’t know as I have never met such opponents).
> But I have been influenced by Benacerraf and also Judson Webb, etc. (and of 
> course Gödel, Hilbert, etc.).
> Yet my approach is different. I start from the computationalist hypothesis, 
> and everything I say is derived from it, first informally (the universal 
> dovetailer argument) and formally (in the more mathematical part).
>> Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy 
>> of mathematics. 
> It can be related to philosophy of mathematics, but that is a work which 
> remains to be done. 
>> However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method 
>> and of testable hypothesis. 
> That is not correct. I prove that if Mechanism is true, the physical reality 
> is “in the head of the universal Turing machine”. 
> That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics which is in the head 
> of the machine with the physics that we infer from observation. When I was 
> young I concluded that Mechanism is refuted, but I was naive and ignorant of 
> quantum mechanics, which eventually confirmed all the weirdness that I got 
> from mechanism, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, the 
> possibility of many “parallel” computations/worlds and the possibility to 
> extract a material sort of information (confirmed by the notion of quantum 
> information). A lot of works remains to be done, but until now, mechanism is 
> confirmed by nature, when physicalism + mechanism is refuted by nature. 
> Physicalism + non mechanism is still an option, though, but is it really 
> plausible? I don’t know. As a scientist, I do not defend any options. I just 
> show mechanism testable and confirmed up to now.
>> You are talking about philosophy, not about science.  
> The complete contrary. I avoid doing philosophy. That is especially important 
> when tacking some philosophical questions (at least classify as such by 
> Aristotelians) and show them testable experimentally. 
>> I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying 
>> the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific 
>> papers.  
> Then study well my papers, because there is no statements which are not 
> testable. The whole goal of my work was to show that metaphysics and 
> theology, in the frame of some hypothesis, become amenable to the scientific 
> method.I literally predicted quantum mechanics from pure arithmetic + 
> mechanism a long time ago. Then my thesis shows that all universal machine 
> finds this when looking inward (in the sense of Gödel’s self-reference).
>> Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.  
> I am with you on this. It is the whole point of my research. Too show that 
> thanks to Gödel’s and Turing’s discovery, and some works, we can test today 
> if Aristotle Primary Matter hypothesis is confirmed by Nature. But the 
> results is that Plato is confirmed, and Aristotle is debunked. We can say 
> that we have looked closely at Nature, and that it confirms the immaterialism 
> of Mechanism. Nature exists phenomenologically, as we recover its logic and 
> laws from arithmetic when we assume computationalism. But assuming some 
> primary matter re-introduce the mind-body problem. As there has never been 
> any evidence for primary matter found yet, better to not add it.
> Bruno
>> --
>> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>> domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal 
>> <>:
>> Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,
>>> On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths < 
>>> <>> wrote:
>>> What is a 'thing'? 
>> I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if 
>> true it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.
>> For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any 
>> universal complete theory or system.
>> To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are 
>> more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. 
>> That determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience 
>> differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially 
>> correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the 
>> believer, the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc. 
>> A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative) 
>> neighbourhood of consistent continuations.
>> I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it 
>> explains many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as 
>> immediate undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for 
>> consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers.
>>> Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist, and that 
>>> for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual membranes 
>>> around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. From this 
>>> point of view we do not have two aspects (things and predictions about 
>>> those things), but simply the monitoring of processes, and theorising about 
>>> what we find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. 
>>> mechanisms might be a special kind of process).
>>> Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully 
>>> reformulated as "Is information a thing?”.
>> It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal 
>> difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen 
>> from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not 
>> dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity 
>> emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted 
>> the non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it. 
>> The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations 
>> between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe, 
>> know, observe among all things/relations.
>> Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what 
>> the universal machine like to do the most. 
>> See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast 
>> variety of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which 
>> exist also in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its 
>> computable part).
>> Bruno
>>> Dai
>>> On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:
>>>> Dear FISers, 
>>>> I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an 
>>>> idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of 
>>>> philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of 
>>>> things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against 
>>>> Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are 
>>>> undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we 
>>>> cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is 
>>>> scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative 
>>>> social system differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I 
>>>> think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the 
>>>> social system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are 
>>>> incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown 
>>>> (in this point I confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's 
>>>> ideas. I think I have many points of agreement with him but also of 
>>>> disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a 
>>>> thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent 
>>>> ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with 
>>>> paradoxes. 
>>>> Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the 
>>>> constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set 
>>>> of statements that represent what we know about information. The problem 
>>>> is that although we can have the intuition that information is real, 
>>>> physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like 
>>>> "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the 
>>>> system. I remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised 
>>>> the concept of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, 
>>>> the Ding an sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we 
>>>> should not be asking us a question that cannot be answered. 
>>>> Best,
>>>> JJ
>>>> El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" < 
>>>> <>> escribió:
>>>>    Dear FISers,
>>>>    It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and 
>>>> creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. 
>>>> Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, 
>>>> I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our 
>>>> intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.
>>>>    To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information 
>>>> physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical 
>>>> means the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, 
>>>> the substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological 
>>>> or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum information” is only the way 
>>>> of expressing that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level 
>>>> of nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal 
>>>> numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and not numbers 
>>>> themselves.
>>>>   If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, 
>>>> to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that 
>>>> information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our 
>>>> discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for example, 
>>>> Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).
>>>>    Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, 
>>>> to admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
>>>>    If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we 
>>>> have three options assuming that information exists:
>>>> - information is physical
>>>> - information is mental
>>>> - information is both physical and mental  
>>>> Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises 
>>>> three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of 
>>>> structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:
>>>> - information is physical
>>>> - information is mental
>>>> - information is structural  
>>>> - information is both physical and mental  
>>>> - information is both physical and structural  
>>>> - information is both structural and mental  
>>>> - information is physical, structural and mental  
>>>>  The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to 
>>>> avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information 
>>>> (in a general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical 
>>>> world, it is called energy, in the mental world, it is called mental 
>>>> energy, and in the world of structures, it is called information (in the 
>>>> strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark 
>>>> Johnson that information is both physical and not physical only the 
>>>> general theory of information makes this idea more exact and testable.
>>>>    In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the 
>>>> strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and 
>>>> carriers. Note that any representation of information is its carrier but 
>>>> not each carrier of information is its representation. For instance, an 
>>>> envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in this letter but it 
>>>> is not its representation.
>>>>    Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by the 
>>>> name energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy.
>>>>    Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this discussion, 
>>>> may be Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative combining the most 
>>>> interesting contributions into a paper with the title
>>>>                                                                        Is 
>>>> information physical?
>>>>    and publish it in his esteemed Journal.
>>>>    Sincerely,
>>>>    Mark Burgin
>>>> On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:
>>>>> Dear Arturo, 
>>>>> There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that 
>>>>> relate to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. 
>>>>> That was the time as computers could newly be used in an interactive 
>>>>> fashion, and the Rogers techniques were a current discovery.
>>>>> (Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the 
>>>>> contents of what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of 
>>>>> the message, assumed to be at work in the patient.)
>>>>> They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a 
>>>>> human or a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations. 
>>>>> Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are 
>>>>> indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called 
>>>>> "expert systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is 
>>>>> rational,  that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi 
>>>>> Wittgenstein, the difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery 
>>>>> or a human", becomes irrelevant. 
>>>>> Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to 
>>>>> translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not 
>>>>> yet well understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the 
>>>>> current fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall 
>>>>> live to experience the ultimate disillusionment,  namely that humans are 
>>>>> a combinatorial tautology. 
>>>>> Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you state: 
>>>>> that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints that 
>>>>> as far as rational capabilities go, the same principles apply. There is a 
>>>>> rest, you say, which is not of this kind. The counter argument says that 
>>>>> irrational processes do not take place in organisms, therefore what you 
>>>>> refer to belongs to the main process, maybe like waste belongs to the 
>>>>> organism's principle. This view draws a picture of a functional biotope, 
>>>>> in which the waste of one kind of organism is raw material for a 
>>>>> different kind. 
>>>>> Karl 
>>>>> < <>> schrieb am Do., 
>>>>> 10. Mai 2018 15:24:
>>>>> Dear Bruno, 
>>>>> You state: 
>>>>> "IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
>>>>> THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>>>>> “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>>>>> ...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>>>>> description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>>>>> change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>>>>> brain/body at that level of description".
>>>>> The problem of your account is the following:
>>>>> You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
>>>>> Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested 
>>>>> and it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of 
>>>>> postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it.  The current 
>>>>> neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced 
>>>>> by) a digital machine.
>>>>> In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not 
>>>>> exist in our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.  
>>>>> --
>>>>> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>>>>> giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal 
>>>>> <>:
>>>>> (This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, 
>>>>> with minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first 
>>>>> comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
>>>>> Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
>>>>> Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my 
>>>>> new computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
>>>>> This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the 
>>>>> end of the week.
>>>>>> On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < 
>>>>>> <>> wrote:
>>>>>> Dear Colleagues,
>>>>>> I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>>>>>>                                       Is information physical?
>>>>> That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. 
>>>>> My result here is that 
>>>>> IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, 
>>>>> THEN  “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>>>>> “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>>>>> The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from 
>>>>> Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of 
>>>>> “model" (logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
>>>>> Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>>>>> description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>>>>> change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>>>>> brain/body at that level of description.
>>>>> Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all 
>>>>> physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. 
>>>>> Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any 
>>>>> Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny 
>>>>> semi-computable part of arithmetic) is Turing complete (Turing Universal).
>>>>> The basic idea is that:
>>>>> 1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an 
>>>>> arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And,
>>>>> 2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are 
>>>>> necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated 
>>>>> in arithmetic. 
>>>>> That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my 
>>>>> actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I 
>>>>> can describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
>>>>> Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we 
>>>>> cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used 
>>>>> to recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano 
>>>>> arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first 
>>>>> and third person views (and six others!).
>>>>> I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this 
>>>>> (including the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was 
>>>>> about sure this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum 
>>>>> mechanics, which verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical 
>>>>> Mechanism, unless we add the controversial wave collapse reduction 
>>>>> principle.
>>>>> The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many 
>>>>> computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy 
>>>>> becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter 
>>>>> becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person 
>>>>> indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a 
>>>>> duplication, …) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that 
>>>>> neither matter appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, 
>>>>> as the whole arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion 
>>>>> as we know since Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics 
>>>>> leaning to inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which 
>>>>> implies the negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire 
>>>>> physical universe, which I rather doubt).
>>>>>> My opinion is presented below:
>>>>>>    Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
>>>>>>    The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong 
>>>>>> belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only 
>>>>>> physical reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people 
>>>>>> encounter something that they call information.
>>>>>>    When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information 
>>>>>> because with the letter they receive information. The letter is 
>>>>>> physical, i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking 
>>>>>> that information is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they 
>>>>>> comprehend that it is information because with the e-mail they receive 
>>>>>> information. The e-mail comes to the computer in the form of 
>>>>>> electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, people start 
>>>>>> thinking even more that information is physical.
>>>>>>    However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical 
>>>>>> objects are only carriers or containers of information.
>>>>>>    To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to 
>>>>>> say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that 
>>>>>> the textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same 
>>>>>> way, the textbook contains information but is not information itself. 
>>>>>> The same is true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other 
>>>>>> physical objects because all of them only contain information but are 
>>>>>> not information. For instance, as we know, different letters can contain 
>>>>>> the same information. Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or 
>>>>>> any other text, then the letter and its copy will be different physical 
>>>>>> objects (physical things) but they will contain the same information.
>>>>>>    Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, 
>>>>>> data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on 
>>>>>> physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people 
>>>>>> who think that information is physical.
>>>>> OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non 
>>>>> physical objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem 
>>>>> faced by dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover 
>>>>> many dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies.
>>>>>>    One more misleading property of information is that people can 
>>>>>> measure it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to 
>>>>>> measure only physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the 
>>>>>> erroneous conclusion that information is physical. However, measuring 
>>>>>> information is essentially different than measuring physical quantities, 
>>>>>> i.e., weight. There are no “scales” that measure information. Only human 
>>>>>> intellect can do this.
>>>>> OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.
>>>>> Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of 
>>>>> the “knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will 
>>>>> not tell me that this table is unreal”.
>>>>> I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made 
>>>>> dreams in which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by 
>>>>> that argument … until I wake up.
>>>>> When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument” 
>>>>> illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. 
>>>>> A subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of 
>>>>> consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty 
>>>>> of strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) 
>>>>> for a primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle 
>>>>> assumes it quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against 
>>>>> Pythagorus).
>>>>> Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the 
>>>>> world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very 
>>>>> elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is 
>>>>> already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a Universal 
>>>>> Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all programs).
>>>>> So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we 
>>>>> assume Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not 
>>>>> *primarily* physical: it is all in the “head of the universal 
>>>>> machine/number” (so to speak).
>>>>> And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if 
>>>>> there is a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the 
>>>>> observation, and the physics that we extract from “the head” of the 
>>>>> machine. This took me more than 30 years of work, but the results 
>>>>> obtained up to now is that there is no discrepancies. I have compared the 
>>>>> quantum logic imposed by incompleteness (formally) on the semi-computable 
>>>>> (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, with most quantum logics given 
>>>>> by physicists, and it fits rather well.
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>> Bruno
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>>> -- 
>>> -----------------------------------------
>>> Professor David (Dai) Griffiths
>>> Professor of Education
>>> School of Education and Psychology
>>> The University of Bolton
>>> Deane Road
>>> Bolton, BL3 5AB
>>> Office: M106
>>> SKYPE: daigriffiths
>>> Phones (please don't leave voice mail)
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