I'm afraid I'm not satisfied. So often when I ask what appears to be a relatively straightforward question I get drowned in words that dance around the subject in ways I don't understand. For example, Eric wrote, "What I don't accept, however, is the that the notion that all experience is some how "inescapably subjective" in the sense that ... "
I had asked what *you *mean by the term *experience*. None of this tells me. Mainly you attribute a position to me (or imply that I hold it) and then attack it. This seems to happen all the time. I ask you a question and your response is to say that my position (or some position that you apparently associate with me) is wrong. How about just answering the question. What do *you *mean when *you *use the word "experience?" On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 8:24 AM Eric Charles <[email protected]> wrote: > The other thread was getting bogged down in other things, so I'm starting > a new one to try to answer Russ's question about some of the terms Nick and > I are using, in particular "experience" and whether I deny "subjectivity". > > The latter is easier. Re subjectivity: > I do not deny that the knowledge relationship has two elements (knower and > known) and the relationship between them that we refer to as "knowing." But > that leaves open the question of what type of relationship that is. If you > are merely pointing out that there are "subjects" who look out into the > world, then I have no objection. If you are pointing out that those > subjects see the world from a particular point of view (in a literal and > metaphorical sense), I still have no objection. What I don't accept, > however, is the that the notion that all experience is some how > "inescapably subjective" in the sense that A) we can never really know what > someone else is experiencing, or B) that we are never really experiencing > anything but "our own subjective worlds." The latter, if taken seriously, > has lead emminent philosophers to feel like intellectual giants if they > channel their inner The Big Lebowski and reply to any claim about the world > with, "Yeah, well, you know, that's just, like, uh, your opinion, man." > > I'm not sure what would satisfy you re experience. I will try quoting some > Dewey to see if that helps: > > Immediate empiricism postulates that things- anything, everything, in the > ordinary or nontechnical use of the term " thing "- are what they are > experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task > is to tell what it is experienced as being. If it is a horse that is to be > described, or the *equus *that is to be defined, then must the > horse-trader, or the jockey, or the timid family man who wants a " safe > driver," or the zoologist or the paleontologist tell us what the horse is > which is experienced. If these accounts turn out different in some > respects, as well as congruous in others, this is no reason for assuming > the content of one to be exclusively " real," and that of others to be " > phenomenal"; for each account of what is experienced will manifest that it > is the account o f the horse-dealer, or of the zoologist, and hence will > give the conditions requisite for understanding the differences as well as > the agreements of the various accounts. And the principle varies not a whit > if we bring in the psychologist's horse, the logician's horse, or the > metaphysician's horse. > > In each case, the nub of the question is, what sort of experience is > denoted or indicated: a concrete and determinate experience, varying, when > it varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when it agrees, in > specific real elements, so that we have a contrast, not between a Reality, > and various approximations to, or phenomenal representations of Reality, > but between different reals of experience. And the reader is begged to bear > in mind that from this standpoint, when " an experience " or " some sort of > experience " is referred to, " some thing " or " some sort of thing " is > always meant.... > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: [email protected] > > On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 11:20 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> This has moved so far beyond what I'm capable of thinking about that I'm >> lost. (Although I thank Nick for crediting me with pointing out the >> activity of the visual cortex. Good point -- even though it didn't occur to >> me to refer to it.) >> >> I'm still way back at a much simpler question. What do Nick and Eric mean >> when they use the word *experience *as a noun and as a verb as Eric did >> in the following? >> >> *whatever you are experiencing, you are experiencing it as somehow akin >> to a visual experience* >> >> Eric actually wrote the preceding not too long ago. >> >> Or to take a more recent example, Nick wrote, "*I don’t think that is >> what John had in mind."* What does Nick mean by "had in mind"? >> >> The point is that both Eric and Nick seem to use subjective experience >> language fairly freely but at the same time claim that it doesn't mean >> anything. So my question continues to be what do they mean when they use it. >> >> ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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