Nick (to Jon) Re Gen Phen: That's the Whole Point, here. There are two different distinctions, here, one apparently arising form computation (?) and one arising from biology. Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid downward causation. More recently we have been talking about the GENotype/PHENotype distinction which is narrower and does - historically-forbid downward causation. So, I think we need to spell the words out completely from now on, so we know which game we are playing.
Your reference to language games raises the question of what sort of "game" are we playing when we talk about causation. One rule of that game, I think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things cannot cause things. Only events can cause events. The reason is that the notion of cause involves temporal order and things (as opposed to the arrival of things or the placement of things or the removal things) cannot be in a temporal order. I am wondering if adherence to this discipline might make the whole problem of downward causation disappear? So, the addition of the 5th stick (an event) to previous four sticks CAUSES the other 4 sticks not to rotate (an event) and CAUSES the structure to be strong (another event). Notice that this formulation appears to forbid us to say that the constraints on the rotation of the other four sticks provided by the fifth stick CAUSES the strengthening of the structure because those two events are temporally inextricable. What IS the relation between those two facts if not a causal one? I think I would argue that it's a constitutive relation; ie, the rotational constraints constitute the greater strength of the square with the fifth stick. Nick [email protected] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ Jon to Nick -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 11:07 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM Maybe I am misremembering (which clearly happens), but didn't the discussion of gen-phen-like maps arise in the context of goal-function distinctions? In this latter class, we included the thermostat system where constraining systems to Weismann's doctrine would not be meaningful. Clearly, in the goal-function system, an individual that changes the thermostat dial because they prefer the house to be at 60 degrees rather than 80 degrees (a variation on function) performs downwardly to affect the tolerance of the piece of metal or mercury switch (a variation on goal). Are we breaking the semantic game by now demanding that our admissable gen-phen-like maps preserve Weismann's doctrine? I understood Glen's evocation to not be so constrained. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
