Fraser Tweedale via FreeIPA-users wrote: > On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 12:48:50PM +0200, Alexander Bokovoy via FreeIPA-users > wrote: >> On pe, 06 maalis 2020, Sigbjorn Lie via FreeIPA-users wrote: >>>> On 4 Mar 2020, at 14:27, Alexander Bokovoy via FreeIPA-users >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> On ke, 04 maalis 2020, Sigbjorn Lie via FreeIPA-users wrote: >>>>> Hi Alex, >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for your prompt response. >>>>> >>>>> There are no Debian/Ubuntu systems in our environment. >>>>> >>>>> From your response, is the dual CA cert to be expected / by design? >>>> >>>> Yes, actually, it is to be expected for any setup with external CA root. >>> >>> This is not an external CA root. I presume both internal and external >>> CA root is treated the same then. >> >> Yes, there is no difference in this sense. In both cases Dogtag owns the >> key -- the difference would only be where a self-signed root is located >> in a CA path. >> >>>>> I have not verified what certificate every application in our >>>>> environment ends up utilizing yet, as serving both the old and the new >>>>> CA certificates seem to me to be a bug, and I would rather fix the bug >>>>> than make workarounds. >>>> >>>> No it is not a bug. It is normal and common to have multiple CA roots >>>> available in a certificate store. The checks are done against a valid >>>> CA root for the specific certificate and if you have one issued with the >>>> use of older CA root certificate, you need to verify against that. >>> >>> This does not seem to be correct for IPA. As far as I recall there was >>> a feature for making sure at that the renewed IPA CA certificate (when >>> using self-signed CA cert) continue to work for the existing issued >>> certificates. Verifying a certificate that was issues by the old CA >>> against the new CA returns OK, and there are no issues connecting to >>> the website. >>> >>> sudo openssl verify -verbose -CAfile /etc/ipa/ca-new.crt >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt: OK >> >> openssl verification is done down to a self-signed trust anchor. If your >> new CA root is using the same key (no re-keying happened on CA root >> renewal), the same key is in place, and IPA CA is self-signed, that's >> why it works. My understanding is that if you re-keyed CA root >> certificate on renewal, this wouldn't be true and you would need the old >> CA certificate to validate these server certificates. >> >> I might be wrong here, though. See man page for openssl-verify, section >> 'VERIFY OPERATION' for some logic description. >> >>>> What I'd like to get clear is why are you pointing the applications to >>>> /etc/ipa/ca.crt? Supposedly, the content of this file is already a part >>>> of the system-wide certificate store. On RHEL/CentOS/Fedora systems the >>>> way how system-wide store works, there are multiple representations that >>>> are supported by all crypto libraries and frameworks. So you don't need >>>> to put a direct reference to /etc/ipa/ca.crt. >>> >>> We have been using IPA in production since 2012. In testing even a >>> couple of years earlier. Back then the only place the ca cert was >>> written to the client was /etc/ipa/ca.crt, and so this is what has been >>> used in our Puppet setup ever since the beginning. The fact that the >>> ipa-client installs the CA certificate in the system-wide certificate >>> store is a more recent development. >>> (https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/3504) >> >> Understood. The ticket mentioned was closed in 2014, so we are talking >> about all RHEL 7+/Fedora 19+ systems. >> >> >>>>> Back to my original question, what is the reason for keep serving the >>>>> old certificate? Would it not be sufficient to serve only the new >>>>> certificate to new clients being enrolled and clients using the >>>>> ipa-certupdate command? >>>> >>>> It is to allow clients to verify certificates issued with the previous >>>> CA root certificate. Until you have renewed all certificates issued with >>>> the old CA root, you need to keep that in place or clients/servers using >>>> that wouldn't be able to trust the certificate. >>> >>> This is perhaps true for most PKI setups, however as mentioned, I seem >>> to recall that a a feature for making sure at that the renewed IPA CA >>> certificate (when using self-signed CA cert) continue to work for the >>> existing issued certificates. Again, openssl returns OK when verifying >>> existing certificates with the new CA, and there are no issues >>> connecting to the website where this is hosted. >>> >>> sudo openssl verify -verbose -CAfile /etc/ipa/ca-new.crt >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt: OK >>> >>> >>> As this duplicated CA cert is a feature, what will happen when we move >>> pass the expiry date of the old CA? Will it be automatically removed >>> from IPA or is there any manual cleanup required? >> >> There is no automatic cleanup right now. I thought we had a ticket for >> the clean up tool but I cannot find it right now. Please open one? >> > Rob recently implemented `ipa-cacert-manage delete` subcommand, on > master and ipa-4-8 branch (there hasn't been a release containing it > yet, though). It can be used to remove a specified certificate from > the IPA trust store. But it is not automatic. > > If expired CA certs are present in trust stores, clients will (or > should) ignore them.
I should point out that the delete command deletes ALL certs for a nickname so it wouldn't help in this particular case. rob _______________________________________________ FreeIPA-users mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/archives/list/[email protected]
