A thoughtful response. You are right,
one inconsistency for the theater
metaphor is the missing distinction
between sensoric and motoric regions.
The coupling between them is also
completely neglected.
Another one is the missing distinction
between different levels of abstraction
for the various actors on the stage,
ranging from concrete perceptions to
abstract perception and beliefs, and
from concrete actions to abstract actions
and intentions.
Perhaps one could imagine a theater
with multiple stages, like a disco or club
with multiple dance floors. Theaters and
clubs are similar, in both of them there are
always a lot of people watching (the
unconscious elements), and only a
few are moving around in the spotlight
(the conscious ones).
-J.
----- Original Message -----
From: "ERIC P. CHARLES" <[email protected]>
To: "Jochen Fromm" <[email protected]>
Cc: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group" <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 12:52 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive
theatre
metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the
modeler's
life harder NOT easier.
Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is
about my
keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do
other
things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).
It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and
systems
biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over space
and
time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of
world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly
integrated
with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently towards
the
world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems,
should
form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call
that
the "realist's model".
Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
Cartesian
theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about how
mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a model
has
to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once
you
have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have
two
mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms
the
mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical
actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a dualist,
it
is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the
world.
So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial
problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at least
three
complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence in
the
prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system
integrates
with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on a
stage
(only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those
"ideas"
play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both
about the
causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those
"ideas"
and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic
process
that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean
action of
the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head
the
stage is in. Yuck!
That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective,
I
think it might be the main one.
Eric
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