I don't mean to answer for Bruce. That UV light may cause some response from my skin but that does not fall within my definition of "see". Not even close.
Frsnk ----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 9:14 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, Bruce, > > > > I finally found this. Email grief. Sorry to be so slow in answering. > > > > Nick Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > [email protected] > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Bruce Simon > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 1:44 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15 > > > > Birds and bees see ultraviolet light but I don't. > > *[NST===>] Well, your skin sees it, right? If you transduce it down to > wavelengths that your eye can respond to, you will see it with your eyes, > right? So all of this hangs on your definition of “see”. * > > Flowers give off UV but I can't have the experience of it. A > spectrophotometer can detect UV and I can see the dial move but that is not > the same as experiencing it. *[NST===>] Again, that hangs on a definition > of “see”. *“ Suppose God gave me the ability to see like a bird. Could > I describe to you what the flower looks like (re. UV?). > > *[NST===>] You mean, I can never experience the world as a bird > experiences the world, right? But, on your account, as I understand it, we > don’t have to appeal to the birds and the bees to reach this conclusion: I > can never experience the world as YOU experience it, because each persons > experience is ineffably his own. But isn’t there a strange regress going > on here.* > > > > *Bruce: I experience that flower.* > > > > *Nick: I, too, experience that flower.* > > > > *Bruce: But you don’t experience my experience of that flower.* > > > > *Nick: Non-sense. I am experiencing your experience of that flower as we > speak! Otherwise we could not be speaking of it. * > > * you y * > > > > On Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 12:23:29 PM MST, > [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > Send Friam mailing list submissions to > > [email protected] > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > [email protected] > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > [email protected] > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) > 2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Frank Wimberly) > 3. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) > 4. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? > ([email protected]) > > It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's > unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: > > Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in > any language will be a false description? > > Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting > Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way > that could happen: > > von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always one > order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce the > object. > > Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly > from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete > description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the > non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete > description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of > course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to > be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of > thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two > complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of > other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. > > By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will > fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types > conception. > > > > [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing > Automata > > On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: > > > > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to > all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, > were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, > recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's > experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently > experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as > the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my > experience. > > > > God is therefore real and extant? > > > > But wait ... > > > > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and > the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, > a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, > of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of > the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I > was raised. > > > > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is > false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact > continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the > meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the > "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) > "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the > "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or > even differentiable from each other. > > > > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns > of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain > before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and > experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of > the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual > experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the > "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, > "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " > > > > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, > possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from > "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental > context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm > the prediction of effects. > > > > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes > quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? > > > > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its > totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are > false-to-fact. > > > > ???? > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I > want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I > want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some > reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that > I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly > what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not > convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to > express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way > I will return to what I think is the broader issue. > >> > >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to > exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no > effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might > as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. > >> > >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive > the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects > is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of > is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in > principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed > adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts > can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. > >> > >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The > bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic > maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we > may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means > to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, > be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of > what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but > which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. > >> > >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > > I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: > > > > Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. > > ----------------------------------- > Frank Wimberly > > My memoir: > https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly > > My scientific publications: > https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 > > Phone (505) 670-9918 > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: > > It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's > unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: > > Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in > any language will be a false description? > > Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting > Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way > that could happen: > > von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always one > order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce the > object. > > Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly > from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete > description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the > non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete > description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of > course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to > be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of > thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two > complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of > other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. > > By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will > fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types > conception. > > > > [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing > Automata > > On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: > > > > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to > all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, > were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, > recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's > experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently > experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as > the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my > experience. > > > > God is therefore real and extant? > > > > But wait ... > > > > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and > the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, > a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, > of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of > the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I > was raised. > > > > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is > false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact > continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the > meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the > "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) > "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the > "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or > even differentiable from each other. > > > > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns > of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain > before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and > experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of > the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual > experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the > "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, > "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " > > > > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, > possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from > "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental > context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm > the prediction of effects. > > > > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes > quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? > > > > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its > totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are > false-to-fact. > > > > ???? > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I > want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I > want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some > reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that > I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly > what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not > convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to > express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way > I will return to what I think is the broader issue. > >> > >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to > exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no > effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might > as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. > >> > >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive > the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects > is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of > is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in > principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed > adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts > can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. > >> > >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The > bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic > maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we > may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means > to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, > be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of > what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but > which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. > >> > >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > I'm not. Wittgenstein was very cool. But he wasn't a *builder*. (... as > far as I know. I'd be happy to be wrong.) The thing that (in my ignorant > opinion) distinguishes people like Wittgenstein from people like Gödel, von > Neumann, Feynman, etc. ... even Penrose with the tilings and such, is that > they *build* things. Until the hoity-toity results from the unification > theorem come percolating down to morons like me, I'll continue treating > constructive proofs as better and more real/existing than classical proofs. > > On 12/11/19 10:44 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote: > > I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: > > > > Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > > Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank. See Larding Below: > > > > Nick Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > [email protected] > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? > > > > > > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to > all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, > were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, > recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's > experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently > experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as > the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my > experience. > > *[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer. * > > > > God is therefore real and extant? > > *[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we > would have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”. I > say that God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz. An old guy who hides in a > closet and manipulates our experience with giant levers. That conception > is probably “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out. Or, ringed > around with sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and > therefore not “prove-out-able”. So, * > > > > But wait ... > > > > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and > the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, > a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, > of course, the form of all those words and effects is but > > *[NST===>] Why “but”, Dave? It’s an artifact of culture. It’s an > experience that proves out only with in the framework of a culture. As > long as you stay within the culture, it proves out pretty good. When you > moved away from home, it didn’t prove out. * > > an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) > within which I was raised. > > > > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is > false-to-fact. > > *[NST===>] Stipulated* > > What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and > predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an > experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an > ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the > "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience." None of these > implied relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from > each other. > > > > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns of > brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain before > and after "It" are measurable and comparable. > > *[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing. What experiences > does brain talk represent. Were you looking at an MRI while all of this > was happening? * > > Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in > the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations > of individual experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others > on the "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible > beyond, "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, > but ... " > > *[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are > themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways. * > > > > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, > possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from > "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental > context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm > the prediction of effects. > > > > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes > quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? > > > > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its > totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are > false-to-fact. > > *[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is > effable. Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we > can use as a model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can > agree, “Nick and Dave really effed that sucker!” In the meantime, please > have a look at the attached text, pp 4-8. * > > > > *Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”* > > > > Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to > conclude that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are > inevitably explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet, > you cannot explain something until you have something to explain – so all > explanations must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable > conclusion, if you take both of these claims at face value, is that all > explanations are based on prior explanations! The distinction between > description and explanation concerns their position in an argument, not > their objectivity or subjectivity in some enduring sense. Whether a > statement is explanatory or descriptive depends upon the understandings > that exist between the speaker and his or her audience at the time the > statement is made. *Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and > the audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further > explanations*.[1] <#m_-881266309841501019_m_-6995609592522041570__ftn1> > > > > > > ???? > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > > Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I > want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I > want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some > reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that > I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly > what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not > convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to > express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way > I will return to what I think is the broader issue. > > > > Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to > exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no > effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might > as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. > > > > The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the > object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is > the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of > is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in > principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed > adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts > can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. > > > > However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The > bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic > maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we > may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means > to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, > be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits of > what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but > which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. > > > > Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > > American University - Adjunct Instructor > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: > > I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in > convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in > the meantime, ... > > > > "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald > Trump isn't funny > > > https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/ > > > > There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread: > > > > 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous > juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument, > you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument." > > > > I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole > purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually > *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke. > > > > And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is > illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is > salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..." > > > > I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of > play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of > times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening", > and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think > monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than > pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At > least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to > *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various > types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or > 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing > competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate. > > > > As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's > the failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should > work toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is > we think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally > ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything. > > > > On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote: > > > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots > of experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible" > nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor > communicated using words. > > > > > > Words fail! Indeed! > > > > > > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail. > > > > > > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT > render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about > an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally > ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make > a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of > Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find > my own experience of like kind. > > > > > > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters > thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein > you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken > in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades > and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never > expressing, in words or language, the experience itself. > > > > > > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a > language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or > mathematical symbols or such-based languages. > > > > > > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids > in ontology? > > > > > > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it. > > > > > > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the > notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe to > be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does not > follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words. > > > > > > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because you > are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the > "N-Word" or the "C-Word." > > > > -- > > ☣ uǝlƃ > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > [1] <#m_-881266309841501019_m_-6995609592522041570__ftnref1> Conversely, > explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be > unverified under the present circumstances. > > _______________________________________________ > Friam mailing list > [email protected] > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
