The other thread was getting bogged down in other things, so I'm starting a
new one to try to answer Russ's question about some of the terms Nick and I
are using, in particular "experience" and whether I deny "subjectivity".

The latter is easier. Re subjectivity:
I do not deny that the knowledge relationship has two elements (knower and
known) and the relationship between them that we refer to as "knowing." But
that leaves open the question of what type of relationship that is. If you
are merely pointing out that there are "subjects" who look out into the
world, then I have no objection. If you are pointing out that those
subjects see the world from a particular point of view (in a literal and
metaphorical sense), I still have no objection. What I don't accept,
however, is the that the notion that all experience is some how
"inescapably subjective" in the sense that A) we can never really know what
someone else is experiencing, or B) that we are never really experiencing
anything but "our own subjective worlds." The latter, if taken seriously,
has lead emminent philosophers to feel like intellectual giants if they
channel their inner The Big Lebowski and reply to any claim about the world
with, "Yeah, well, you know, that's just, like, uh, your opinion, man."

I'm not sure what would satisfy you re experience. I will try quoting some
Dewey to see if that helps:

Immediate empiricism postulates that things- anything, everything, in the
ordinary or nontechnical use of the term " thing "- are what they are
experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task
is to tell what it is experienced as being. If it is a horse that is to be
described, or the *equus *that is to be defined, then must the
horse-trader, or the jockey, or the timid family man who wants a " safe
driver," or the zoologist or the paleontologist tell us what the horse is
which is experienced. If these accounts turn out different in some
respects, as well as congruous in others, this is no reason for assuming
the content of one to be exclusively " real," and that of others to be "
phenomenal"; for each account of what is experienced will manifest that it
is the account o f the horse-dealer, or of the zoologist, and hence will
give the conditions requisite for understanding the differences as well as
the agreements of the various accounts. And the principle varies not a whit
if we bring in the psychologist's horse, the logician's horse, or the
metaphysician's horse.

In each case, the nub of the question is, what sort of experience is
denoted or indicated: a concrete and determinate experience, varying, when
it varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when it agrees, in
specific real elements, so that we have a contrast, not between a Reality,
and various approximations to, or phenomenal representations of Reality,
but between different reals of experience. And the reader is begged to bear
in mind that from this standpoint, when " an experience " or " some sort of
experience " is referred to, " some thing " or " some sort of thing " is
always meant....








-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Lab Manager
Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning
American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
phone: (202) 885-3867   fax: (202) 885-1190
email: [email protected]

On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 11:20 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> wrote:

> This has moved so far beyond what I'm capable of thinking about that I'm
> lost. (Although I thank Nick for crediting me with pointing out the
> activity of the visual cortex. Good point -- even though it didn't occur to
> me to refer to it.)
>
> I'm still way back at a much simpler question. What do Nick and Eric mean
> when they use the word *experience *as a noun and as a verb as Eric did
> in the following?
>
> *whatever you are experiencing, you are experiencing it as somehow akin to
> a visual experience*
>
> Eric actually wrote the preceding not too long ago.
>
> Or to take a more recent example, Nick wrote, "*I don’t think that is
> what John had in mind."* What does Nick mean by "had in mind"?
>
> The point is that both Eric and Nick seem to use subjective experience
> language fairly freely but at the same time claim that it doesn't mean
> anything. So my question continues to be what do they mean when they use it.
>
>
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