On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 10:25:01AM -0400, Rob Crittenden wrote:
> Fraser Tweedale via FreeIPA-users wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 12:48:50PM +0200, Alexander Bokovoy via
> > FreeIPA-users wrote:
> >> On pe, 06 maalis 2020, Sigbjorn Lie via FreeIPA-users wrote:
> >>>> On 4 Mar 2020, at 14:27, Alexander Bokovoy via FreeIPA-users
> >>>> <freeipa-users@lists.fedorahosted.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On ke, 04 maalis 2020, Sigbjorn Lie via FreeIPA-users wrote:
> >>>>> Hi Alex,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thanks for your prompt response.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> There are no Debian/Ubuntu systems in our environment.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> From your response, is the dual CA cert to be expected / by design?
> >>>>
> >>>> Yes, actually, it is to be expected for any setup with external CA root.
> >>>
> >>> This is not an external CA root. I presume both internal and external
> >>> CA root is treated the same then.
> >>
> >> Yes, there is no difference in this sense. In both cases Dogtag owns the
> >> key -- the difference would only be where a self-signed root is located
> >> in a CA path.
> >>
> >>>>> I have not verified what certificate every application in our
> >>>>> environment ends up utilizing yet, as serving both the old and the new
> >>>>> CA certificates seem to me to be a bug, and I would rather fix the bug
> >>>>> than make workarounds.
> >>>>
> >>>> No it is not a bug. It is normal and common to have multiple CA roots
> >>>> available in a certificate store. The checks are done against a valid
> >>>> CA root for the specific certificate and if you have one issued with the
> >>>> use of older CA root certificate, you need to verify against that.
> >>>
> >>> This does not seem to be correct for IPA. As far as I recall there was
> >>> a feature for making sure at that the renewed IPA CA certificate (when
> >>> using self-signed CA cert) continue to work for the existing issued
> >>> certificates. Verifying a certificate that was issues by the old CA
> >>> against the new CA returns OK, and there are no issues connecting to
> >>> the website.
> >>>
> >>> sudo openssl verify -verbose -CAfile /etc/ipa/ca-new.crt
> >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt
> >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt: OK
> >>
> >> openssl verification is done down to a self-signed trust anchor. If your
> >> new CA root is using the same key (no re-keying happened on CA root
> >> renewal), the same key is in place, and IPA CA is self-signed, that's
> >> why it works. My understanding is that if you re-keyed CA root
> >> certificate on renewal, this wouldn't be true and you would need the old
> >> CA certificate to validate these server certificates.
> >>
> >> I might be wrong here, though. See man page for openssl-verify, section
> >> 'VERIFY OPERATION' for some logic description.
> >>
> >>>> What I'd like to get clear is why are you pointing the applications to
> >>>> /etc/ipa/ca.crt? Supposedly, the content of this file is already a part
> >>>> of the system-wide certificate store. On RHEL/CentOS/Fedora systems the
> >>>> way how system-wide store works, there are multiple representations that
> >>>> are supported by all crypto libraries and frameworks. So you don't need
> >>>> to put a direct reference to /etc/ipa/ca.crt.
> >>>
> >>> We have been using IPA in production since 2012. In testing even a
> >>> couple of years earlier. Back then the only place the ca cert was
> >>> written to the client was /etc/ipa/ca.crt, and so this is what has been
> >>> used in our Puppet setup ever since the beginning. The fact that the
> >>> ipa-client installs the CA certificate in the system-wide certificate
> >>> store is a more recent development.
> >>> (https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/3504)
> >>
> >> Understood. The ticket mentioned was closed in 2014, so we are talking
> >> about all RHEL 7+/Fedora 19+ systems.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>> Back to my original question, what is the reason for keep serving the
> >>>>> old certificate? Would it not be sufficient to serve only the new
> >>>>> certificate to new clients being enrolled and clients using the
> >>>>> ipa-certupdate command?
> >>>>
> >>>> It is to allow clients to verify certificates issued with the previous
> >>>> CA root certificate. Until you have renewed all certificates issued with
> >>>> the old CA root, you need to keep that in place or clients/servers using
> >>>> that wouldn't be able to trust the certificate.
> >>>
> >>> This is perhaps true for most PKI setups, however as mentioned, I seem
> >>> to recall that a a feature for making sure at that the renewed IPA CA
> >>> certificate (when using self-signed CA cert) continue to work for the
> >>> existing issued certificates. Again, openssl returns OK when verifying
> >>> existing certificates with the new CA, and there are no issues
> >>> connecting to the website where this is hosted.
> >>>
> >>> sudo openssl verify -verbose -CAfile /etc/ipa/ca-new.crt
> >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt
> >>> /etc/pki/httpd/website1.crt: OK
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> As this duplicated CA cert is a feature, what will happen when we move
> >>> pass the expiry date of the old CA? Will it be automatically removed
> >>> from IPA or is there any manual cleanup required?
> >>
> >> There is no automatic cleanup right now. I thought we had a ticket for
> >> the clean up tool but I cannot find it right now. Please open one?
> >>
> > Rob recently implemented `ipa-cacert-manage delete` subcommand, on
> > master and ipa-4-8 branch (there hasn't been a release containing it
> > yet, though). It can be used to remove a specified certificate from
> > the IPA trust store. But it is not automatic.
> >
> > If expired CA certs are present in trust stores, clients will (or
> > should) ignore them.
>
> I should point out that the delete command deletes ALL certs for a
> nickname so it wouldn't help in this particular case.
>
Thanks for the clarification, Rob.
If you need to remove just a single cert for the same subject (e.g.
an older expired one), you can delete that particular
userCertificate attribute value from its LDAP entry under
cn=certificates,cn=ipa,cn=etc,{basedn}.
I also want to clarify that it is expected behaviour for IPA will
put all trusted CA certs, including possibly expired variants, in
the /etc/ipa/ca.crt and other system trust stores. If it is causing
an issue for some other program, the problem is with that program,
not with FreeIPA.
Thanks,
Fraser
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