*That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.*
Did Peirce write that? Shouldn't it be "whether you, I, or any other..." Nick, don't take Ecstasy. Frank --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Sun, May 24, 2020, 11:21 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, dave. See Larding, below. > > > > Nicholas Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > [email protected] > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West > *Sent:* Sunday, May 24, 2020 8:58 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism > > > > Eric, > > > > Thank you for the response, it is useful. > > > > The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an > external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect." > > > > *[NST=**è** His formulation was more like “That which is the case, > whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.“ > I am not sure there is an important difference there. More important to > remember that Peirce’s is an assertion concerning the meaning of the > conception “truth”, not an assertion that there is a truth of any matter. > It is the definition of truth that makes coherent our behavior with respect > to the word. * > > *<===nst] * > > I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and > elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about > them when he was writing. > > *[NST===>Yes, he would say that they are candidate “reals”. <===nst] * > > But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle > or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human > observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's > definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing > a nuance somewhere. > > *[NST===>Well, here is where I think he would get off the bus. If I can > make a true statement of the form, “if I do this procedure, then I will > probably get that result, then the elements in that statement are probably > real.” Probably true and probably real are all you ever get in Peirce. > <===nst] * > > > > My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths > discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, > but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient > experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology > claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the > rules of method. > > *[NST===>Just keep remembering that the pragmatic maxim is a claim about > MEANING, to a metaphysical claim.* > > Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicIal bearings, we > conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of > these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.. > > > > *<===nst] * > > > > If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high > probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your > rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your > method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a > general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem > to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the > method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless > for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, > consciousness, etc. > > *[NST===>I have a long history in my writing of being allergic to other > people’s tautologies, so you have me by the short hair, here. The > PragmatiCIst Maxim does place upon you the burden of stating what > differences in knowledge-gathering practice your conception of truth > makes. If those differences are not practicially obsure, then you have a > definition in good standing with Peirce, and science can go on. The > opposite of truth in Peirce not falsity (for falsity is a kind of truth) > but doubt. If there is nothing upon which we are “fated to agree”, then > there is no truth. <===nst] * > > > > Ready to be set straight. > > *[NST===>I am not sure I am in a condition to set anybody straight about > anything. You seem to be able to read, during this crisis. I can no more > read anything right now than I could during a bad hurricane in a rickety > New England farm house. Congratulations. If your MDMA will help me get > back to reading, I am for it. <===nst] * > > > > davew > > > > > > On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > > Dave, > > These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's > writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early > in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go > on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more > precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that > problem. > > > > 1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he > still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the > cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs > and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only > "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work > on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of > his work. > > > > 2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure > this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum > indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis > on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects. > > > > 3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the > Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the > scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If > you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are > some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my > favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other > methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor. > > > > 4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, > Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions > we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the > solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. > You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions > about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might > be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed > questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting > killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. > The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what *would > *happen *if *we systematically started examining the consequences of that > belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might > have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not > it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the > full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. > "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and > merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods > by which humans are capable of examining things. > > > > Does that help? > > > > > > > > ----------- > > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > > American University - Adjunct Instructor > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Peirce: > > > > "To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be > found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some > external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... > Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in > more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters > are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our > senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as > different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the > laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and > truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason > enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion." > > > > The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask > questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish > me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to > Peirce in general. > > > > 1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and > there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, > affected by our thoughts: > > a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between > an external permanency and internal thought? > > b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'? > > > > 2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the > the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, > or, at least, human attention." > > a. Are there 'Real things'? > > > > 3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined > by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by > which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over > another.. > > a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other > methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'? > > > > 4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] > reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, > constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one > [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, > not congruence with any "external permanency." > > a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses? > > b. What are the "laws of perception?" > > c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, > and intolerant, orthodoxy? > > > > davew > > > > > > > > -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . > ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ... > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . > ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ... > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > > > -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . > ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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