Nick, Let's say I have a language designed to work with sticks, where for instance, it makes sense to name certain relations *Triangle*. Additionally, let's assume that the language is detailed enough to include less obvious relations such as those which relate sticks to trees to soil and water. Would it be cheap to narrowly define *downward causation* as the manipulation of the world in accordance with this language to produce new sticks?
Consider as another example when one manipulates charge in bulk using analog filters. Here, a circuit designer may not need to know about spin or superposition or a lot of other details about the universe. In fact, the designer may not know how to write a "mid-frequency ranged filter" if they were only given a quantum mechanical view of the world. They may, however, know how to build such a filter if they are given appropriately shaped conductive surfaces and coils. My apologies in advance if this characterization (that of reducing *downward causation* to manipulation of a domain-specific language) is horribly flawed, but I spent this much time writing a response. So, there. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
