Agency is not the referent. I'm arguing that it's the perception of agency
that's being pointed to by "free will". I forget where this point was made,
now. But somewhere in this thread someone posted an article that pointed out
"good" behavior increased when subjects were primed to believe they had free
will. And "bad" behavior was more prevalent when they were primed to doubt free
will. The important part, though, was the idea that imputation of free will
onto others (aka empathy) was not necessarily beneficial. It may be good for us
to believe in our own free will, but to doubt others' free will.
So, the operative objective function is one's own sense of one's own self.
That's the target.
Until we can measure the analog (robot/computer) in the same way we can measure
the referent (people), e.g. by asking them whether they feel they have free
will, we'll be comparing apples to oranges.
On 4/5/21 8:43 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Glen writes:
>
> "Instantiating artifacts that exhibit the markers for an interoceptive sense
> of agency ("free will") is obviously difficult."
>
> I don't see how agency itself is particularly hard. Some executive process
> needs to model and predict an environment, and it needs to interact with that
> environment. Is it hard in a way different from making an adaptable robot?
> Waymo, Tesla, and others are doing this.
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