There is a school of thought called "strong ALife", stating that computational systems can be alive, given the right program. It is analogous (but not equivalent to) the better known "strong AI" position, sometimes known as "computationalism".
Rosen's result essentially says that "strong ALife" is impossible. Hence the interest in it, particularly from ALifers. There is also interest from AI people and more importantly philosphers of the mind, as it is often thought that the parallels between ALife and AI are strong enough to carry results from one field to the other (which personally I'm a bit dubious about). Of course, it doesn't help that nobody has a really good definition of life... On Sun, Dec 30, 2007 at 06:23:52PM +0000, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I missed the implication people are finding in Rosen's idea of > "non-computable models". Can someone offer some examples of instances where > that matters. It sounds like it means something other than 'insoluable'. > Could it perhaps include 'internalized' & so therefore not accessible? > > Phil -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
