Dear Bruno, You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the arithmetical reality)". This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, Benacerraf. Your idea is interesting and intriguing, related as it is to the philosophy of mathematics. However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method and of testable hypothesis. You are talking about philosophy, not about science. I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific papers. Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context. -- Inviato da Libero Mail per Android domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be :
>Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues, > > >>On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths < dai.griffith...@gmail.com > wrote: >>What is a 'thing'? > >I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true >it provides a clear (and tastable) answer. > >For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any universal >complete theory or system. >To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are >more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. That >determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience >differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially >correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the believer, >the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc. > >A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative) >neighbourhood of consistent continuations. > >I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it explains >many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as immediate >undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for >consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers. > > > > >>Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that only processes >> exist, and that for human convenience in living in the world we >> put conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and >> call them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two >> aspects (things and predictions about those things), but simply >> the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find. >> This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms >> might be a special kind of process). >>Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully >> reformulated as "Is information a thing?”. > >It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal >difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen >from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not >dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity >emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted the >non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it. >The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations >between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe, >know, observe among all things/relations. > >Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what the >universal machine like to do the most. >See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast variety >of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also >in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its computable part). > >Bruno > > > > >>Dai >> >> >>On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco >> Rivero wrote: >>>Dear FISers, >>>I recently came across an old interview to W. van >>> Orman Quine and I got an idea -maybe not very original per se. >>> Quine distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems: >>> ontological (those referred to the existence of things) and >>> predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against >>> Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological >>> problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. >>> The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we >>> have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think >>> of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from >>> its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree >>> with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social >>> system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are >>> incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians >>> have shown (in this point I confess I would need to examine >>> carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many points of >>> agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I >>> currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough >>> discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most >>> coherent ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn >>> to deal with paradoxes. >>>Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify >>> the constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that >>> paradox in a set of statements that represent what we know about >>> information. The problem is that although we can have the >>> intuition that information is real, physical as has been said, >>> it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality ", if >>> we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the >>> system. I remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann >>> devised the concept of consistency proofs >>> (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is >>> inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not >>> be asking us a question that cannot be answered. >>>Best, >>>JJ >>>El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" >>> < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > escribió: >>>> Dear FISers, >>>> It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly >>>> intelligent and creative individuals participated expressing >>>> different points of view. Many interesting ideas were >>>> suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would like >>>> to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our >>>> intrinsic and often tacit assumptions. >>>> >>>> To great extent, our possibility to answer the question >>>> “Is information physical? “ depends on our model of the >>>> world. Note that here physical means the nature of >>>> information and not its substance, or more exactly, the >>>> substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical >>>> biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum >>>> information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier >>>> of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This >>>> is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal >>>> numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and >>>> not numbers themselves. >>>> >>>> If we assume that there is only the physical world, we >>>> have, at first, to answer the question “Does information >>>> exist? “ All FISers assume that information exists. >>>> Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions. >>>> However, some people think differently (cf., for example, >>>> Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information). >>>> >>>> Now assuming that information exists, we have only one >>>> option, namely, to admit that information is physical >>>> because only physical things exist. >>>> If we assume that there are two worlds - information is >>>> physical, we have three options assuming that information >>>> exists: >>>>- information is physical >>>>- information is mental >>>>- information is both physical and mental >>>> >>>>Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which >>>> comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental >>>> world and the world of structures, we have seven options >>>> assuming that information exists: >>>>- information is physical >>>>- information is mental >>>>- information is structural >>>>- information is both physical and mental >>>>- information is both physical and structural >>>>- information is both structural and mental >>>>- information is physical, structural and mental >>>> >>>> The solution suggested by the general theory of information >>>> tries to avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences >>>> suggesting that information (in a general sense) exists in >>>> all three worlds but … in the physical world, it is called >>>> energy , >>>> in the mental world, it is called mental energy , and >>>> in the world of structures, it is called information (in the >>>> strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with >>>> the suggestion of Mark Johnson that information is both >>>> physical and not physical only the general theory of >>>> information makes this idea more exact and testable. >>>> In addition, being in the world of structures, >>>> information in the strict sense is represented in two other >>>> worlds by its representations and carriers. Note that any >>>> representation of information is its carrier but not each >>>> carrier of information is its representation. For instance, >>>> an envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in >>>> this letter but it is not its representation. >>>> Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of >>>> information by the name energy - physical energy, mental >>>> energy and structural energy. >>>> >>>> Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this >>>> discussion, may be Krassimir will continue his excellent >>>> initiative combining the most interesting contributions into >>>> a paper with the title >>>> >>>> Is information physical? >>>> and publish it in his esteemed Journal. >>>> >>>> Sincerely, >>>> Mark Burgin >>>> >>>>On >>>> 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote: >>>>>Dear Arturo, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>There were some reports in clinical >>>>> psychology, about 30 years ago, that relate to the >>>>> question whether a machine can pretend to be a >>>>> therapist. That was the time as computers could newly >>>>> be used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers >>>>> techniques were a current discovery. >>>>>(Rogers developed a dialogue method >>>>> where one does not address the contents of what the >>>>> patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the >>>>> message, assumed to be at work in the patient.) >>>>> >>>>>They then said, that in some cases it >>>>> was indistinguishable, whether a human or a machine >>>>> provides the answer to a patient's elucidations. >>>>> >>>>>Progress since then has surely made >>>>> possible to create machines that are indistinguishable >>>>> in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called >>>>> "expert systems ", are widely used in many fields. If >>>>> the interaction is rational, that is: formally >>>>> equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, >>>>> the difference in: "who arrived at this answer, >>>>> machinery or a human", becomes irrelevant. >>>>> >>>>>Artistry, intuition, creativity are >>>>> presently seen as not possible to translate into >>>>> Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are >>>>> not yet well understood. But!: there are some who are >>>>> busily undermining the current fundamentals of >>>>> rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live >>>>> to experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely >>>>> that humans are a combinatorial tautology. >>>>> >>>>>Accordingly, may I respectfully express >>>>> opposing views to what you state: that machines and >>>>> humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints >>>>> that as far as rational capabilities go, the same >>>>> principles apply. There is a rest, you say, which is >>>>> not of this kind. The counter argument says that >>>>> irrational processes do not take place in organisms, >>>>> therefore what you refer to belongs to the main >>>>> process, maybe like waste belongs to the organism's >>>>> principle. This view draws a picture of a functional >>>>> biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism is >>>>> raw material for a different kind. >>>>> >>>>>Karl >>>>>< tozziart...@libero.it > >>>>> schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24: >>>>>>Dear Bruno, >>>>>>You state: >>>>>>"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the >>>>>> cognitive science, >>>>>>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in >>>>>> arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a >>>>>> mathematical notion. >>>>>>...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis >>>>>> that there is a level of description of the >>>>>> brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel >>>>>> any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a >>>>>> digital machine emulating the brain/body at that >>>>>> level of description". >>>>>>The problem of your account is the >>>>>> following: >>>>>>You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is >>>>>> the HYPOTHESIS". >>>>>>Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is >>>>>> not empirically tested and it is not empirically >>>>>> testable. You are starting with a sort of >>>>>> postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with >>>>>> it. The current neuroscience does not state that >>>>>> our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a >>>>>> digital machine. >>>>>>In other words, your "IF" stands for something >>>>>> that possibly does not exist in our real world. >>>>>> Here your entire building falls down. >>>>>>-- >>>>>>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM >>>>>>+02:00 da Bruno >>>>>> Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be : >>>>>> >>>>>>>(This mail has been sent previously , >>>>>>> but without success. I resend it, with >>>>>>> minor changes). Problems due to >>>>>>> different accounts. It was my first >>>>>>> comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is >>>>>>> information physical?”. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Apology for not answering the mails >>>>>>> in the chronological orders, as my new >>>>>>> computer classifies them in some >>>>>>> mysterious way! >>>>>>>This is my first post of the week. I >>>>>>> might answer comment, if any, at the end >>>>>>> of the week. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, >>>>>>>> Burgin, Mark < >>>>>>>> mbur...@math.ucla.edu > >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>Dear >>>>>>>> Colleagues, >>>>>>>>I >>>>>>>> would like to suggest the new >>>>>>>> topic for discussion >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is information physical? >>>>>>> >>>>>>>That is an important topic >>>>>>> indeed, very close to what I am >>>>>>> working on. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>My result here is that >>>>>>> >>>>>>>IF indexical >>>>>>> digital mechanism is correct in the >>>>>>> cognitive science, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>THEN “physical” >>>>>>> has to be defined entirely in >>>>>>> arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” >>>>>>> becomes a mathematical notion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>The proof is constructive. It >>>>>>> shows exactly how to derive physics >>>>>>> from Arithmetic (the reality, not >>>>>>> the theory. I use “reality” instead >>>>>>> of “model" (logician’s term, because >>>>>>> physicists use “model" for >>>>>>> “theory"). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Indexical digital mechanism is >>>>>>> the hypothesis that there is a level >>>>>>> of description of the brain/body >>>>>>> such that I would survive, or “not >>>>>>> feel any change” if my brain/body is >>>>>>> replaced by a digital machine >>>>>>> emulating the brain/body at that >>>>>>> level of description. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Not only information is not >>>>>>> physical, but matter, time, space, >>>>>>> and all physical objects become part >>>>>>> of the universal machine >>>>>>> phenomenology. Physics is reduced to >>>>>>> arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any >>>>>>> Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly >>>>>>> Arithmetic (even the tiny >>>>>>> semi-computable part of arithmetic) >>>>>>> is Turing complete (Turing >>>>>>> Universal). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>The basic idea is that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>1) no universal machine can >>>>>>> distinguish if she is executed by an >>>>>>> arithmetical reality or by a >>>>>>> physical reality. And, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>2) all universal machines are >>>>>>> executed in arithmetic, and they are >>>>>>> necessarily undetermined on the set >>>>>>> of of all its continuations emulated >>>>>>> in arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>That reduces physics to a >>>>>>> statistics on all computations >>>>>>> relative to my actual state, and see >>>>>>> from some first person points of >>>>>>> view (something I can describe more >>>>>>> precisely in some future post >>>>>>> perhaps). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Put in that way, the proof is not >>>>>>> constructive, as, if we are machine, >>>>>>> we cannot know which machine we are. >>>>>>> But Gödel’s incompleteness can be >>>>>>> used to recover this constructively >>>>>>> for a simpler machine than us, like >>>>>>> Peano arithmetic. This way of >>>>>>> proceeding enforces the distinction >>>>>>> between first and third person views >>>>>>> (and six others!). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>I have derived already many >>>>>>> feature of quantum mechanics from >>>>>>> this (including the possibility of >>>>>>> quantum computer) a long time ago. >>>>>>> I was about sure this would refute >>>>>>> Mechanism, until I learned about >>>>>>> quantum mechanics, which verifies >>>>>>> all the most startling predictions >>>>>>> of Indexical Mechanism, unless we >>>>>>> add the controversial wave collapse >>>>>>> reduction principle. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>The curious “many-worlds” becomes >>>>>>> the obvious (in arithmetic) many >>>>>>> computations (up to some equivalence >>>>>>> quotient). The weird indeterminacy >>>>>>> becomes the simpler amoeba like >>>>>>> duplication. The non-cloning of >>>>>>> matter becomes obvious: as any piece >>>>>>> of matter is the result of the first >>>>>>> person indeterminacy (the first >>>>>>> person view of the amoeba undergoing >>>>>>> a duplication, …) on infinitely many >>>>>>> computations. This entails also that >>>>>>> neither matter appearance nor >>>>>>> consciousness are Turing emulable >>>>>>> per se, as the whole arithmetical >>>>>>> reality—which is a highly non >>>>>>> computable notion as we know since >>>>>>> Gödel—plays a key role. Note this >>>>>>> makes Digital Physics leaning to >>>>>>> inconsistency, as it implies >>>>>>> indexical computationalism which >>>>>>> implies the negation of Digital >>>>>>> Physics (unless my “body” is the >>>>>>> entire physical universe, which I >>>>>>> rather doubt). >>>>>>>>My >>>>>>>> opinion is presented below: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Why >>>>>>>> some people erroneously think >>>>>>>> that information is physical >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>> main reason to think that >>>>>>>> information is physical is the >>>>>>>> strong belief of many people, >>>>>>>> especially, scientists that >>>>>>>> there is only physical >>>>>>>> reality, which is studied by >>>>>>>> science. At the same time, >>>>>>>> people encounter something >>>>>>>> that they call information. >>>>>>>> When >>>>>>>> people receive a letter, they >>>>>>>> comprehend that it is >>>>>>>> information because with the >>>>>>>> letter they receive >>>>>>>> information. The letter is >>>>>>>> physical, i.e., a physical >>>>>>>> object. As a result, people >>>>>>>> start thinking that >>>>>>>> information is physical. When >>>>>>>> people receive an e-mail, they >>>>>>>> comprehend that it is >>>>>>>> information because with the >>>>>>>> e-mail they receive >>>>>>>> information. The e-mail comes >>>>>>>> to the computer in the form of >>>>>>>> electromagnetic waves, which >>>>>>>> are physical. As a result, >>>>>>>> people start thinking even >>>>>>>> more that information is >>>>>>>> physical. >>>>>>>> However, >>>>>>>> letters, electromagnetic waves >>>>>>>> and actually all physical >>>>>>>> objects are only carriers or >>>>>>>> containers of information. >>>>>>>> To >>>>>>>> understand this better, let us >>>>>>>> consider a textbook. Is >>>>>>>> possible to say that this book >>>>>>>> is knowledge? Any reasonable >>>>>>>> person will tell that the >>>>>>>> textbook contains knowledge >>>>>>>> but is not knowledge itself. >>>>>>>> In the same way, the textbook >>>>>>>> contains information but is >>>>>>>> not information itself. The >>>>>>>> same is true for letters, >>>>>>>> e-mails, electromagnetic waves >>>>>>>> and other physical objects >>>>>>>> because all of them only >>>>>>>> contain information but are >>>>>>>> not information. For instance, >>>>>>>> as we know, different letters >>>>>>>> can contain the same >>>>>>>> information. Even if we make >>>>>>>> an identical copy of a letter >>>>>>>> or any other text, then the >>>>>>>> letter and its copy will be >>>>>>>> different physical objects >>>>>>>> (physical things) but they >>>>>>>> will contain the same >>>>>>>> information. >>>>>>>> Information >>>>>>>> belongs to a different >>>>>>>> (non-physical) world of >>>>>>>> knowledge, data and similar >>>>>>>> essences. In spite of this, >>>>>>>> information can act on >>>>>>>> physical objects (physical >>>>>>>> bodies) and this action also >>>>>>>> misleads people who think that >>>>>>>> information is physical. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>OK. The reason is that we can >>>>>>> hardly imagine how immaterial or non >>>>>>> physical objects can alter the >>>>>>> physical realm. It is the usual >>>>>>> problem faced by dualist ontologies. >>>>>>> With Indexical computationalism we >>>>>>> recover many dualities, but they >>>>>>> belong to the phenomenologies. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> One >>>>>>>> more misleading property of >>>>>>>> information is that people can >>>>>>>> measure it. This brings an >>>>>>>> erroneous assumption that it >>>>>>>> is possible to measure only >>>>>>>> physical essences. Naturally, >>>>>>>> this brings people to the >>>>>>>> erroneous conclusion that >>>>>>>> information is physical. >>>>>>>> However, measuring information >>>>>>>> is essentially different than >>>>>>>> measuring physical quantities, >>>>>>>> i.e., weight. There are no >>>>>>>> “scales” that measure >>>>>>>> information. Only human >>>>>>>> intellect can do this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>OK. I think all intellect can do >>>>>>> that, not just he human one. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Now, the reason why people >>>>>>> believe in the physical is always a >>>>>>> form of the “knocking table” >>>>>>> argument. They knocks on the table >>>>>>> and say “you will not tell me that >>>>>>> this table is unreal”. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>I have got so many people giving >>>>>>> me that argument, that I have made >>>>>>> dreams in which I made that >>>>>>> argument, or even where I was >>>>>>> convinced by that argument … until I >>>>>>> wake up. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>When we do metaphysics with the >>>>>>> scientific method, this “dream >>>>>>> argument” illustrates that seeing, >>>>>>> measuring, … cannot prove anything >>>>>>> ontological. A subjective experience >>>>>>> proves only the phenomenological >>>>>>> existence of consciousness, and >>>>>>> nothing more. It shows that although >>>>>>> there are plenty of strong evidences >>>>>>> for a material reality, there are no >>>>>>> evidences (yet) for a primitive or >>>>>>> primary matter (and that is why, I >>>>>>> think, Aristotle assumes it quasi >>>>>>> explicitly, against Plato, and >>>>>>> plausibly against Pythagorus). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Mechanism forces a coming back to >>>>>>> Plato, where the worlds of ideas is >>>>>>> the world of programs, or >>>>>>> information, or even just numbers, >>>>>>> since very elementary arithmetic (PA >>>>>>> without induction, + the predecessor >>>>>>> axiom) is already Turing complete >>>>>>> (it contains what I have named a >>>>>>> Universal Dovetailer: a program >>>>>>> which generates *and* executes all >>>>>>> programs). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>So I agree with you: information >>>>>>> is not physical. I claim that if we >>>>>>> assume Mechanism (Indexical >>>>>>> computationalism) matter itself is >>>>>>> also not *primarily* physical: it is >>>>>>> all in the “head of the universal >>>>>>> machine/number” (so to speak). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>And this provides a test for >>>>>>> primary matter: it is enough to find >>>>>>> if there is a discrepancy between >>>>>>> the physics that we infer from the >>>>>>> observation, and the physics that we >>>>>>> extract from “the head” of the >>>>>>> machine. This took me more than 30 >>>>>>> years of work, but the results >>>>>>> obtained up to now is that there is >>>>>>> no discrepancies. I have compared >>>>>>> the quantum logic imposed by >>>>>>> incompleteness (formally) on the >>>>>>> semi-computable (partial recursive, >>>>>>> sigma_1) propositions, with most >>>>>>> quantum logics given by physicists, >>>>>>> and it fits rather well. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Best regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>Bruno >>>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>Fis mailing list >>>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>>> >>>> >>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>Fis mailing list >>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>>> >>> >>> >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Fis mailing list >>>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>> >>-- >>----------------------------------------- >> >>Professor David (Dai) Griffiths >>Professor of Education >>School of Education and Psychology >>The University of Bolton >>Deane Road >>Bolton, BL3 5AB >> >>Office: M106 >> >>SKYPE: daigriffiths >> >>Phones (please don't leave voice mail) >> UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 >> Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 >> Work landline: + 44 (0)1204903598 >> >>email >> d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk >> dai.griffith...@gmail.com _______________________________________________ >>Fis mailing list >>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >_______________________________________________ >Fis mailing list >Fis@listas.unizar.es >http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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