Jochen, I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive theatre metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the modeler's life harder NOT easier.
Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is about my keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do other things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function). It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and systems biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over space and time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly integrated with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently towards the world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems, should form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call that the "realist's model". Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the Cartesian theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about how mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a model has to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once you have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have two mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms the mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a dualist, it is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the world. So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at least three complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence in the prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system integrates with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on a stage (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those "ideas" play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both about the causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those "ideas" and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic process that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean action of the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head the stage is in. Yuck! That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective, I think it might be the main one. Eric On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 04:42 PM, "Jochen Fromm" <[email protected]> wrote: > Yes. You can find the text of his 1988 book >"A cognitive theory of consciousness" there. >I borrowed it this week from the university >library (we have got a new one here in Berlin, >see here http://bit.ly/2ELIaK ). > >The theory seems to be rather weak, >I think the best thing in his "theory" is the theater >metaphor. But if you want to model consciousness >and self-awareness by an ABM, then this >seems to be the starting line, as Dennett says. > >-J. > >----- Original Message ----- >From: Roger Critchlow >To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:06 PM >Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness > >So, this Baars fellow who you're discussing, this is the Bernard J Baars >whose home page at http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/ links to copies of >all the books and papers under discussion? > > > >============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > Eric Charles Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
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