Incidentally, I think these asynchronous communications are not speech. They are another kind of encoding and decoding system. There is often ambiguity in terminology to be reconciled, and wider and narrower search that can be conducted to do that reconciliation, but that is not what I would call empathy. Empathy is about anticipation and resonance of feelings. I think in written communication correspondents should be expected to manage their feelings because they have a good opportunity to do so.
On 6/8/20, 5:57 AM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣" <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote: E.g. Motor Imagery of Speech: The Involvement of Primary Motor Cortex in Manual and Articulatory Motor Imagery https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6579859/ > The results have implications for models of mental imagery of simple articulatory gestures, in that no evidence is found for somatotopic activation of lip muscles in sub-phonemic contexts during motor imagery of such tasks, suggesting that motor simulation of relatively simple actions does not involve M1. Observation-execution matching and action inhibition in human primary motor cortex during viewing of speech-related lip movements or listening to speech https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0028393211001801?via%3Dihub > The MEP findings support the notion that observation-execution matching is an operating process in the putative human MNS that might have been fundamental for evolution of language. Furthermore, the SICI findings provide evidence that inhibitory mechanisms are recruited to prevent unwanted overt motor activation during action observation. On 6/7/20 3:31 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > What's interesting to me is the extent to which one *simulates* actual talking when sitting quietly formulating thoughts. It's often less about *what* you want to say and more about how you want to say it to this audience. When Bob and I are talking, it feels like I have little simulations running inside me like Could I say it this way? Could I say it that way? Will that work with Bob? Etc. [†] > > And if I'm right that I'm *simulating* talking as I prepare to talk, then the only distinguishable difference is which motor functions are engaged when simulating vs actually talking. (Note I'm not suggesting all internal dynamics are equivalent to talking. Only that the difference between thinking "I have a cat" and saying "I have a cat" is vanishingly small, or at least not as large/distinct most people think it is.) > > [†] This is one of the reasons people who never pause to let others think and simply fill all the silence with jabber irritate me. Give me a little time to run some simulations, here! -- ☣ uǝlƃ .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
