Glen, You covered a lot of ground in this email, and I'm struggling to figure out how to respond. I can't address everything, but I can make a few points.
A) The point of the analogy with the 'solveability' of computers was merely to point out that people often assert there are big mysteries in sciences they do not know very well. In some (but certainly not all) of those situations, people embedded in that science insist NOT that the mystery has been 'solved', but rather that the science has moved beyond dealing with the issue in a way that is at all mysterious. Maybe I did not express the idea well enough, or maybe I am off base with my understanding of computer science. Admittedly, I had only one graduate-level theory of computation class, and that was quite a few years ago. Perhaps Nick is correct that his inquiries about vortexes are a better example. For many people vortexes remain a classic example of a 'natural Mystery', for some so remain rainbows. B) The best I muster to those who insist upon a 'mind-body problem' is NOT just that the question is poorly posed, but that there is quite a bit of evidence to against their being a problem. If you are arguing against induction, by asserting that even an infinite array of evidence cannot justify the inductive conclusion that 'all' mental processes are things that bodies do... well, you win. But that is a shallow victory, and if it is applicable here, it is only applicable to the same extent that arguments against induction are applicable as a criticism of all science. Empirical psychologists, at least when they are acting as such, are not interested in truth by definition, but in studying identified phenomenon in a systematic manner. C) I'm not sure what to do with your talk of 'qualia', nor what you mean when you say I can make very few claims about 'the mind'. All I can say is that if the subject matter as defined as being mysteriously-not-tractable, well, then you will always see it as mysterious. Not to pick on your particular example too much, but quite a few researchers in my area (the study of perception-action linkages) focus narrowly on motor control and coordination of locomotive behavior. I have never done such research. However, I have seen SEVERAL talks measuring how perception of the world is affected by things like hip injuries. Hip stability effects (yes, effects) what people see as a climb-up-able step, what they see as a cross-able gap, their experience of safety vs. danger, their feelings of comfort vs. anxiety, etc. All these ARE changed by altering their hip. If 'seeing the stairs as dangerous' and 'feeling anxious' are not examples of 'qualia', then I really have no clue what you are asking me about. D) We know a lot about brains and nervous systems and how they work. We are far from knowing everything. We also know an awful lot about how the rest of the body works. Again, we are far from knowing everything. However, to act like we are still in the 1700's regarding our understanding of mind-brain relations is just odd. When Descartes wrote, there was in fact a Mystery with a capitol 'M'. Now, not so much. I suppose I must accept your criticism that this is a statement of 'faith' on my part, it is. However, I do not see how it is more a statement of faith than the one a physicist makes when he tells his class that matter is made up of atoms. There are still things about the atomic structure of materials that we don't understand, and the existence or non-existence of atoms was also once a Big Question. Eric On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 01:32 PM, "glen e. p. ropella" <g...@tempusdictum.com> wrote: > Well, needless to say, I completely disagree. First, the analogy with >computers and "solveability" is so completely fallacious it boggles my >mind. My head just about exploded when I read that. ;-) We have a >formalism (more than one, actually) and a set of theorems regarding >the >universality of some Turing machines. We're not even close to having >even a single formalism, let alone a body of theorems, showing that the >mind is generated solely from the body. (An operational closure.) > >But, more importantly, the best criticism you'll be able to muster >against those who see a categorical difference between mind and body is >that the problem is ill-posed. You can't say that all thoughts are >generated from the body with anything coming close to credibility. The >first, but not the least, objection to such a claim is the quantifier >"all". You can't even estimate the cardinality of thought. You can't >say whether language is required for thought. You can't account for >qualia. You can _barely_ demonstrate neural correlates between bodily >actions (like speaking or looking) and activity in the brain. In fact >there is very little you can claim about the mind. And yet you can >miraculously claim you know, beyond a shadow of any doubt, that all mind >is generated by the body? Wow. Talk about an article of faith. > >Now, I'm not suggesting that the mind is generated by something other >than the body. All I'm doing is avoiding conviction within a particular >conclusion[*]. I believe that the body is a medium for the mind (there >may be other media). In that, we agree. But I am not so arrogant to >say that the mind is solely a behavior of the body. (And I'm especially >not so arrogant as to claim we've proven that.) The difference is >subtle. All we've done so far is demonstrate that there is an absence >of evidence for the mind without the (a) body. But absence of >evidence >is NOT evidence of absence. > >There is clearly a Big Question. And that is: What changes can we make >to the body without categorically changing the mind? Or, vice versa: >What changes can we make to the mind without categorically changing the >body? We already know many of the changes. You can change out >someone's hip, for example, without fundamentally altering their mind. > >Medically, this Big Question flows down into questions like: > >1) Does a person's identity change after a stroke? Or the onset of >Alzheimer's? Parkinson's? Cancer? A bunion? >2) How is a schizophrenic person different from a "healthy" >person and >what changes can/should we make to "heal" such a person? >3) What is the personhood status of a fetus? A comatose patient? A >brain-dead patient? > >These aren't just "little mysteries", as you so belittle them. They >are >instances of the mind-body problem with very practical and often >heartbreaking contexts. > >[*] We do have a significant non-whacko population of people who believe >in things like memes, social construction/regulation of the mind, >evo-devo, multi-level selection, extended physiology, etc. To say the >mind-body problem is solved is to dismiss all these positions and their >backers. > >ERIC P. CHARLES wrote circa 11-09-20 07:48 AM: >> Well... yes and no. >> >> To keep my metaphor in the 'P.S.' going, we also can't say exactly how a >> computer could solve every solvable problem... but that doesn't mean >> there is a Big Question 'solveability' mystery still around. Instead >> there are many little mysteries: How would this particular problem be >> solved? >> >> For example, the point I was trying to make was that mind and body do >> not differ in the manner the Big Question version of the 'mind-body' >> problem assumes. Mental things are one of the many things that bodies >> do, nothing more. If you accept that (which I am fairly certain you >do), >> then you have already moved beyond thinking there is mystery of how mind >> and body are related. What you (and I) are left with is a bunch >of >> little, normal science questions. What is the exact mechanism of X? How >> does Y develop? etc. Such questions represent scientific unknowns, just >> as do questions about how to synthesize a particular compound. There has >> been much success in solving many of the little mysteries. Many, many, >> brilliant experiments illuminating the mechanisms by which bodies do >> mental things, and explaining how such mechanisms develop. I could >> recommend several large books if desired. >> >> When people talk about a 'mind-body' problem, they are convinced there >> is still a Big Question. Something like the question of where and how >> the soul enters the body, or the question about how the ethereal mind >> connects with our corporeal mere-matter. Robert's link showed this >> nicely. Though some of that language has been rejected (souls are not >> mentioned much anymore), any sense of Big Question 'mysteriousness' >> indicates that people are still thinking along those lines. > > >-- >glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com > > >============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > Eric Charles Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
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