An example: a person who has been totally blind since birth probably has an active visual cortex and therefore sees some kind of "hallucination". Anybody have data on this? Mike?
----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Sat, Dec 21, 2019, 7:30 AM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> wrote: > This is a good example of necessary vs sufficient. In my opinion, > involvement of the visual cortex is necessary but not sufficient for > seeing. But I'm open minded on this point. > > Frank > > ----------------------------------- > Frank Wimberly > > My memoir: > https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly > > My scientific publications: > https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 > > Phone (505) 670-9918 > > On Fri, Dec 20, 2019, 11:17 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi, Frank, >> >> >> >> I think I am logical entitled, if not social so, to assert that, on your >> account so far, ANYTHING the visual cortex does is “seeing”. In other >> words, to be satisfied with your own definition, you will have to specify >> that only those activities of the visual cortex that are involved in >> “seeing” should be considered, in which case, we are right back to defining >> “seeing” again. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> Clark University >> >> [email protected] >> >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West >> *Sent:* Friday, December 20, 2019 8:36 AM >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15 >> >> >> >> "Seeing" is the consequence of patterned neural activity in the cerebral >> cortex? >> >> >> >> what is the relevance of "constraints," "enhancements," "inputs >> (electrical impulses or hormones or chemicals that excite/inhibit synaptic >> firing)," that are in any sense "required" for the patterns to form? >> >> >> >> please note these are questions, not assertions. >> >> >> >> davew >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 20, 2019, at 2:57 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote: >> >> For me it has to involve the visual cortex. I see things in my dreams >> and I see hallucinations when I drink caffeinated coffee. So I'm not saying >> it's what my eyes do. >> >> >> >> ----------------------------------- >> >> Frank Wimberly >> >> >> >> My memoir: >> >> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >> >> >> >> My scientific publications: >> >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >> >> >> >> Phone (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 11:18 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Which raises the question, what is your definition of "see". To me, >> seeing is building a three dimensional model of the world around you from >> your point of view. So, a blind man sees with his cane. You see with a >> television. You saw trump tonight on the television. >> >> >> >> Before you laugh at me, try to build a different definition of "see". >> It's harder than you might suppose. Whatever my eyes do, won't do. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019 at 9:52 PM Frank Wimberly <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> I don't mean to answer for Bruce. That UV light may cause some response >> from my skin but that does not fall within my definition of "see". Not >> even close. >> >> >> >> Frsnk >> >> >> >> ----------------------------------- >> >> Frank Wimberly >> >> >> >> My memoir: >> >> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >> >> >> >> My scientific publications: >> >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >> >> >> >> Phone (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 9:14 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Hi, Bruce, >> >> >> >> I finally found this. Email grief. Sorry to be so slow in answering. >> >> >> >> Nick Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> >> Clark University >> >> [email protected] >> >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Bruce Simon >> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 1:44 PM >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15 >> >> >> >> Birds and bees see ultraviolet light but I don't. >> >> *[NST===>] Well, your skin sees it, right? If you transduce it down to >> wavelengths that your eye can respond to, you will see it with your eyes, >> right? So all of this hangs on your definition of “see”. * >> >> Flowers give off UV but I can't have the experience of it. A >> spectrophotometer can detect UV and I can see the dial move but that is not >> the same as experiencing it. *[NST===>] Again, that hangs on a >> definition of “see”. *“ Suppose God gave me the ability to see like a >> bird. Could I describe to you what the flower looks like (re. UV?). >> >> *[NST===>] You mean, I can never experience the world as a bird >> experiences the world, right? But, on your account, as I understand it, we >> don’t have to appeal to the birds and the bees to reach this conclusion: I >> can never experience the world as YOU experience it, because each persons >> experience is ineffably his own. But isn’t there a strange regress going >> on here.* >> >> >> >> *Bruce: I experience that flower.* >> >> >> >> *Nick: I, too, experience that flower.* >> >> >> >> *Bruce: But you don’t experience my experience of that flower.* >> >> >> >> *Nick: Non-sense. I am experiencing your experience of that flower as >> we speak! Otherwise we could not be speaking of it. * >> >> * you y * >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 12:23:29 PM MST, >> [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Send Friam mailing list submissions to >> >> [email protected] >> >> >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> >> [email protected] >> >> >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> >> [email protected] >> >> >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> >> than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..." >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) >> 2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Frank Wimberly) >> 3. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?) >> 4. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >> ([email protected]) >> >> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's >> unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: >> >> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in >> any language will be a false description? >> >> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting >> Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way >> that could happen: >> >> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always >> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce >> the object. >> >> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly >> from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete >> description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the >> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete >> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of >> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to >> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of >> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two >> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of >> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. >> >> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will >> fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types >> conception. >> >> >> >> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing >> Automata >> >> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: >> > >> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >> experience. >> > >> > God is therefore real and extant? >> > >> > But wait ... >> > >> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and >> the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, >> a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, >> of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of >> the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I >> was raised. >> > >> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact >> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the >> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the >> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) >> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the >> "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or >> even differentiable from each other. >> > >> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns >> of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain >> before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and >> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of >> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual >> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the >> "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, >> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " >> > >> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >> the prediction of effects. >> > >> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >> > >> > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >> false-to-fact. >> > >> > ???? >> > >> > dave west >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. >> I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >> >> >> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / >> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >> >> >> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive >> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects >> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of >> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in >> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >> >> >> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The >> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we >> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of >> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >> >> >> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >> >> -- >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: >> >> >> >> Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. >> >> ----------------------------------- >> Frank Wimberly >> >> My memoir: >> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly >> >> My scientific publications: >> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 >> >> Phone (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's >> unclear to me what the question is. If the question is: >> >> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in >> any language will be a false description? >> >> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting >> Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way >> that could happen: >> >> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always >> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce >> the object. >> >> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly >> from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete >> description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the >> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete >> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of >> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to >> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of >> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two >> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of >> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture. >> >> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will >> fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types >> conception. >> >> >> >> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing >> Automata >> >> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: >> > >> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >> experience. >> > >> > God is therefore real and extant? >> > >> > But wait ... >> > >> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and >> the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, >> a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, >> of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of >> the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I >> was raised. >> > >> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact >> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the >> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the >> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) >> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the >> "Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or >> even differentiable from each other. >> > >> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns >> of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain >> before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and >> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of >> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual >> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the >> "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, >> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " >> > >> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >> the prediction of effects. >> > >> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >> > >> > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >> false-to-fact. >> > >> > ???? >> > >> > dave west >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. >> I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >> >> >> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / >> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >> >> >> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive >> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects >> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of >> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in >> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >> >> >> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The >> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we >> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of >> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >> >> >> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >> >> -- >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> I'm not. Wittgenstein was very cool. But he wasn't a *builder*. (... as >> far as I know. I'd be happy to be wrong.) The thing that (in my ignorant >> opinion) distinguishes people like Wittgenstein from people like Gödel, von >> Neumann, Feynman, etc. ... even Penrose with the tilings and such, is that >> they *build* things. Until the hoity-toity results from the unification >> theorem come percolating down to morons like me, I'll continue treating >> constructive proofs as better and more real/existing than classical proofs. >> >> On 12/11/19 10:44 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote: >> > I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein: >> > >> > Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen. >> >> -- >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank. See Larding Below: >> >> >> >> Nick Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> >> Clark University >> >> [email protected] >> >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West >> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? >> >> >> >> >> >> Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to >> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, >> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, >> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's >> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently >> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as >> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my >> experience. >> >> *[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer. * >> >> >> >> God is therefore real and extant? >> >> *[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we >> would have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”. I >> say that God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz. An old guy who hides in a >> closet and manipulates our experience with giant levers. That conception >> is probably “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out. Or, ringed >> around with sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and >> therefore not “prove-out-able”. So, * >> >> >> >> But wait ... >> >> >> >> I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and >> the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, >> a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, >> of course, the form of all those words and effects is but >> >> *[NST===>] Why “but”, Dave? It’s an artifact of culture. It’s an >> experience that proves out only with in the framework of a culture. As >> long as you stay within the culture, it proves out pretty good. When you >> moved away from home, it didn’t prove out. * >> >> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective >> unconscious) within which I was raised. >> >> >> >> There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is >> false-to-fact. >> >> *[NST===>] Stipulated* >> >> What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and >> predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an >> experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an >> ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the >> "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience." None of these >> implied relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from >> each other. >> >> >> >> There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns >> of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain >> before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. >> >> *[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing. What experiences >> does brain talk represent. Were you looking at an MRI while all of this >> was happening? * >> >> Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, >> in the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of >> interpretations of individual experiences is dramatically altered. >> Experience — of others on the "outside" — is altered as well, although >> often not expressible beyond, "there's something different about you, can't >> put my finger on it, but ... " >> >> *[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are >> themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways. * >> >> >> >> Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, >> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from >> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental >> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm >> the prediction of effects. >> >> >> >> "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes >> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? >> >> >> >> Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its >> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are >> false-to-fact. >> >> *[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is >> effable. Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we >> can use as a model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can >> agree, “Nick and Dave really effed that sucker!” In the meantime, please >> have a look at the attached text, pp 4-8. * >> >> >> >> *Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”* >> >> >> >> Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to >> conclude that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are >> inevitably explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet, >> you cannot explain something until you have something to explain – so all >> explanations must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable >> conclusion, if you take both of these claims at face value, is that all >> explanations are based on prior explanations! The distinction between >> description and explanation concerns their position in an argument, not >> their objectivity or subjectivity in some enduring sense. Whether a >> statement is explanatory or descriptive depends upon the understandings >> that exist between the speaker and his or her audience at the time the >> statement is made. *Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and >> the audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further >> explanations*.[1] >> <#m_2300299217579441687_m_-2581826447417716101_m_3115841449660933792_m_-71896931143132> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ???? >> >> >> >> dave west >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I >> want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I >> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some >> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that >> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly >> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not >> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to >> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way >> I will return to what I think is the broader issue. >> >> >> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to >> exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might >> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >> >> >> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the >> object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is >> the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of >> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in >> principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >> >> >> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The >> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic >> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we >> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means >> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, >> be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits of >> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but >> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >> >> >> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> >> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >> >> American University - Adjunct Instructor >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in >> convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in >> the meantime, ... >> >> >> >> "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald >> Trump isn't funny >> >> >> https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/ >> >> >> >> There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread: >> >> >> >> 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous >> juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument, >> you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument." >> >> >> >> I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole >> purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually >> *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke. >> >> >> >> And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is >> illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is >> salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..." >> >> >> >> I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of >> play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of >> times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening", >> and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think >> monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than >> pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At >> least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to >> *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various >> types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or >> 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing >> competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate. >> >> >> >> As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's >> the failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should >> work toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is >> we think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally >> ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything. >> >> >> >> On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote: >> >> > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots >> of experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible" >> nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor >> communicated using words. >> >> > >> >> > Words fail! Indeed! >> >> > >> >> > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail. >> >> > >> >> > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT >> render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about >> an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally >> ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make >> a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of >> Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find >> my own experience of like kind. >> >> > >> >> > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters >> thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein >> you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken >> in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades >> and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never >> expressing, in words or language, the experience itself. >> >> > >> >> > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a >> language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or >> mathematical symbols or such-based languages. >> >> > >> >> > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids >> in ontology? >> >> > >> >> > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it. >> >> > >> >> > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the >> notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe to >> be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does not >> follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words. >> >> > >> >> > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because >> you are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the >> "N-Word" or the "C-Word." >> >> >> >> -- >> >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> [1] >> <#m_2300299217579441687_m_-2581826447417716101_m_3115841449660933792_m_-71896931143132> >> Conversely, >> explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be >> unverified under the present circumstances. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Friam mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
