For me it has to involve the visual cortex. I see things in my dreams and I see hallucinations when I drink caffeinated coffee. So I'm not saying it's what my eyes do.
----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 11:18 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: > Which raises the question, what is your definition of "see". To me, > seeing is building a three dimensional model of the world around you from > your point of view. So, a blind man sees with his cane. You see with a > television. You saw trump tonight on the television. > > Before you laugh at me, try to build a different definition of "see". > It's harder than you might suppose. Whatever my eyes do, won't do. > > Nick > > On Thu, Dec 19, 2019 at 9:52 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I don't mean to answer for Bruce. That UV light may cause some response >> from my skin but that does not fall within my definition of "see". Not >> even close. >> >> Frsnk >> >> ----------------------------------- >> Frank Wimberly >> >> My memoir: >> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >> >> My scientific publications: >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >> >> Phone (505) 670-9918 >> >> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 9:14 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi, Bruce, >>> >>> >>> >>> I finally found this. Email grief. Sorry to be so slow in answering. >>> >>> >>> >>> Nick Thompson >>> >>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >>> >>> Clark University >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Bruce Simon >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 1:44 PM >>> *To:* [email protected] >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15 >>> >>> >>> >>> Birds and bees see ultraviolet light but I don't. >>> >>> *[NST===>] Well, your skin sees it, right? If you transduce it down to >>> wavelengths that your eye can respond to, you will see it with your eyes, >>> right? So all of this hangs on your definition of “see”. * >>> >>> Flowers give off UV but I can't have the experience of it. A >>> spectrophotometer can detect UV and I can see the dial move but that is not >>> the same as experiencing it. *[NST===>] Again, that hangs on a >>> definition of “see”. *“ Suppose God gave me the ability to see like a >>> bird. Could I describe to you what the flower looks like (re. UV?). >>> >>> *[NST===>] You mean, I can never experience the world as a bird >>> experiences the world, right? But, on your account, as I understand it, we >>> don’t have to appeal to the birds and the bees to reach this conclusion: I >>> can never experience the world as YOU experience it, because each persons >>> experience is ineffably his own. But isn’t there a strange regress going >>> on here.* >>> >>> >>> >>> *Bruce: I experience that flower.* >>> >>> >>> >>> *Nick: I, too, experience that flower.* >>> >>> >>> >>> *Bruce: But you don’t experience my experience of that flower.* >>> >>> >>> >>> *Nick: Non-sense. I am experiencing your experience of that flower as >>> we speak! Otherwise we could not be speaking of it. * >>> >>> * you y * >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 12:23:29 PM MST, >>> [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Send Friam mailing list submissions to >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> >>> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> >>> than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..." >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) >>> 2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Frank Wimberly) >>> 3. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) >>> 4. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >>> ([email protected]) >>> >>> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But >>> it's unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: >>> >>> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it >>> in any language will be a false description? >>> >>> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy >>> quoting Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate >>> one way that could happen: >>> >>> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always >>> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce >>> the object. >>> >>> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more >>> clearly from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the >>> complete description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the >>> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete >>> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of >>> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to >>> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of >>> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two >>> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of >>> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. >>> >>> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description >>> will fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types >>> conception. >>> >>> >>> >>> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing >>> Automata >>> >>> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: >>> > >>> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >>> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >>> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >>> experience. >>> > >>> > God is therefore real and extant? >>> > >>> > But wait ... >>> > >>> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, >>> and the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the >>> fact, a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of >>> "something." And, of course, the form of all those words and effects is but >>> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) >>> within which I was raised. >>> > >>> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >>> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact >>> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the >>> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the >>> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) >>> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the >>> "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or >>> even differentiable from each other. >>> > >>> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that >>> patterns of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the >>> brain before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and >>> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of >>> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual >>> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the >>> "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, >>> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " >>> > >>> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >>> the prediction of effects. >>> > >>> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >>> > >>> > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >>> false-to-fact. >>> > >>> > ???? >>> > >>> > dave west >>> > >>> > >>> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >>> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. >>> I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >>> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >>> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >>> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >>> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >>> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >>> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >>> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >>> >> >>> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / >>> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >>> >> >>> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive >>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects >>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of >>> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in >>> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >>> >> >>> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. >>> The bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we >>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >>> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of >>> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >>> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >>> >> >>> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >>> >>> -- >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> >>> I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: >>> >>> >>> >>> Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. >>> >>> ----------------------------------- >>> Frank Wimberly >>> >>> My memoir: >>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >>> >>> My scientific publications: >>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >>> >>> Phone (505) 670-9918 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But >>> it's unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: >>> >>> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it >>> in any language will be a false description? >>> >>> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy >>> quoting Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate >>> one way that could happen: >>> >>> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always >>> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce >>> the object. >>> >>> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more >>> clearly from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the >>> complete description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the >>> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete >>> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of >>> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to >>> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of >>> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two >>> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of >>> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. >>> >>> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description >>> will fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types >>> conception. >>> >>> >>> >>> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing >>> Automata >>> >>> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: >>> > >>> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >>> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >>> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >>> experience. >>> > >>> > God is therefore real and extant? >>> > >>> > But wait ... >>> > >>> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, >>> and the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the >>> fact, a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of >>> "something." And, of course, the form of all those words and effects is but >>> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) >>> within which I was raised. >>> > >>> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >>> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact >>> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the >>> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the >>> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) >>> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the >>> "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or >>> even differentiable from each other. >>> > >>> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that >>> patterns of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the >>> brain before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and >>> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of >>> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual >>> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the >>> "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, >>> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " >>> > >>> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >>> the prediction of effects. >>> > >>> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >>> > >>> > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >>> false-to-fact. >>> > >>> > ???? >>> > >>> > dave west >>> > >>> > >>> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >>> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. >>> I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >>> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >>> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >>> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >>> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >>> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >>> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >>> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >>> >> >>> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / >>> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >>> >> >>> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive >>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects >>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of >>> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in >>> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >>> >> >>> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. >>> The bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we >>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >>> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of >>> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >>> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >>> >> >>> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >>> >>> -- >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >>> >>> I'm not. Wittgenstein was very cool. But he wasn't a *builder*. (... as >>> far as I know. I'd be happy to be wrong.) The thing that (in my ignorant >>> opinion) distinguishes people like Wittgenstein from people like Gödel, von >>> Neumann, Feynman, etc. ... even Penrose with the tilings and such, is that >>> they *build* things. Until the hoity-toity results from the unification >>> theorem come percolating down to morons like me, I'll continue treating >>> constructive proofs as better and more real/existing than classical proofs. >>> >>> On 12/11/19 10:44 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote: >>> > I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: >>> > >>> > Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. >>> >>> -- >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> >>> Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank. See Larding Below: >>> >>> >>> >>> Nick Thompson >>> >>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >>> >>> Clark University >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM >>> *To:* [email protected] >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >>> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >>> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >>> experience. >>> >>> *[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer. * >>> >>> >>> >>> God is therefore real and extant? >>> >>> *[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we >>> would have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”. I >>> say that God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz. An old guy who hides in a >>> closet and manipulates our experience with giant levers. That conception >>> is probably “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out. Or, ringed >>> around with sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and >>> therefore not “prove-out-able”. So, * >>> >>> >>> >>> But wait ... >>> >>> >>> >>> I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and >>> the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, >>> a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, >>> of course, the form of all those words and effects is but >>> >>> *[NST===>] Why “but”, Dave? It’s an artifact of culture. It’s an >>> experience that proves out only with in the framework of a culture. As >>> long as you stay within the culture, it proves out pretty good. When you >>> moved away from home, it didn’t prove out. * >>> >>> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective >>> unconscious) within which I was raised. >>> >>> >>> >>> There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >>> false-to-fact. >>> >>> *[NST===>] Stipulated* >>> >>> What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and >>> predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an >>> experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an >>> ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the >>> "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience." None of these >>> implied relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from >>> each other. >>> >>> >>> >>> There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns >>> of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain >>> before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. >>> >>> *[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing. What experiences >>> does brain talk represent. Were you looking at an MRI while all of this >>> was happening? * >>> >>> Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, >>> in the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of >>> interpretations of individual experiences is dramatically altered. >>> Experience — of others on the "outside" — is altered as well, although >>> often not expressible beyond, "there's something different about you, can't >>> put my finger on it, but ... " >>> >>> *[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are >>> themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways. * >>> >>> >>> >>> Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >>> the prediction of effects. >>> >>> >>> >>> "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >>> >>> >>> >>> Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >>> false-to-fact. >>> >>> *[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is >>> effable. Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we >>> can use as a model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can >>> agree, “Nick and Dave really effed that sucker!” In the meantime, please >>> have a look at the attached text, pp 4-8. * >>> >>> >>> >>> *Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”* >>> >>> >>> >>> Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to >>> conclude that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are >>> inevitably explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet, >>> you cannot explain something until you have something to explain – so all >>> explanations must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable >>> conclusion, if you take both of these claims at face value, is that all >>> explanations are based on prior explanations! The distinction between >>> description and explanation concerns their position in an argument, not >>> their objectivity or subjectivity in some enduring sense. Whether a >>> statement is explanatory or descriptive depends upon the understandings >>> that exist between the speaker and his or her audience at the time the >>> statement is made. *Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and >>> the audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further >>> explanations*.[1] >>> <#m_3115841449660933792_m_-7189693114313297488_m_-881266309841501019_m_-6995609592522041570__ftn1> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ???? >>> >>> >>> >>> dave west >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >>> >>> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I >>> want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >>> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >>> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >>> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >>> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >>> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >>> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >>> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >>> >>> >>> >>> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to >>> exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >>> >>> >>> >>> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive >>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects >>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive >>> of is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in >>> principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >>> >>> >>> >>> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The >>> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we >>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >>> be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits of >>> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >>> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >>> >>> >>> >>> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------- >>> >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> >>> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >>> >>> American University - Adjunct Instructor >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in >>> convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in >>> the meantime, ... >>> >>> >>> >>> "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald >>> Trump isn't funny >>> >>> >>> https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/ >>> >>> >>> >>> There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread: >>> >>> >>> >>> 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous >>> juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument, >>> you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument." >>> >>> >>> >>> I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole >>> purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually >>> *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke. >>> >>> >>> >>> And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is >>> illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is >>> salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..." >>> >>> >>> >>> I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of >>> play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of >>> times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening", >>> and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think >>> monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than >>> pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At >>> least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to >>> *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various >>> types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or >>> 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing >>> competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate. >>> >>> >>> >>> As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's >>> the failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should >>> work toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is >>> we think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally >>> ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything. >>> >>> >>> >>> On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote: >>> >>> > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots >>> of experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible" >>> nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor >>> communicated using words. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Words fail! Indeed! >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT >>> render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about >>> an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally >>> ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make >>> a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of >>> Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find >>> my own experience of like kind. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters >>> thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein >>> you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken >>> in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades >>> and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never >>> expressing, in words or language, the experience itself. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a >>> language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or >>> mathematical symbols or such-based languages. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids >>> in ontology? >>> >>> > >>> >>> > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the >>> notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe to >>> be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does not >>> follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because >>> you are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the >>> "N-Word" or the "C-Word." >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> [1] >>> <#m_3115841449660933792_m_-7189693114313297488_m_-881266309841501019_m_-6995609592522041570__ftnref1> >>> Conversely, >>> explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be >>> unverified under the present circumstances. >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Friam mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >>> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
