Worksforme. On Sep 24, 2012 9:34 PM, "Victoria Hughes" <[email protected]> wrote:
> Perhaps one could rename or subset the meeting as FRIPM. > Meet at Sas' and finally combine the whiskey, the cast of characters, and > the table-pounding. > After October 10. > > > On Sep 24, 2012, at 9:28 PM, Douglas Roberts wrote: > > Yikes. I might just have to break tradition and attend an actual FRIAM > meeting. Has there ever been an actual fist fight at a FRIAM meeting? > > -Doug > > Sent from Android. > On Sep 24, 2012 9:17 PM, "Nicholas Thompson" <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Hi Russ, **** >> >> ** ** >> >> Whatever SEP may have to say, we still have to talk to one another, >> right? Notice that all these meanings have to do with God. If SEP is >> correct, a person not concerned with god in one way or another would never >> use the word. Do you put faith in the advice of your stockbroker? **** >> >> ** ** >> >> Forgive me if I am being abit trollish, here; I perhaps am not following >> closely enough, due to packing, etc., to get back to Santa Fe. This week I >> won’t make it for Friday’s meeting, but NEXT WEEK, look out!**** >> >> ** ** >> >> *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] *On >> Behalf Of *Russ Abbott >> *Sent:* Monday, September 24, 2012 9:42 PM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] faith**** >> >> ** ** >> >> Robert Holmes quoted the *Stanford Encyclopedia of >> Philosophy*<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/faith/#FaiDoxVen>as listing >> these senses of "faith." >> **** >> >> ** ** >> >> · *the ‘purely affective’ model*: faith as a feeling of existential >> confidence **** >> >> · *the ‘special knowledge’ model*: faith as knowledge of specific >> truths, revealed by God **** >> >> · *the ‘belief’ model*: faith as belief *that* God exists **** >> >> · *the ‘trust’ model*: faith as belief *in* (trust in) God**** >> >> · *the ‘doxastic venture’ model*: faith as practical commitment beyond >> the evidence to one's belief that God exists **** >> >> · *the ‘sub-doxastic venture’ model*: faith as practical commitment >> without belief **** >> >> · *the ‘hope’ model*: faith as hoping—or acting in the hope that—the >> God who saves exists. **** >> >> ** ** >> >> Has the discussion done better than this?**** >> >> ** ** >> >> It seems to me that we are getting into trouble because (as this list >> illustrates) we (in English) use the word "faith" to mean a number of >> different things, which are only sometimes related to each other. **** >> >> ** ** >> >> My original concern was with "faith" in the sense of the fifth bullet. >> (The third bullet is explicitly based on belief in God.) According to the >> article, **** >> >> ** ** >> >> On the doxastic venture model, faith involves *full* commitment, in the >> face of the recognition that this is not ‘objectively’ justified on the >> evidence.**** >> >> ** ** >> >> That's pretty close to how I would use the term. To a great extent the >> article has a theological focus, which clouds the issue as far as I'm >> concerned. But here is more of what it says about faith as a doxastic >> venture.**** >> >> ** ** >> >> A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly >> independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support: >> faith then reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes >> faith-propositions to be true *contrary to* the weight of the evidence. >> This view is widely described as ‘fideist’, but ought more fairly to be >> called *arational* fideism, or, where commitment contrary to the >> evidence is positively favoured, *irrational* or *counter-rational* >> fideism. **** >> >> ** ** >> >> and**** >> >> ** ** >> >> Serious philosophical defence of a doxastic venture model of faith >> amounts to a *supra-rational* fideism, for which epistemic concern is >> not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on >> faith-commitment that it *not* accept what is known, or justifiably >> believed on the evidence, to be false. Rather, faith commits itself only* >> beyond*, and not against, the evidence—and it does so *out of* epistemic >> concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. The >> thought that one may be entitled to commit to an existentially momentous >> truth-claim in principle undecidable on the evidence when forced to decide >> either to do so or not is what motivates William James's ‘justification of >> faith’ in ‘The Will to Believe’ (James 1896/1956). If such faith can be >> justified, its cognitive content will (on realist assumptions) have to >> cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world. Faith >> may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. >> Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can >> supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the >> debate about entitlement to faith on this supra-rational fideist doxastic >> venture model.**** >> >> **** >> >> *-- Russ ***** >> >> >> >> **** >> >> On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 5:00 PM, glen <[email protected]> wrote:**** >> >> Robert J. Cordingley wrote at 09/24/2012 04:38 PM:**** >> >> > But my point (regarding God) was an expectation of action by whatever I >> > have faith in and has nothing to do with action on my part. The >> > expected action can be provision of n virgins, not going to hell, relief >> > from pain, reincarnation as a higher being and all sorts of other forms >> > of divine intervention.**** >> >> That's just a slight variation on what I laid out. The point being that >> whatever the article of faith is (a being, an attribute of the world, >> etc.), if it _matters_ to the conclusion whether or not that article is >> true/false or exists or whatever, _then_ belief in it is more likely to >> be called "faith". That's because the word "faith" is used to call out >> or point out when someone is basing their position (or their actions), >> in part, on an unjustified assumption. >> >> I.e. "faith" is a label used to identify especially important >> components. Less important components can be negligible, ignored, or >> easily adopted by everyone involved.**** >> >> >> > PS I may have missed it but please can you explain what a compressible >> > process is? (I know how it relates to things like gasses and some >> > liquids). R**** >> >> A compressible system can be (adequately) represented, mimicked, or >> replaced by a smaller system. Any (adequate) representation of an >> incompressible system will be just as large as the system itself. >> >> -- >> glen**** >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org**** >> >> ** ** >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
